Tuesday, September 24, 2013

Justice Ministry to Silence Lawyers with New Confidentiality Rules

China University of Political Science and Law Professor Wang Jianxun. Photo credit: sohu.com

Months before China’s highest court and prosecutor prescribed imprisonment for online posts that got too popular, the Ministry of Justice introduced information controls in draft regulations targeting criminal defense lawyers. Circulated to province-level judicial administration departments earlier this summer, the rules were met with criticism from those in the legal profession.

Defense lawyers voiced concern that certain provisions would impose upon them absolute obligations to keep various case details confidential. Compared with the Supreme People’s Court’s judicial interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law that barred the use of social media in the courtroom, the Ministry of Justice rules go further. While the judicial interpretation only covers the conduct of lawyers inside the courtroom and, specifically, their ability to reveal trial proceedings, the rules impose limitations on things like sharing case information with the relatives of defendants or accessing or reproducing court records. As the body mandated with the supervision of lawyers, the ministry also has more direct weapons (e.g., the approval of lawyer licenses) to use as punishment against those who fail to abide by its rules.

The main concern, explains China University of Political Science and Law Professor Wang Jianxun, is that the rules are aimed at preventing defense lawyers from using the media and the Internet to raise public awareness about individual cases that may become miscarriages of justice.

In recent years, Chinese lawyers have increasingly made public details of ongoing criminal cases involving procedural irregularities or other types of injustice. There is a perception among some, however, that such mobilization of public opinion interferes with courts’ ability to adjudicate cases independently and ought to be curbed in an effort to promote rule of law.

But as Professor Wang notes, in an article published by Caijing (translated below), the Chinese judicial system is plagued by insufficient transparency and imperfect attention to procedural rights. Moreover, “coordination” between judicial and law-enforcement bodies under the party’s guidance limits, rather than promotes, judicial independence. Under these circumstances, publicity and public opinion offers an important channel through which courts, prosecutors, and police may be held accountable for their actions in the criminal process. Imposing an absolute ban on revealing case details would further limit lawyers’ ability to defend their clients and could potentially result in sanctions for those lawyers who violate these provisions.

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Lawyers’ Defense Rights and the “Cutthroat” Bill

Wang Jianxun
Caijing, July 29, 2013

In the wake of the promulgation of rules related to the new Criminal Procedure Law by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has also drafted a consultation version of Regulations on Several Issues Concerning Criminal Defense by Lawyers, regulations specifically aimed at regulating the criminal defense activities of lawyers. These regulations concern issues related to the appointment of criminal defense lawyers and their abilities to meet with clients, read case files, and carry out defense work. Many provisions tend toward restriction of lawyers’ defense rights, among which a widely criticized one is the requirement that lawyers keep case information confidential.

According to Articles 18, 27, and 42 of these regulations, defense lawyers must not leak notes, audio recordings, video recordings, or photographs to relatives of criminal suspects or defendants or use case-file documents or notes or audio- or video recordings made during the trial for purposes other than defense in that case. Also, any audio- or video recording of the trial or requests to view or reproduce audio- or video recordings of the trial made by the people’s court must first get the court’s approval.

What do these provisions mean, ultimately? Will they constrict the already narrow space available for criminal defense even further? How will lawyers’ criminal defense rights be protected?

There’s no doubt that criminal cases are special, and it’s understandable that lawyers’ activities in criminal litigation be subject to certain regulation and restriction. But the problem is that restrictions on lawyers’ activities ought to be premised on protecting their rights to engage in defense and motivated by protecting the rights of criminal suspects and defendants. After all, the entire system of criminal defense was set up to protect the rights of these persons, and to protect the rights of lawyers to engage in defense is also to protect the rights of suspects and defendants.

In this respect, there is nothing improper about requiring criminal defense lawyers to fulfill certain confidentiality obligations, but complete or unconditional requirements that lawyers keep case information secret are inappropriate.

If in certain special instances secrecy does not benefit a lawyer’s exercise of defense rights or benefit protection of the rights of a criminal suspect or defendant, then there is no reason to require the lawyer to fulfill this kind of confidentiality obligation. For example, the MOJ regulations bar defense lawyers from leaking notes, audio recordings, video recordings, or photographs to relatives of criminal suspects or defendants. Does this mean that defense lawyers may not report information about the case or give a progress report to those relatives? If those things are prohibited, how are they supposed to coordinate on behalf of defending the suspect or defendant?

As another example, the MOJ regulations also bar lawyers from using case documents or notes or audio- or video recordings of the trial for purposes other than defense in the case at hand. This provision is intended to prevent lawyers from revealing information about cases to outsiders.

The question is: what is the legal basis for this sort of prohibition? If a defendant’s confession is coerced through torture, can’t a lawyer notify relatives of audio or videotapes or make them public? And how does one define “other purposes”? Does discussing details of the case with relatives of a suspect or defendant count as “other purposes”? Does being interviewed about a trial count as “other purposes”? Does publicizing details of the trial online count as “other purposes”?

There is widespread concern among lawyers that these provisions barring defense lawyers from revealing case details will in fact block them from using the media and public opinion to prevent miscarriages of justice. In a society where rule of law is imperfect and the judicial process is not independent, there is already limited space for criminal defense. The rights of lawyers to engage in criminal defense work are unable to receive effective protection, and the rights of criminal suspects and defendants are often violated. For proof, just look at the frequent occurrence of miscarriages of justice and the jailing of some criminal defense lawyers.

If one says that the confidentiality responsibility of lawyers in societies with rule of law does not worry people because of procedural justice, then in a society with imperfect rule of law this kind of confidentiality responsibility has the possibility to deny a wrongly accused criminal suspect or defendant their final hope of obtaining justice.

In fact, when we look at the level of practice, in a society where the judicial process is not independent and procedural justice is not made manifest, the act of a lawyer revealing case details will often enable an unfair case to turn itself around and either prevent or remedy a case of injustice due to false evidence or errors in the law.

Cases like the “Beihai Case” in Guangxi or the “Xiaohe Case” in Guiyang were able to benefit to a considerable degree from timely publicity of case information by defense lawyers in order to avoid an even greater degree of judicial unfairness. As everyone knows, one of the chronic problems of the criminal process is insufficient openness and transparency. Even though trials and verdicts are supposed to be public according to the law, in practice both are regularly done in a non-open manner—especially those so-called sensitive or major and important cases. The court often makes excuses for refusing to try a case in public, whether it’s through the excuse that all observer permits have been distributed already, deliberately holding the trial in a small courtroom, or even making it impossible for the defendant’s relatives to observe.

In essence, these kinds of trials are secret trials, and not only do secret trials violate the law, they are also unfair. Even worse, in many criminal cases, defendants and their relatives don’t even get copies of the verdicts.

In this kind of situation with no open trials or verdicts, what is the crime in a defense lawyer making details of the case public? Otherwise, would there be any openness to speak of in the entire criminal process? Without openness, how can the fairness of the judicial process be guaranteed?

One of the signs of humanity’s becoming more civilized is the shift from secret trials to public trials and the shift from secret decisions to public decisions. Where there are secret trials and secret decisions, there is no reason to bar lawyers from revealing case details; otherwise, it’s unavoidable that defendants’ rights will get trampled upon.

Then if you permit lawyers to reveal case details as they please—especially in those cases that have not yet been tried—what do you do when these actions have negative consequences for adjudication or even judicial independence? Frankly speaking, this sort of worry is not without merit because public opinion has the potential to be a double-edged sword.

However, the way to go about resolving this problem is not to bar lawyers from revealing case details, which could possibly make it so that these cases of injustice have no remedy. Rather, the solution is to establish judicial independence in an institutional way and realize the procedural justice of the Criminal Procedure Law.

Were the judicial process to truly achieve independence, then even if a lawyer reveals details of a case or public opinion exerts pressure on the judicial process the judicial process would be able to handle it calmly, stand firm, and carry on. It thus wouldn’t have to worry about the improper influence of public opinion or the media.

Only a judicial system that is not independent will be vulnerable in the face of public opinion and [state] power.

The author is an assistant professor at China University of Political Science and Law.

Tuesday, September 17, 2013

Veteran Rights Activists and the Quantification of Dissent


The 2011 verdict against Chen Wei (left) quantifies the influence of his "incitement" with page views.

A new judicial interpretation defines the number of hits and reposts necessary for online information to be classified as “serious” slander, but counting page views existed in the judicial equation at least as far back as 2009. In December of that year the Beijing Municipality No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Liu Xiaobo to 11 years in prison for inciting subversion.

In the verdict against him, translated by Human Rights in China, the Beijing court listed the number of links, repostings, and/or hits for seven articles he had written or co-authored. The majority had fewer than 800 hits—most far fewer—but one of them was said to have a total of more than 5,000 hits: Charter 08, a political manifesto calling for multi-party government.

The judicial interpretation, issued by the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate earlier this month, lists the accrual of at least 5,000 hits or 500 reposts for a single item as “serious circumstances” for cases involving online defamation. The judicial interpretation applies to crimes of defamation, causing a serious disturbance, extortion, and illegal business activity, but not to inciting subversion.

In 2011, at least five men were given lengthy prison sentences for “serious” cases of inciting subversion in which their verdicts quantified the reach of the essays they had authored. Both Chen Wei and Liu Xianbin (March 2011 verdict) were sentenced by the Suining Intermediate People’s Court in Sichuan Province, while Chen Xi (December 2011 verdict) was sentenced by the Guiyang Intermediate People’s Court in Guizhou Province. Writers Lü Jiaping and Jin Andi were sentenced 10 years and 8 years, respectively, for writing articles accusing a former leader of ceding northeast territories to Russia.

In the criminal verdict against Chen Wei (translated below from a posting by Chinese Human Rights Defenders), the Suining court classifies his crime as serious, reasoning that he “published many articles on the Internet [that] had a strong instigatory nature, and their scope of influence was great.” In demonstrating the influence of the articles, the verdict notes that 11 items published on overseas websites by Chen Wei had been linked to by a total of 37 web pages and received 8,524 hits. The verdict states repeatedly that the articles he wrote spread “rumors and slander.”

If linking to articles is proxy for re-posting, Chen’s essays—shared by just 37 web pages—didn’t come close to the threshold introduced this year. If averaged over 11 items, his page views also fell far below the mark, averaging 775 views per article.

But back then, there was no benchmark. And, of course, the number of times information is viewed does not alone determine the severity of exposure. Influence and social context are important. Like Liu Xiaobo, by the time of their latest court hearings, Chen Wei, Liu Xianbin, and Chen Xi were all veteran rights activists with an aptitude for organizing and speaking their minds. Chen Wei and Chen Xi (no relation) were detained in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution—an uprising that was supposed to have been modeled on the popular uprisings of the “Arab Spring,” but never happened.

In 2013, as the crackdown on activists like Xu Zhiyong unfolds around the New Citizen’s Movement, will the numerical guidelines for “rumors and slander” become the yardstick for quantifying dissent?

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Suining Intermediate People’s Court of Sichuan
Criminal Verdict

(2011) Sui. Int. Crim First No. 00054

The prosecuting organ is the Suining People’s Procuratorate of Sichuan.

Defendant Chen Wei, male, born February 21, 1969, in Suining, Sichuan, Han ethnicity, attended university, unemployed, place of household residence at [redacted by translator], Suining, Sichuan, resides at [redacted by translator], Suining, Sichuan. In December 1994, he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, with subsequent deprivation of political rights for two years, for the crime of counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement. He was released from prison at the end of his sentence on May 28, 1997. On February 21, 2011, he was placed under criminal detention on suspicion of inciting subversion and formally arrested on March 28 of that year. He is currently being detained in the Suining Detention Center.

Defense counsel is Zheng Jianwei, attorney with the Chongqing Kangshi Law Firm.

Defense counsel is Liang Xiaojun, attorney with the Beijing Daoheng Law Firm.

On November 25, 2011, the Suining People’s Procuratorate filed indictment Sui. Proc. Indict. (2011) No. 42 with this court, charging defendant Chen Wei with inciting subversion. This court formed a collegiate bench in accordance with the law and held a hearing in open court to try this case. The Suining People’s Procuratorate appointed prosecutor Li Hongzhi and associate prosecutor Li Qin to appear in court on behalf of the prosecution. Defendant Chen Wei and his defense counsel Zheng Jianwei and Liang Xiaojun appeared in court to participate in the proceedings. The trial has now concluded.

The Suining People’s Procuratorate alleged that: Between March 2009 and January 2011, defendant Chen Wei used the Internet to publish “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy” and other articles that he had written on overseas websites such as minzhuzhongguo.org, Human Rights in China, and yibaochina.com, spreading rumors and slander [such as] “the people have been deprived of their [freedoms of] thought and belief” and “the Chinese Communist Party uses the machinery of violence to control the people” and inciting “the death knell has tolled for one-party dictatorship” and “[we] must change this system.” His articles were widely linked to, reposted, and viewed, [causing] an extremely bad influence. In court, the prosecution produced evidence including a crime scene inspection record, an inspection work record of electronic evidence, expert verifications, witness testimony, and the defendant’s confession. The prosecution maintains that defendant Chen Wei’s actions constitute the crime of inciting subversion, falling under the category of a serious offense, and it requests that the people’s court issue a verdict in accordance with the law.

Defendant Chen Wei and his defense counsel argue in defense that Chen Wei did not have the intention to incite subversion of state power and what he published were all theoretical articles that did not contain rumors or slander. [They further argue that] his views fall within the scope of a citizen’s freedom of speech and do not constitute the crime of inciting subversion and that he is not a repeat offender.

In the course of the trial it was ascertained that: Between March 2009 and January 2011, defendant Chen Wei used the Internet to publish “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy,” “The Growth of Civil Opposition is a Crucial Factor in China’s Democratization,” “The Harmony Trap and the Absence of Fairness,” “Reflections on a Hunger Strike on Human Rights Day” and other articles that he had written on overseas websites such as minzhuzhongguo.org, Human Rights in China, and yibaochina.com, spreading rumors and slander [such as] “the people have been deprived of their [freedoms of] thought and belief,” “the Chinese Communist Party uses the machinery of violence to control the people,” “[they] are the enemies of democracy,” and “everyone realizes the Chinese Communists’ anti-human nature” and inciting “the death knell has tolled for one-party dictatorship,” “use street-level opposition to promote civic politics,” and “[we] must change this system.” His articles were widely linked to, reposted, and viewed, [causing] an extremely bad influence.

The aforementioned facts are confirmed by the following evidence, which was cross-examined and confirmed in court:

1. A record of receiving a criminal case, case-filing decision, case-solution report, and report of custody, confirming the source of the case and details about the investigation and manner in which Chen Wei was taken into custody.

2. A search warrant, search record, inventory of seized items, a record of crime-scene inspection, and crime-scene photographs, confirming that the investigating organ seized two laptop computers, a portable hard drive, and some train tickets from Chen Wei’s residence in accordance with the law.

3. Inspection work records of electronic evidence from the Suining Public Security Bureau—Sui. PSB (Int. Sec.) Inspect [2011] No. 011 Inspection Work Record of Electronic Evidence, Sui. PSB (Int. Sec.) Inspect [2011] No. 012 Inspection Work Record of Electronic Evidence, Sui. PSB (Int. Sec.) Inspect [2011] No. 013 Remote Inspection Record, and Sui. PSB (Int. Sec.) Inspect [2011] No. 010 Letter and Reply Regarding Assistance with Inspection of Relevant Data—confirming that “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy,” “Reflections on a Hunger Strike on Human Rights Day,” “The Harmony Trap and the Absence of Fairness,” and other articles were discovered on the hard drive of the laptop computer seized from Chen Wei’s residence. Through remote inspection it was determined that as of February 25, 2011, 11 articles published by Chen Wei on overseas websites like minzhuzhongguo.org, Human Rights in China, and yibaochina.com had been linked to by a total of 37 web pages and received 8,524 hits.

4. A forensic verification report (BNIA For. Ctr [2011] Verif. No. 12) and sample use explanation from the Beijing Network Industry Association Electronic Data Forensic Report Center, confirming that on the hard drive implicated in the Chen Wei case were discovered “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy,” “Reflections on a Hunger Strike on Human Rights Day,” “The Harmony Trap and the Absence of Fairness,” and other articles written by Chen Wei and a record of the use of his registered Skype account to upload articles that he wrote point-to-point overseas.

5. Hard copies of “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy,” “The Growth of Civil Opposition is a Crucial Factor in China’s Democratization,” “The Harmony Trap and the Absence of Fairness,” “Reflections on a Hunger Strike on Human Rights Day,” and other articles published on the Internet, identified with a signature by Chen Wei as articles published by him, confirming that Chen Wei published instigatory articles on the Internet, spreading rumors and slander [such as] “the people have been deprived of their [freedoms of] thought and belief,” “the Chinese Communist Party uses the machinery of violence to control the people,” “[they] are the enemies of democracy,” and “everyone realizes the Chinese Communists’ anti-human nature” and inciting “the death knell has tolled for one-party dictatorship,” “use street-level opposition to promote civic politics,” and “[we] must change this system.”

6. A criminal verdict from the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court, criminal decision from the Beijing High People’s Court, and certificate of release from the Sichuan Province Chuanzhong Prison, confirming that on December 16, 1994, the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Chen Wei to five years’ imprisonment, with subsequent deprivation of political rights for two years, for the crime of counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement. He was released at the completion of his sentence on May 28, 1997.

7. Household registration documents, confirming Chen Wei’s personal identity information.

8. Witness testimony from Wang Xiaoyan (Chen Wei’s wife), Wang Lanfang (Chen Wei’s sister-in-law), Tang Jianlin (Chen Wei’s brother-in-law), Wang Lanying (Chen Wei’s sister-in-law), confirming that Chen Wei and his wife and Wang Lanfang and her husband [Tang Jianlin] reside together at [address redacted by translator], Suining. None of them have relatives living overseas. The documents “List of Sichuan Democracy Movement Activists” and “Activist Liu Xianbin” were not saved by them on the hard drive of the Founder laptop computer or Samsung portable hard drive seized in this case, and they did not publish articles on the Internet under Chen Wei’s name. Chen Wei had Wang Xiaoyan, Wang Lanfang, Tang Jianlin, and Wang Lanying settle overseas wire payments at the bank.

9. Testimony of witnesses Chen Wei [陈伟], Yin Xia, and Yu Yuebo, confirming that they had each read articles written by Chen Wei on websites like minzhuzhongguo.org.

10. Confession of defendant Chen Wei, confirming that he had written “Systemic Illness and the Medication of Constitutionalism and Democracy,” “The Growth of Civil Opposition is a Crucial Factor in China’s Democratization,” “The Harmony Trap and the Absence of Fairness,” “Reflections on a Hunger Strike on Human Rights Day,” and other articles published on overseas websites such as minzhuzhongguo.org, Human Rights in China, and yibaochina.com.

This court finds that defendant Chen Wei wrote and published on the Internet articles that used rumors and slander to incite subversion of state power and overthrow of the socialist system and that his actions constitute the crime of inciting subversion. Chen Wei published many articles on the Internet, [these articles] had a strong instigatory nature, and their scope of influence was great; therefore, his crimes are categorized as serious. Chen Wei was previously convicted of a crime of endangering state security and, after the completion of that sentence, he again committed a crime of endangering state security; therefore, he is a repeat offender and ought to receive heavier punishment in accordance with the law. Chen Wei and his defense counsel claim that the articles he published fall within the scope of a citizen’s right to free speech, that he neither had the subjective intention nor committed the objective acts of inciting subversion of state power, and that his acts [therefore] do not constitute a criminal offense. Upon review, [this court finds that] Chen Wei published numerous articles on the Internet that used rumors and slander in a goal of inciting subversion of state power and overthrow of the socialist system; therefore, his actions do not fall within the scope of a citizen’s right to free speech. He seriously damaged the interests and security of the state; therefore, his defense arguments and justifications are not tenable and this court does not accept them. Chen Wei and his defense counsel claim that he is not a repeat offender. Upon review, [this court finds that] Chen Wei was previously convicted of counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement and, after the completion of that sentence, he again committed the crime of inciting subversion. These crimes both fall under the category of crimes of endangering state security; therefore, he is a repeat offender and his defense arguments and justifications are not tenable and this court does not accept them. In conclusion, the facts of the prosecution’s charges are clear, the evidence is reliable and sufficient, and the charged offense is valid; this court therefore supports [the prosecution’s charges]. In accordance with Articles 105(2), 55(1), 56(1), 66, and 64 of the Criminal Law of the PRC, [this court] rules as follows:

I. For the crime of inciting subversion, defendant Chen Wei is sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, with subsequent deprivation of political rights for two years.

(The prison term is to be calculated from the day the verdict is implemented, with each day spent in detention prior to the verdict’s implementation to count as one day of the prison term; therefore, it will run from February 21, 2011, to February 20, 2020.)

II. Items that were used in the crimes in this case shall be confiscated.

If this verdict is not accepted, an appeal may be filed within 10 days of the second day following the receipt of this verdict, either to this court or directly to the Sichuan High People’s Court. In the case of a written appeal, the original appellate petition must be submitted together with two copies.

   

Presiding Judge: Liu Zebin
Judicial Officer: Wei Xiao
Judicial Officer: Deng Gang

 

December 23, 2011

 

Court Clerk: Quan Liguo

Wednesday, September 11, 2013

Important (Political, “Cult”) Prisoners: Identify & Manage


Important prisoners, like Gao Zhisheng, are required to be imprisoned far from home. Xinjiang Shaya Prison. Photo credit: rfa.org

In February 1995, John Kamm, an independent human rights activist and now executive director of The Dui Hua Foundation, met with representatives of the State Council Information Office and Ministry of Justice (MOJ) in Beijing. Agreement was reached that the MOJ would provide information on prisoners in response to 100 requests Kamm would make that year.

Two months later, in April 1995, the ministry’s Prison Administration Bureau released a “Notice on Establishing a Reporting System for Important Prisoners.” The notice was to “strengthen supervision over important prisoners . . . and coordinate with the international struggle over human rights.” It spelled out eight categories of important prisoners—chiefly people serving sentences for political crimes—and laid out what information should be reported in the registration and management of such prisoners. Among other things, the notice requires prison authorities to report to prison administration bureaus (PAB): “the circumstances of important prisoners whose sentences have been extended or reduced, who have been released on probation or medical parole, or who have been released upon completion of their sentences.”

The information necessary to register important prisoners is largely the same information that China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides in responses to requests for information from foreign countries engaging with it in bilateral human rights dialogues. It is likely that the information in the registration form provides the basis for these responses.

Although the MOJ has not released a comprehensive revision of the 1995 notice, central and provincial PABs have modified and expanded it. Thus, Shanghai’s Prisoner Visitation Management Rules (2010) require, in Article 7, approval from the municipal PAB’s prison political management office for an important prisoner to receive more than one family visit a month; Jiangsu Prisons Detailed Implementation Rules on Work Procedures for Applying for Sentence Reduction and Parole (2011) require, in Article 18, that sentence reduction and parole for important prisoners must be approved by the provincial PAB before being sent to a court; and Detailed Rules for Law Enforcement Evaluation of Weihai [Shandong] Prison Police (2006) spell out, in Article 5.3, demerits for prison police who fail to report sentence reductions or paroles for important prisoners to the provincial PAB’s prison political management office.

Perhaps the most detailed update of the 1995 notice is to be found in Jianyu Gongzuo Shiwu, published by China Legal Publishing House in 2011. A section of the book (translated below) lists 10 new classes of important prisoners—Falun Gong and “cult” practitioners top the list—and provides directions for how important prisoners are to be managed. Isolation appears to be key: important prisoners are not to be incarcerated in the same place as their household registration (hukou) or residence, accomplices of important prisoners are generally not to be incarcerated in the same prison as the important prisoner, and visitors of important prisoners other than family members must be approved by the PAB’s public security office. Regulations for the treatment of important prisoners may explain why Gao Zhisheng is incarcerated in Shaya Prison—500 miles from Urumqi, the place of his hukou. Another example of an important prisoner incarcerated far from his hukou is Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo. Liu is serving his sentence in Jinzhou Prison, a day's travel by train from Dalian, his hukou.

The most significant modification to the 1995 notice is the requirement that, after being reviewed by the warden’s office, sentence reductions and paroles for important prisoners must be reported to the PAB’s penalty execution office and reviewed and consented to by the PAB’s sentence reduction, parole, and medical parole approval committee before their submission to a court for final approval. This rule effectively adds two layers to the approval process for sentence reduction and parole for important prisoners, and helps explain why, in recent years, relatively few sentence reductions and paroles of prisoners serving sentences for endangering state security have taken place.

Although the Jianyu Gongzuo Shiwu mentions only two extra layers of approval, there is probably at least one more for especially sensitive cases. In a video interview given by Chen Guangcheng in January 2010, the blind activist recounts how the prison where he was incarcerated applied to the provincial PAB to grant him a six-month sentence reduction after he had earned enough points for an 18-month reduction. Rather than acting on the application, the bureau sent it to the Ministry of Justice in Beijing, but no action was taken and Chen served out his entire term before being released into a home teeming with police.



Important Prisoners: click to expand

Important prisoners refer to prisoners who committed duty-related crimes, head criminals and ringleaders of organized crime syndicates, key prisoners with a certain degree of influence in the local district, and other important prisoners.

I. Criteria for routing out important prisoners. In addition to important prisoners as defined by the Ministry of Justice Prison Administration Bureau Notice on Establishing a Reporting System for Important Prisoners ([1995] MOJ PAB Doc. No. 60), the following prisoners shall be incorporated into the management of important prisoners:

  1. "Falun Gong" and other cult prisoners;
  2. Prisoners from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan who are sentenced for endangering state security crimes;
  3. Head criminals and ringleaders of organized crime syndicates;
  4. Prisoners whose cases of duty-related crimes such as graft, bribery, or malfeasance involve very large sums of money or have relatively significant influence within the entire city/municipality;
  5. Prisoners whose cases have been reported in provincial- or municipal-level newspapers and magazines, on television, or in other media and have very significant influence domestically, internationally, and within society;
  6. Prisoners whose crimes are vile in their nature or circumstances, lead to serious consequences, or are followed closely by local people or the investigation and handling of whose cases are led directly by the Politico-legal Affairs Committee of the Municipal Party Committee;
  7. Prisoners who were working in economics, finance, or other industries prior to their arrest and had relatively significant influence in their field or who seriously harm economic or financial security or disrupt the order of the market economy;
  8. Head criminals and ringleaders who participate in or create incidents of mass social conflict;
  9. Prisoners whose cases involve victims, relevant interested persons, or others who are dissatisfied with the court decision and frequently petition or report to [the authorities];
  10. Others who need to be classified as important prisoners.

II. Determination of important criminal [status]. Determination of important criminal [status] is made by [prison administration bureau (PAB)] public security office review of [cases] prisons report to it ([upon their] internal detection) or by notification from the PAB public security office. Determination work is performed by the [PAB] public security office in conjunction with its prison political management office and penalty execution office. Prisons shall fill out the “Important Prisoners Registration Form” and submit it to the [PAB] public security office within one month of taking important prisoners into custody.

...

(II) Management of Important Prisoners

  1. Important prisoners who have their sentences extended, have their sentences reduced, are paroled, are released on medical parole, are released after serving out their sentences, or encounter major situations must be reported as they occur. Inquiries made by the [PAB] business department regarding the situation of important prisoners must be handled quickly and reported accurately.
  2. Important prisoners shall not be incarcerated in prisons that are in the same locality as their place of household registration, residence, or crime. Important prisoners who are accomplices to the same crime shall generally be incarcerated in different prisons. Where accomplices are numerous to the extent that they are incarcerated in the same prison, they shall be incarcerated in different prison blocks.
  3. Visits between important prisoners and people other than their relatives or guardians must be approved by the PAB public security office. Head criminals and ringleaders of organized crime syndicates and prisoners from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan sentenced for endangering state security crimes are generally not allowed to be visited by people other than their relatives or guardians.
  4. Sentence reductions and paroles of important prisoners must be reviewed at a meeting of the warden’s office; reported to the PAB penalty execution office; and reviewed and consented to by the PAB sentence reduction, parole, and medical parole approval committee before their submission to a court for deliberation.

Chinese Source(原文):
王志亮 [Wang Zhiliang], 监狱工作实务 [Jianyu Gongzuo Shiwu] (北京 [Beijing]: 中国法制出版社 [China Legal Publishing House], 2011), 140‒142
Click on icon to expand


重要罪犯。重要罪犯是指职务犯、黑社会性质组织犯罪主犯和首要分子、本地区有一定影响的罪犯中的重点对象以及其他重要罪犯。

1. 重要罪犯的排摸条件。除司法部监狱管理局《关于建立重要罪犯报告制度的通知)([1995J 司狱字第60 号文)规定的重要罪犯外,以下罪犯纳入重要罪犯管理。

  1. "法轮功"及其他邪教罪犯;
  2. 以危害国家安全罪判刑的港澳台罪犯;
  3. 黑社会性质组织犯罪的主犯和首要分子;
  4. 贪污贿赂、渎职等职务犯罪中案值数额巨大,或案件在全市有较大影响的罪犯;
  5. 省市级以上报刊电视等媒体曾予报道、并在国内外或社会上有重大影响的案件中的罪犯;
  6. 犯罪性质、情节恶劣、后果严重、当地群众非常关注或市委政法委直接领导侦办案件的罪犯;
  7. 捕前从事经济、金融等行业并在行业中有较大影响的罪犯,或严重危害经济、金融安全,扰乱市场经济秩序的罪犯;
  8. 参与、制造社会群体性矛盾事件的主犯和首要分子;
  9. 案件被害人或相关利害人等对判决不满、经常上访、举强的案件中的罪犯;
  10. 其他需要被列为重要罪犯的。

2. 重要罪犯的确定。重要罪犯由监狱上报经局公安处(狱内侦查)审核确定或由局公安处通知确定。确定工作由局公安处会同狱政管理处、刑罚执行处进行。监狱应在收押重要罪犯后1 个月内填报《重要罪犯登记表),报局公安处。

......

(二)重要罪犯的管理

  1. 重要罪犯被加刑、减刑、假释、保外就医、刑满释放以及遇到重要情况要随时上报。对局业务部门要求查询的重要罪犯情况,要迅速、准确地核查上报。
  2. 重要罪犯不得关押于同其户籍地、居住地或犯罪地为同一区域的监狱。同一团伙的重要罪犯一般应当分别关押不同监狱,因团伙人数较多关押在同一监狱的,应分别关押在不同监区。
  3. 重要罪犯会见亲属或监护人以外的其他人员,须报局公安处批准。其中黑社会性质组织的主犯和首要分子,以危害国家安全罪判刑的港澳台罪犯,一般不得会见亲属或监护人以外的其他人员。
  4. 重要罪犯的减刑、假释,经监狱长办公会议审核,报局刑罚执行处,经局减刑、假释、保外就医评审委员会审核同意后,再提请法院裁定。

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