Patriotic Acts as Cause for Non-Prosecution

Changle government building. Image credit: Google images 

Chinese prosecutors have the discretion not to indict an accused when the evidence is insufficient or when his/her perceived threat to society is minimal. However, these are not necessarily the most important reasons. Dui Hua’s research found that criminal suspects deemed patriotic can also avoid prosecution in mainland China. 

China’s long-time conviction rate of over 99.9 percent often overshadows the judicial progress it has made in other areas. While the acquittal rate dipped to its lowest point at 0.052 percent in 2021, Chinese prosecutors have approved fewer arrests and indicted fewer suspects in recent years. Statistics released by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate in March 2022 indicated that the country’s non-prosecution rate increased from 9.9 percent in 2019 to 16.6 percent in 2021. 

Non-prosecution embodies the lenient aspect of China’s largely punitive criminal justice system. Among the major beneficiaries of non-prosecution are juvenile delinquents, the elderly, severely ill, first-time offenders, and pregnant and breastfeeding women. Prosecutors can also exercise discretion and choose to not indict suspects if they have made “major contributions to the state or society” or performed “meritorious deeds.” Existing laws and regulations leave undefined what acts are considered “major contributions,” but the following case Dui Hua discovered concerning a Hong Kong “patriot” provides insight into this term. 

On October 21, 2019, the Public Security Bureau of Changle District, Fuzhou, decided not to prosecute a Hong Kong resident surnamed Chan. The bureau carried out criminal detention in December 2013 and listed Chan as a wanted criminal online on June 18, 2014. Chan was suspected of “organizing an illegal border crossing,” for allegedly forging identity documents for a group of 11 Chinese nationals in their applications for tourist visas at the US Consulate in Guangzhou. Their application was unsuccessful because the documents were found to be counterfeit by the consulate staffers. 

Chan flew back to Fuzhou from Hong Kong and turned himself in on October 14, 2019, six years after his alleged offense took place. That same day, Chan was released on bail pending further investigation. About a week later, the procuratorate issued a non-prosecution decision, citing the various patriotic acts he had performed in Hong Kong. 

Fuzhou Changle International Airport. Chan flew here from Hong Kong before turning himself in, six years after his alleged crime. Image credit: Fuzhou Changle International Airport 

First among these acts, Chan served as the then-incumbent executive vice president of the Hong Kong Family Union (New Territories West Branch), a pro-China non-governmental organization which helps mainland residents to emigrate to Hong Kong. During his tenure, Chan allegedly organized and participated in multiple activities to promote love for the motherland and Hong Kong. Chan was given credit for carrying out stability maintenance and secret investigation work for the Hong Kong Liaison Office during “Occupy Central,” the civil disobedience movement which paralyzed parts of Hong Kong for 79 days in late 2014.  

On October 13, 2014, protestors camp out in the streets of Hong Kong as part of the Occupy Central movement. Image credit: L-BBE / CC BY 3.0 

Furthermore, Chan was commended for performing security work for the official celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover to Chinese rule in 2017, the only year Xi Jinping attended the handover celebrations in the former British colony as Chinese president, as of this writing. More notably, Chan was cited for his “fearless” and “tenacious struggle” against the “radical opposition forces” during the recent 2019 protests, as well as his unified actions in supporting the Hong Kong government. The decision not to prosecute Chan came as Hong Kong protesters fought citywide pitched battles with police in an eruption of public anger against an already suspended extradition bill that critics saw as a fundamental threat to the former British colony’s civic freedoms and rule of law. 

Prosecutors also outlined other reasons for not indicting Chan, but the arguments are not without flaws. For example, one reason for not indicting Chan is because he turned himself in even though he did so six years after the public security bureau carried out criminal detention. Additionally, it was argued that the seriousness of Chan’s crime was mitigated because his attempt to organize illegal crossings failed. Chan did not complete the crime; he only attempted to commit it, argued the prosecutors. Even with this reasoning, it is unclear why the prosecutors did not charge Chan with forgery, covered by Article 280 of the Criminal Law, since the non-prosecution decision found that Chan did indeed forge identity documents for 11 Chinese nationals. 

The crime of organizing illegal border crossings is known to incur serious penalties. Dui Hua previously reported that the crime resulted in Korean missionary Cho Young-joo getting a seven-year prison sentence. Cho was not given lenient punishment for the humanitarian mission he conducted across the Yunnan-Myanmar border. Prominent house church leader Cao Sanqiang (曹三强) has more than a year to serve before completing his seven-year prison sentence in Yunnan for the same crime. Also convicted of the same crime are two Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protesters who attempted to flee to Taiwan by speedboat but were intercepted by mainland coastguards in August 2020. The duo is still serving their sentences in Guangdong. 

Map showing the route (in green) from Kunming to Jinghong, from where Cho intended to travel to Mongla. Source: Gaode Map 

The treatment given to Chan was vastly different to that of Cho, Cao, and two of the Hong Kong 12, despite all of them being accused of organizing illegal border crossings. Chan’s preferential treatment calls into question whether “patriots” enjoy impunity for the criminal offenses they committed in mainland China. This raises speculation that Chan is not the only case of prosecutors dropping criminal charges against the so-called “patriots” because of meritorious services rendered in Hong Kong, China, or elsewhere. 

Crimes of Extremism, Part II: Harsh Sentences, Low Transparency in Xinjiang

A Chinese propaganda poster denouncing extremism. In 2018, the poster went viral after a social media user noticed that one of the poster’s images condemning Islamic facial hair featured actor Keanu Reeves, who does not identify as Muslim. Image credit: Reddit via Taiwan News 

Read Part I here.

Although ethnic minorities make up the majority of the extremism cases, there is a dearth of publicly available information about them, particularly those of the Islamic faith. Court judgments and judicial decisions like this in Xinjiang are deemed to be highly sensitive; they were almost never posted online even before the purge on China Judgements Online started in June 2021. Overseas news media sources have reported on a few cases, but it is impossible to grasp the whole picture due to the tight control on information flows in the region. In most cases, media reports did not explicitly state which specific extremism crimes were invoked.   

Radio Free Asia (RFA) is among the overseas news media groups which have occasionally covered extremism cases over the years. In September 2017, a Uyghur woman named Horigul Nasir was reportedly sentenced to 10 years in prison in Kashgar, presumably for extremism because she allegedly told one of her friends that not wearing a headscarf is sinful. The allegation, however, has been disputed by her brother, who claimed that his sister does not even wear a headscarf or pray five times a day.  

In another case also reported by RFA, a Uyghur businessman named Ekber Imin is serving a 25-year prison sentence for an unspecified extremism crime alongside two of his brothers. They were reportedly convicted for having foreign contacts and spreading extremism by incorporating ethnic and religious elements in the buildings they developed.  

In March 2022, RFA reported that Abdureshid Obul died in 2020 while serving his eight-year prison sentence for an extremism crime. The Uyghur farmer was reportedly jailed for having a fourth child and relocating his pregnant wife to avoid a forced abortion. Ethnic minority families living in rural areas are limited to two children. Authorities considered Abdureshid’s violation of the family planning policy to be an act of extremism.  

(Top) Horigul Nasir’s identification card. (Bottom) A photo of Ekber Imin’s passport page. Image credits: RFA listeners via RFA 

The harsh punishments given to the aforementioned Uyghurs are by no means isolated incidents. Dui Hua’s research into Chinese government sources found evidence of Muslim minorities receiving excessive punishment for committing extremism crimes in Xinjiang. For instance, Dui Hua discovered a case in which a Uyghur prisoner had his prison sentence extended by 15 years in July 2017 for violating Article 120(3). He was already serving his seven-year prison sentence for Article 300 “organizing or using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.” It is unclear which “cult organization” he had joined leading to his initial conviction. The court ordered him to serve a total prison sentence of 19 years and 8 months, which included the 56-month sentence for Article 300 he had yet to complete. After his prison sentence expires in 2036, he must still serve a supplemental deprivation of political rights sentence of five years. 

It would be a mistake to assume that only Uyghurs are singled out for excessive criminal punishment. An ethnic Dongxiang surnamed Chen received a 10-year prison sentence for Article 120(3) with a deprivation of political rights sentence of three years in Nilka County in July 2018. As with almost all other cases of a similar nature, there is no information about the acts that led to his harsh prison sentence. 

Two Rare Judgments 

Despite being unable to find an extremism judgment in Xinjiang, where the majority of extremism cases are tried and heavy sentences are meted out, Dui Hua found two rare judgments in other provinces. Dongxiang are among the Muslim communities who have faced restrictions in and outside of Xinjiang, but very little information is known about the crackdown on this ethnic group. The case of Ma Yinglong (马英龙) in Beijing indicates that besides growing beards, conducting regular prayer or unauthorized religious classes, or fasting for Ramadan, Islamic booksellers are another target of China’s crackdown on extremism. 

A picture of the opening ceremony of a Xinjiang re-education camp, posted online by the government in Korla, Xinjiang in June 2018. The partially obscured sign on the left reads “Transformation Through Education Center” (教育转化中心 jiàoyù zhuǎnhuà zhōngxīn). Image credit Korla government via SupChina 

Ma is a native from Xinjiang’s Yining County. He was convicted of Article 120(3) and sentenced to 13 months in prison by Beijing’s Haidian District People’s Court in September 2017. The crime stemmed from him running an Islamic bookstore which sold books about Islam and related topics. Additionally, he administered his IslamBook.net website, which offered a number of Islamic religious items including Malaysian-made hijabs and other clothing, Islamic arts and crafts, and halal food items, according to reporting from unofficial news media sources. 

The court judgment focused on one title he sold: Milestones: Ma'alim Fi'l Tariq. This book was written by Egyptian Islamic author Sayyid Qutb, who calls for the re-creation of the Muslim world on strictly Quranic grounds to counter western influence. Qutb is seen by some observers as one of the formative, leading theorists of violent jihad. Unbeknownst to Ma, the Chinese version of this book had been classified in China as an illegal publication about terrorism and extremism. Ma stated in his defense that he had not read the book; he only procured a total of six copies of Milestones at the request of his customers. The court rejected Ma’s defense because “he should have known about the extremely harmful nature of the book” considering he had many years of experience selling Islamic books. 

In another case, Dui Hua found that Uyghur businessman Erkin Balat was sentenced to 22 months in prison for Article 120(6) in Shandong. Erkin moved to Qufu from Xinjiang to start his jade business in 2007. In early 2017, he was found in possession of 50 Uyghur-language books, one Uyghur-Arabic dictionary and one Arabic-language Quran, which became evidence of him possessing articles to promote extremism. Some of the Uyghur titles touched on topics such as the history of Islam. Other evidence included two Japanese sabres and one Arabian scimitar he displayed in one of his shops. Erkin completed his prison sentence on March 8, 2021. 

Same Acts, Different Outcomes

In Part I, Dui Hua discussed how Han come into conflict with the law for extremism, including by possessing or circulating videos with scenes of violence in connection to the “East Turkestan Independence Movement,” ISIS, or the Taliban. Chinese law criminalizes such behavior regardless of ethnicity, but in practice there is a clear ethnic bias in sentencing. The same acts committed by Uyghurs or other Muslim minority groups are more likely to result in harsher criminal punishments. Precedents indicated that the same audio-visual evidence is almost certainly construed by prosecutors and judges to contain messages about “jihad” and “hijrat” (i.e. migration to another place for the sake of Allah) where the defendants practice Islam. In such cases, other crimes such as splittism, inciting splittism, and/or organizing or participating in a terrorist organization are often tacked on to the allegations of extremism.  

Screenshot from a 2019 CGTN program titled Fighting Terrorism in Xinjiang. Image credit: CGTN 

While Muslims in Western countries have been given prison sentences for viewing, disseminating, or producing films containing extremist material, these cases have typically been handled with greater transparency to hold law enforcements accountable for their decisions and ensure that their counterterrorism measures are non-arbitrary and impartial. In cases where this might not be possible, such as the CIA’s use of black sites to interrogate suspected terrorist actors or other “enemy combatants,” civil society organizations and independent journalism efforts can provide a degree of scrutiny.  

By contrast, cases in China are selectively transparent at best, as in many publicized cases of Han. The vast majority of ethnic minority cases remain shrouded in secrecy. Limited available evidence on Uyghurs and other ethnic groups suggests that the acts are more diverse, but they all resolve around the expression of Islam. Muslims are also much more likely to receive disproportionately severe sentences for the same crimes than the Han counterparts. 

Crimes of Extremism, Part I: Observations on Use and Sentencing

Screenshot from a 2019 CGTN program titled Fighting Terrorism in Xinjiang. Image credit: CGTN 

Extremism, officially defined in Chinese law as the “ideological basis of terrorism”, or more broadly, “inciting hatred, discrimination or agitating violence through distorting religious doctrines or other means, has long been integral to China’s security policy against the “three evil forces” (i.e terrorism, splittism, and religious extremism). However, it was not a precisely defined legal term until the following provisions were added in 2015 under Article 120 of the Criminal Law, “organizing, leading, and actively participating in a terrorist organization:” 

• Article 120(3): Promoting terrorism, or extremism or instigating terrorist activities;  
• Article 120(4): Using extremism to undermine implementation of the law; 
• Article 120(5): Coercing other people into wearing costumes or symbols to promote terrorism or extremism;
• Article 120(6): Illegally possessing articles to promote terrorism or extremism. 

Reporting by overseas news media sources suggests that the four new crimes are most typically invoked against Uyghurs. The crimes have been criticized by United Nations’ special rapporteurs and working groups for being overly vague with no basis in binding international legal standards. Human rights groups have also said that many of the extremism arrests are made without evidentiary basis and authorities frequently fail to respect the due process rights of detainees.  

This is the first installment in a two-part series which discusses Dui Hua’s observations on extremism, with a focus on Article 120(3) and (6). Part I discusses the extent of the crimes’ application and sentencing trends, drawing on the 2016 statistics released by the Supreme People’s Court. Individuals charged with and convicted of extremism crimes are not exclusively members of ethnic minority groups, despite their accounting for most of the cases. Extremism cases are selectively published in Chinese government sources. Those involving Han are notably well documented, and only rarely do they receive lengthy prison sentences. Part II focuses on cases involving Muslim minorities. Hefty punishments appear commonplace in Xinjiang, but information on prisoners pre- and post-sentencing is extremely limited.  

Court Statistics One Year After Expansion

According to the 12-volume Records of People’s Courts Historical Judicial Statistics: 1949-2016, China tried 1,403 extremism cases involving 2,463 defendants in 2016. Of them, 2,031, or 82 percent, were ethnic minorities. Additionally, 85 percent of the defendants were farmers. As Xinjiang has been cast as a key battlefield in the fight against extremism, it would be natural to assume that the charges are predominantly leveled against Muslim minorities.  

Table 1. Court statistics on extremism crimes for 2016

Source: Records of People’s Courts Historical Judicial Statistics: 1949-2016

Two-thirds of the defendants violated Article 120(3) “promoting terrorism, or extremism or instigating terrorist activities.” Slightly over one quarter were tried for Article 120(6) “illegally possessing articles to promote terrorism or extremism.” About five percent, or 124 people, were tried for Article 120(4) “using extremism to undermine implantation of the law.” Only 18 people were tried in 17 cases of Article 120(5) “coercing other people into wearing costumes or symbols to promote terrorism or extremism” in 2016. 

Of the four extremism crimes, Article 120(3) is most likely to result in lengthy prison sentences. Among the 1,669 people who received criminal punishment for this crime, 1,109, or 66 percent, received prison sentences of five years or more. By contrast, a much bigger portion of people who are tried for Article 120 (4), (5) and (6) received prison sentences below five years. The use of non-custodial punishment in all extremism cases was rare. Only 70 people convicted of the four extremism crimes were given suspended sentences or control (guanzhi). 

Members of China’s largest ethnic group, Han, are not immune to the crackdown on extremism. The court statistics indicated that 422, or 17 percent, of the 2,463 people tried for the new extremism crimes in 2016 were Han. Of them, 198 were tried for Article 120(3) “promoting terrorism, or extremism or instigating terrorist activities,” 172 for Article 120(6) “illegally possessing articles to promote terrorism or extremism,” 59 for Article 120(4) “using extremism to undermine implantation of the law,” and two for Article 120(5) “coercing other people into wearing costumes or symbols to promote terrorism or extremism.” 

Han Cases

Han extremism cases are easily searchable in Chinese government and media sources. Their cases rarely result in lengthy prison sentences. Dui Hua found 18 cases tried in Beijing which invoked Article 120(3) or (6) from 2017-2021. There were 19 defendants, of whom 11 were Han, one ethnic Manchu, and one Dongxiang. Ethnicity is not always specified in the judgments. None of the Han defendants in Beijing received prison sentences of more than one year, and the lengthiest sentence of two years was given to a duo whose ethnicity is not specified. 

The circumstances of the publicly disclosed extremism cases in other Han-majority provinces are almost identical: they are accused of disseminating violent and terrorist videos they downloaded from overseas websites with the use of a VPN. The videos, typically filmed in the Middle East, contain scenes of violence with prisoners of war beheaded or executed, footage of Islamic State or sometimes Taliban attacks, training, and fighting. The defendants unwittingly commit Article 120(3) when they share the videos with their friends, post them on social media, or put them in cloud storage.  

A screenshot of a 2015 tweet from Mashable on Chinese-language ISIS propaganda. Image credit: Mashable Twitter account 

Most Han defendants are not religious, and they are depicted to have been driven by curiosity to download or share the violent videos. In some cases, they are convicted for simply poking fun at terrorist organizations or figures. In December 2019, news media sources reported that a man surnamed Zhang was sentenced to nine months in prison in Beijing for Article 120(3) for sending out a six-word joke in Chinese which can be translated as “follow me and believe in Islam, join the ISIS” to a WeChat group with over 300 people. He also used a photo of Bin Laden as his profile portrait. 

A portion of Han defendants were convicted of Article 120(6) “illegally possessing articles to promote terrorism or extremism” for keeping violent footage on their personal electronic or mobile devices, despite them not having shared anything with other people. None of the Han defendants convicted of this crime in Beijing received prison sentences exceeding one year.  

Targeting Han Dissidents

While most Han defendants in extremism cases are portrayed as thrill seekers who inadvertently violate the law, precedents also show that extremism easily becomes a catch-all offense to be used in politically motivated prosecutions targeting political and religious dissenters. In such cases, prison sentences can be excessive. For instance, Huang Yunmin (黄云敏) is serving his 10-year prison sentence for Article 120(6), one of the longest prison sentences given to a Han dissenter for an extremism crime. Huang was initially detained for provoking ethnic hatred in March 2017 for accompanying farmers and ex-soldiers to Beijing to petition during the “Two Sessions.” Additionally, prosecutors accused Huang of downloading a large number of anti-China footage from overseas websites and audiovisual materials related to the July 5 Urumqi riots. Huang is scheduled for release in 2027. 

(Clockwise top left) Journalist Zhang Baocheng; Huang Yunmin, known for helping petitioners; Zhao Waikei, Xuncheng Reformed Church leader. Image credits: Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch via RFA; Asia News; WeChat via ChinaAid 

Han who express sympathy with the Uyghur cause are at heightened risk of imprisonment for extremism crimes. Zhang Baocheng (张宝成) is serving his 42-month prison sentence in Beijing for Article 120(3) and "picking quarrels and provoking trouble" until November 27, 2022. The extremism charge, which afforded him a prison sentence of eight months, stemmed from one video clip he circulated about “East Turkestan.” In November 2021, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that Zhang’s detention since 2019 was “arbitrary” and called on China to “release Mr. Zhang immediately,” noting that the prosecution’s main evidence against him related not to violence but to his tweets criticizing the re-education camps in Xinjiang holding Uyghurs. The Working Group’s ruling was made public by one of the plaintiffs on April 25, 2022. 

In a separate case, Hu Xincheng (胡新城) was arrested for Article 120(3) in Taiyuan, Shanxi, in January 2022 because of his journalistic work. Hu became a thorn in the side of local governments after he published hundreds of articles and reports about corruption. Additionally, Hu reportedly gave advice to petitioners on how to find redress for grievances within the petitioning system. 

Extremism is also used to target Christians unwilling to join the state sanctioned Three Self Patriotic Church. In July 2020, police in Taiyuan arrested Zhao Weikai (赵维凯) for Article 120(6). Zhao, a leader of the Xuncheng Reformed Church, repeatedly faces harassment by the authorities because of his insistence on educating his three children at home instead of sending them to a state school to receive atheist education. Zhao was formally arrested in the same month, being accused of possessing extremism materials. 

Part II will be published next week. Subscribe to Dui Hua publications here. 

Underground, Not Extinct: South China Church

An open letter from the daughters of Pastor Gong Shengliang to then-President George W. Bush. The letter includes a picture of the Gong family (Gong Shengliang seated bottom left). Image credit: Boxun News 

The lack of recent information about South China Church has led to questions about its continued existence. Dui Hua’s research, including a criminal judgment issued in 2016 involving its members, suggests, however, that the group continues to operate even as its founder remains incarcerated. 

Founded in Hubei Province in 1991 as an offshoot of Full Scope Church, South China Church (华南教会) was designated as an “evil cult” by the Chinese government in 1995. At the time, the church was thought to have 50,000 followers across central China (some sources reported nearly 100,000 members). In 2001, the trial of 17 leaders of this Protestant house church sparked an international outcry. Church members submitted sworn statements to the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention claiming that the church leaders had been tortured into confessing and making false statements prior to and during the trial. 

Among those sentenced was church founder Gong Shengliang (龚圣亮), who initially received a death sentence for “organizing a cult to undermine implementation of the law,” aggravated assault, and rape. Responding to international pressure, the Hubei High People’s Court dropped the death sentence and ordered a retrial. Gong was granted a two-year reprieve from his death sentence in September 2002 after making a successful appeal. 

Reporting on Gong Shengliang’s two-year reprieve from the death penalty: (left) A reprinted Baltimore Sun article from 2002 on Gong; (right) a BBC article mentioning Gong’s case from November 9, 2004. Image credits: The Tech; BBC News 

Gong’s sentence was commuted to life in prison in 2006. Gong was granted a six-month sentence reduction in 2008. As he has been held behind bars for twenty years, updates about him and his church have been sparse. An exception came in December 2012, when his family members spoke to foreign press about Gong’s deteriorating health in prison. Gong was reportedly paralyzed by stroke. He was unable to speak or move the left side of his body and kept drooling from his mouth. However, prison officials have not conceded to his family’s request to release him on medical parole. 

Compared to Falun Gong and Almighty God, South China Church has not been a prime target of attacks by China’s anti-cult propaganda since its 17 church leaders were put on trial in the early 2000s. As recently as March 2020, a county government in Gansu mentioned South China Church only in passing alongside other seemingly inactive unorthodox Christian sects such as Anointed King, New Testament Church, Dami Mission, World Elijah Evangelical Mission, and Buddhist sect Yuandun Famen. 

Partly because of a lack of recent information about South China Church since Gong’s imprisonment, questions have arisen as to whether the group still exists. Some leaders left the church after 2002, while other members have continued to meet and have accepted the teachings of orthodox pastors. In the early 2010s, www.kaiwind.com, a so-called non-governmental website claiming to reveal facts about Falun Gong, ran at least four reports covering South China Church. The interviewees were allegedly abused by South China Church members. The series appears to be a response to the brief foreign media exposure in 2012 resulting from Gong’s family members speaking out about his deteriorating health.

A screenshot of a search on Kaiwind.com showing reports on South China Church, including alleged abuses. Image credit: Kaiwind.com 

South China Church is a subject of research in at least two academic journals published after 2015. Their findings affirmed the church’s continuing operation. Huang Jianbo, anthropology professor at East China Normal University, wrote in Chinese Journal of Theology in 2015 that South China Church members continued to proselytize and that they administered the now-defunct website www.huananchurch.org. The journal was published by Institute of Sino-Christian Studies in Hong Kong. 

As recently as 2018, Beijing-based Christian Times (基督时报), which claimed to be independent of house churches or other religious organizations, also provided updates about South China Church. The in-depth article, authored by prolific Christian researcher Liu Yanyue, stated that Gong continued to decree that church members must read John Calvin’s seminal work of Institutes of the Christian Religion. The church might soon become marginalized, wrote Liu, but he also cited a church member he had interviewed as saying that many of its members are still longing for Gong’ release. 

(Left) The cover of a 1995 translation of John Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion, said to be required reading for South China Church members; (right) the first page of the book’s first printing, from 1536. Image credits: The Book Depository; Public domain 

Dui Hua’s research into court websites also uncovered a judgment involving seven South China Church members who made an unsuccessful appeal in Jiangxi to overturn their conviction in December 2016. They were sentenced to 20-36 months in prison for “gathering a crowd to disturb social order,” instead of Article 300. One of the defendants was previously sentenced to a 10-year prison sentence in October 2002 for aggravated assault, the same year when Gong’s death sentence was reduced to death with two-year reprieve. 

In May 2015, the defendants organized over 40 church members to travel from their home province Hubei to Gao’an City, Jiangxi, to protest the police’s handling of a traffic accident that had left one of their church members dead. The judgment stated that they chanted slogans, unfurled banners, placed wreathes, and held photos of the deceased while protesting and blocking traffic for four hours. Forty-one protesters were taken away at the scene. 

All the defendants have been released from prison at the time of writing. Two other court rulings Dui Hua uncovered indicated that Ding Zhicheng (丁志成) and Zhang Chengqin (张成勤) completed their sentences about four months early in January-February 2018 after being granted a sentence reduction. Ding and Zhang received the longest prison sentences, consisting of three years each, among the defendants in the case. Another recently uncovered official document from 2015 helped Dui Hua identify another defendant named Mei Yuqing (梅宇清) who received a two-year sentence while defendants Dong Hualing (董华玲), Dong Nengjun (董能军), and Wang Tiantian (万甜甜) both received sentences of one year and eight months in prison. 

Gong is believed to be the only South China Church leader still imprisoned. He has been a source of controversy due to questions concerning the orthodoxy of his teachings and his personal conduct. In 2007, reports by rights monitoring groups overseas found some evidence corroborating accusations against Gong, including that he molested female church members and that he encouraged the use of violence against the church’s perceived enemies. Yet, Dui Hua’s recent research on unorthodox religious groups and their treatment by the CCP suggests that the great majority of unorthodox religious prisoners are nonviolent.  

Like many other unorthodox religious groups suppressed by the Chinese government, South China Church has not been rendered extinct. Many of its activities appear to have been driven underground. With two more years to serve in prison, Gong is scheduled for release in April 2024. 

 

Read Dui Hua’s report “The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China” here. [PDF, 1.4MB] 

Read more about unorthodox religious groups in China here

Views of China Remain at Record Low, More See China’s Military as “Critical” Threat

A post on Gallup News’ Twitter account releasing their study on threats to the United States. Image credit: Gallup News Twitter account 

In Gallup’s latest annual World Affairs poll, conducted from February 1-17, the American public’s opinion of China remains at a historic low. The poll, conducted partly during the 2022 Winter Olympics, found that 79 percent of respondents have an unfavorable view of China, with 41 percent answering “very unfavorable.” Only 20 percent of respondents have a “favorable” view of China. The numbers remain largely unchanged from the 2021 poll.  

China’s favorability rating is at its lowest since Gallup started to poll American attitudes towards the country in 1979. An on-going trade imbalance, the COVID-19 pandemic, and alleged human rights violations in Hong Kong and Xinjiang likely all contributed to unfavorable opinions. In a 2020 poll by the Pew Research Center, 82 percent viewed China’s human rights policies as a serious problem. 

The Gallup poll also found that Americans view China as a “critical” threat to US security. While more respondents identified terrorism (including cyber, international, and domestic) and the development of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea as critical threats, anxiety over China’s military power outranked the spread of infectious diseases and climate change in perceptions of being a critical threat. When given a list of possible threats to US interests, 67 percent said that China’s military power is a “critical” threat and 29 percent ranked it as “important;” only 4 percent characterized it as “unimportant.” The concern reached a historic high and even outstripped worries over military threat from Russia. The threat of China’s economic power is also considered “critical” by 57 percent of respondents and “important” by 34 percent. However, concern over China’s economic power fell from 63 percent in 2021.  

From Gallup’s February 1-17 survey, Americans’ favorability of China from 1979-2022. The poll was conducted from February 1-17 via telephone interviews with 1,008 adults and has a margin of error of 4 percentage points. Image credit: Gallup [PDF, 873 KB] 

A similar poll by Pew Research conducted before the 2022 Beijing Olympics asked Americans if they see China as a partner, competitor, or enemy. The majority, 54 percent, saw China as a competitor; 35 percent answered as an enemy. Only 9 percent saw China as a partner. These opinions remained largely unchanged from 2021, when the views as competitor and enemy were 55 percent and 34 percent, respectively. 

The recently released polls were conducted in January and February, prior to the Russia invasion of Ukraine. China has since publicly supported Russia’s position while amplifying disinformation domestically. It is likely China’s favorability among Americans will suffer further as it embraces stronger anti-Western and anti-United States rhetoric. 

A different time: in 2017, Gallup polling found US attitudes to China to be at their highest point. Image credit: CGTN Twitter account 

The change in US leadership in 2021 did not bring a reset, or significant improvements, in the government’s official stance toward China as some had hoped it would. President Biden has made adjustments to policies inherited from the Trump administration while adopting a less incendiary tone. The Biden administration, however, has continued tough positions on trade negotiations and restrictions on key technologies while imposing more sanctions against human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang.  

This latest polling will likely further the notion that the US-China relationship is at a crossroads, with the leadership of both struggling to differentiate where competition ends and hostility begins. Even at the lowest point of US-China confrontation during the Cold War, diplomacy, including efforts involving non-government interlocutors, was never completely dismissed. With publics in both the United States and China voicing more animosity for each other, politicians may soon be looking to change tact or adopt more policies to further decoupling. 

The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China: A report by Dui Hua

(Clockwise from top left) Chinese government anti-cult propaganda; Tablighi Jamaat members with Hui Muslims at a mosque; practitioners of Yi Guan Dao; promotion for Milky Way Federation; a notice expanding the penalties under Article 300; the Jesus Family. Image credits: The Paper; Umal Al-Dawa Youtube Account; Jin De Fo Tang’s Facebook account; Sohu; Liaoning Pindao; Bridge Magazine  

Dui Hua’s new report “The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China” [PDF, 1.4 MB] details and analyzes the Chinese government’s treatment of unorthodox religious groups, listing known banned groups and the actions taken against them. The report, compiled over several months in 2021, offers a view into a substantial and largely unrecognized aspect of the Chinese population. 

“The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China” is based on legal documents, media reports, case studies, official publications, Chinese government responses to requests for information on persecuted prisoners, court statistics, and Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB).  It provides a comprehensive view of how non-state sanctioned religious practitioners come into conflict with the law, how officials at different levels of government criminalize unorthodox worship, and how past trends can inform future advocacy for those undergoing coercive measures for the non-violent expression of their beliefs.  

As early as 1951, regulations on punishing counterrevolutionaries targeted leaders of reactionary religious organizations. Currently, the Chinese government allows its citizens to take part in the five state-sanctioned patriotic associations of Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism, but many seeking spiritual salvation look beyond government-approved faiths and embrace unorthodox religious groups. 

Graph 1. Defendants and 1st-instance cases accepted and concluded for violating Article 300(1)

Image credit: The Dui Hua Foundation

Noting the extensive historical context informing the Chinese government’s approach to religious groups, especially those not sanctioned by the state, Dui Hua found that the 1997 revision to the criminal law placed “cult” trials into the purview of district courts, resulting in less transparency and attention for such cases. By 1999, trials of Article 300 cases—for those accused of organizing and using superstitious sects, secret societies, and religious organizations to undermine the law—soared, largely due to the ban on Falun Gong.  

The report includes an overview of 41 unorthodox religious groups; a summary of laws and regulations targeting unorthodox religious groups; analysis of court statistics from 1979-2016; discussion of deteriorating transparency in the disclosure of information on Article 300 cases; analysis of religious persecution using the PPDB; a summary of Dui Hua’s advocacy for such prisoners using prisoner lists and responses; and recommendations for future advocacy.  

Table 1. Breakdown of unorthodox religious practitioners in PPDB by affiliation

Source: PPDB

The objective of the report is to enable more effective interventions on behalf of practitioners of unorthodox religious groups who face coercive measures under Article 300 by providing insight and actionable information. Its main findings include the following:  

• The number of adherents of orthodox religious groups makes up more than 10 percent of China’s population, perhaps as many as 15 percent. Unorthodox religious groups exist in all of China’s provinces and autonomous regions, and many have developed links to international groups. If the number of unorthodox religious adherents was incorporated into official figures, then the number of all religious practitioners in China would far exceed the current government figure of 200 million official practitioners (as of 2018).  
• Adherents of unorthodox religious groups subjected to coercive measures for violating Article 300(1)—“organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation of the law”—and other charges make up 60 percent of all prisoners in the PPDB. Their numbers have swelled in recent years as sentence reductions and paroles have been restricted.  
• The most common crime for which adherents of unorthodox religious groups are imprisoned is covered by Article 300(1) of China’s Criminal Law but other crimes are also used, including endangering state security and economic crimes like committing fraud (Article 266) and operating illegal businesses (Article 225).  
• Falun Dafa (aka Falun Gong) and the Church of Almighty God have the largest number of adherents, but there are many other smaller groups. This report identified 41 unorthodox religious groups operating in China today or during the last two decades.  
• From 1998-2016, women made up 41 percent of those sentenced to prison for violating Article 300, five times the percentage of all women prisoners in China.  

Graph 2. Gender Breakdown of prisoners and unorthodox religious prisoners in PPDB

Image credit: The Dui Hua Foundation

• Adherents of unorthodox religions are typically non-violent. Instances of violence are rare; when they occur, the Chinese government features them in “anti-cult” propaganda. Adherents have been convicted of rape and murder. Those so convicted are often executed.  
• The persecution of unorthodox religious groups has existed since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949; adherents were classified as counterrevolutionaries prior to 1997. They have been viewed as threats to the government’s hold on power.  
• Persecution of unorthodox religious practitioners rose sharply following the banning of Falun Gong in 1999. In recent years, practitioners have seen sentences increase and clemency restricted. Persecution shows no sign of abating. In 2018, there were 3,550 people tried for violating Article 300(1), one of the highest numbers of individuals tried for this charge in recent years.   
• Adherents of unorthodox religions rarely make their way onto prisoner lists submitted to the Chinese government in bilateral and multilateral human rights dialogues. Their numbers dwarf those subject to coercive measures for exercising their political beliefs.  

Dui Hua encourages governments to raise the issue of this persecution in formal and informal discussions on human rights with the Chinese government and to include the names of imprisoned practitioners of unorthodox religions to the lists compiled for use in human rights dialogues with China. When, and to the extent possible, governments and NGOs should support appeals of unorthodox religion practitioners to Special Procedures of the United Nations. More so, governments and NGOs should incorporate concerns about the persecution of unorthodox religious groups into submissions to China’s Universal Periodic Review, tentatively scheduled for October 2023. 

Finally, governments should use this report when considering applications of political asylum by practitioners of unorthodox religions. Some governments, particularly in Europe, have become more open to accepting asylum requests for Church of Almighty God members. Dui Hua encourages courts to recognize the persecution of unorthodox religious group members as grounds for asylum and to recognize precedents for such asylum requests.    

Download the report “The Persecution of Unorthodox Religious Groups in China” [PDF, 1.4 MB] 

Read the report on Dui Hua’s website.

People's Parties & "Picking Quarrels," Part II: From ESS to Pocket Crime

Weihui People’s Court. Image credit: Weihui People’s Court Official WeChat account

The 2021 prosecution of a young man surnamed Li for forming a “People’s Party,” disseminating writings prosecutors deemed “slanderous,” and seeking to recruit members points to an increasingly prevalent tactic of criminalization – a shift from charging political dissidents with endangering state security (ESS) crimes to instead charging them with “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” Over a decade ago, the same acts of disseminating “reactionary,” “subversive,” or “slanderous” articles in the name of a political party would have been more likely punished as ESS crimes.  

In Part I, Dui Hua detailed Li’s case and the court's rationale for charging him with “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” This entry looks at similar cases and shifts in sentencing, considering reasons for the enhanced usage of  “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

People's Parties

Li’s People’s Party was not the first political party of its kind. Dissident intellectuals, farmers, workers, and Communist idealists have recruited like-minded individuals and organized underground groups over the past two decades. They often choose names like “People’s Party,” mindang or renmindang, as a way of invoking public support or positioning themselves as representatives of the Chinese people. These “People’s Parties” do not appear to be connected to each other; rather their appeal is to specific social groups. While some aspire to Western-style democracy and call for a multiparty political system, others believe that a return to pre-reform era socialism is a panacea for social injustices and government corruption.  

Dui Hua previously reported that around 2008, Dong Zhanyi (董占义) founded a different People’s Party, which was later renamed to “New Era Communist Party of China.” Dong was convicted of subversion and contract fraud in October 2011 and was sentenced to life in prison. Another party founder Chen Guohua (陈国华) was given a 14-year prison sentence for subversion. This party, once active in Beijing, Henan, Shandong, and Jiangxi, aimed to fight corruption and allegedly recruited aggrieved workers and petitioners to overthrow the Chinese Communist Party. 

Another opposition group, which also existed online like Li’s party, was called the People’s Party. In November 2009, news media sources reported that a Henan netizen surnamed Yan stood trial in Wuhan for inciting subversion after proclaiming himself to be chairman of the “Chinese People’s Party” (中国人民党). Yan’s political orientation is ambiguous. Dui Hua learned that his full name is Yan Bianfang (阎边防). Yan reportedly wrote two “subversive” articles and read them aloud in a video he posted on a US website. The links to his articles and video were circulated domestically on Chinese websites. Yan was sentenced to one year in prison and completed his prison sentence in April 2010. Yan was charged with inciting subversion, a crime of endangering state security; Li’s crime and sentencing were similar to Yan’s, but in an apparent shift in practice, Yan was charged with “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” 

The reason behind this shift is unclear, but it might be a way to obscure cases of a political nature that would otherwise attract scrutiny by treating them as pocket crimes, like “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.” Crimes of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” are tried in district courts while ESS crimes are tried in intermediate courts. District court trials tend to be quicker and attract less attention than those at the intermediate level. Judges are typically less experienced, and corruption is more prevalent. The comparative lack of attention means that judgments are less contentious, with the rationale behind them drawing less scrutiny. 

Another possible explanation for the shift might be that the procuratorate or the court thinks it is easier to determine that a post or act caused “social harm” or “disturbed the social order” than it is to show the “subversion of state power.” The threshold for justifying pocket crimes is lower than that for ESS charges. This catch-all crime now carries a maximum prison sentence of 10 years, up from the previous cap of five years, following the eighth amendment to the Criminal Law in 2011. 

Excerpts from the joint notice broadening the application of the crime of picking quarrels and provoking trouble to include Covid-related actions. Image credit: Ministry of Public Security of China

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” has been used along with an array of other criminal offenses to curb so-called “pandemic-related crimes.” On February 10, 2020, two months into the pandemic, a notice jointly issued by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice broadened the crime’s application to punish those who cause chaos by using “violence or other means” to insult or intimidate medical personnel, as well as those who spread “false news” or “rumors” about the pandemic.  

By February 25, 2020, about a month after Wuhan was first placed on lockdown, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate reported handling 301 pandemic-related picking quarrels cases nationwide involving 375 people. In addition to citizen journalists, street protesters, and rights lawyers, Li’s case indicated that dissident party organizers were also among those at risk of arrest for this pocket crime. 

The vague definition of Article 293 has long attracted criticism from China’s legal scholars and experts. Prominent lawyer Zhu Zhengfu recently suggested in an interview with China News Weekly that the government “abolish the crime of picking quarrels and provoking troubles at a right time.” Zhu, a representative of the Consultative Conference and a member of the All China Lawyers Association’s supervisory board, pointed out that “clarity is the essential requirement of the Nulla poena sine lege; however, the wording in the Article 293 is excessively vague, such as ‘at will,’ ‘willfully,’ ‘serious circumstances,’ or ‘causing serious disturbances to public order.’ Yet those described [activities] are the key elements of the crime.”  

News coverage featuring excerpts of Zhu’s statements on Article 293. Image credit: China News Weekly via Weibo 

Zhu, whose comments came during preparation for the “Two Meetings” which began March 4, added that the definition’s ambiguity enables authorities to selectively enforce the law and harmed citizens’ rights. Zhu’s suggestion has since been echoed by others. Xiao Shenfang, a member of the NPC and vice chairperson of the All China Lawyers Association, also plans to submit a similar proposal at the “Two Meetings.” Xiao also warned of the law’s over-criminalization of social issues.