Punishing Namāz Prayer in Prison, Part II: “Illegal Religious Activity”

A photo of the Id Kah Mosque, the largest in China, in Kashgar, Xinjiang, taken in 2017. The photographer noted that worshippers had their ID cards recorded. Image credit: David Stanley / CC By 2.0 

Part I of this article discussed existing laws and regulations limiting religious expression in China, and it explored the case of Ismayil Sidiq, a Uyghur farmer serving a 10-year prison sentence for “promoting extremism” whose sentence was doubled after he “used a disguised and simplified method to perform namāz in the prison dormitory.” Namāz, commonly known as salah, refers to the pillar of the Islamic faith that obliges believers to pray five times a day. 

Dui Hua’s research into court judgments, however, found a similar case where a Uyghur prisoner was sentenced in December 2019 to 18 months for Article 315 for conducting “illegal religious activity” on four occasions in Xinjiang’s Shihezi Prison. Prior to this, the Uyghur prisoner was serving his 20 years prison sentence for terrorism and promoting extremism. Despite being accused of conducting “illegal religious activity” on one more occasion, he was given an 18-month prison sentence for Article 315—half the length of Ismayil’s sentence. The judgment did not state whether namāz was involved. 

Ismayil’s case is by no means an isolated incident, although what happened to him might have portended the worst possible outcome for performing namāz in prison. Dui Hua found cases where other Uyghur prisoners, while already serving lengthy prison sentences, were criminally prosecuted for Article 315 because of namāz. In the first case, a Uyghur serving his 10-year sentence for participating in a terrorist organization in Xinjiang’s Bayingolin Prison was found to have performed namāz on four occasions during the week of March 14, 2017. On each occasion, he awoke other cellmates, including those serving their sentences for endangering state security, to join his morning prayer. On May 21, he was put under 15 days of solitary confinement, during which he insisted on performing namāz five times a day and called on other cellmates to join his prayer. 

A picture of Bayingolin Prison. Image credit: Shahit.biz 

It would be a mistake to assume that prosecution against namāz only targets Uyghurs convicted of endangering state security, terrorism, or religious extremism offenses. In the second case, a Uyghur serving his seven-year sentence for “gathering a crowd to disturb social order,” a public order offense, in Korla Prison was indicted for Article 315 on June 13, 2017. The indictment stated that he refused to repent and that he insisted on performing namāz every day. Originally due for release on July 17, 2021, this Uyghur prisoner is likely to remain incarcerated until at least 2024. 

In these two cases, the trial outcome is unclear. However, given what happened to Ismayil, they are highly likely to have been convicted and sentenced to additional prison terms under Article 315. 

Besides Uyghurs, Muslim prisoners from other ethnic minority groups outside of Xinjiang also receive punishment for performing namāz. However, Dui Hua found that none of them were sentenced or criminally prosecuted like the abovementioned Uyghurs. These cases involved one Hui and two ethnic Dongxiang Muslims who were convicted of theft or drug-related crimes in Linxia, Gansu. The Hui and Dongxiang Muslims were only given warnings by prison authorities in July 2018. The duo allegedly showed remorse by stopping their prayers completely after they were warned. 

Nevertheless, not all prisoners are as obedient. Ma Mene (马么呢), an ethnic Dongxiang Muslim, displayed a “bad attitude” and confronted prison guards after he was found praying in prison. Ma was placed under yanguan jixun (严管集训) for 15 days, a form of strict control for collective discipline training. During this period, he was unable to accrue clemency points to obtain early release. 

A Muslim prisoner in the United States prays on his rug inside his cell at prison. Image credit: Andy Aitchison, PrisonImage / Creative Commons 

China is not alone in denying Muslims their right to pray or worship meaningfully in prison. From reading the Quran to growing beards and restricting daily group prayers, Muslim prisoners in other countries have their religious rights deprived to varying degrees. In the United States, Muslims are overrepresented in state prisons, making up 9 percent of the prison population despite being 1 percent of the general population according to a 2019 report by Muslim Advocates. The report found that prisons in multiple states fail to accommodate Muslim dietary requirements, force male prisoners to shave their beards, and restrict group prayer.  

As recently as April 2022, Muslim prisoners in the United States faced obstacles in accessing halal food, adequate dietary accommodations during Ramadan, and religious materials such as prayer mats and Qurans even as equivalent requirements are met for other faiths. Some progress has been made after civil society organizations filed lawsuits challenging religious restrictions in prison. For instance, federal prisons in the United States changed the national guideline in 2019 to accommodate Muslim congregational prayer services, which was previously restricted to three people, unless there is a security concern.  

The use of “security concerns” to justify restrictions on religious expressions is an oft-used tool of governments. China, too, often cites security concerns to justify its religious crackdowns in- and outside of its carceral system. In a country which adheres so closely to the notion of “stability above all else,” it is unlikely that religious restrictions on namāz in prison will abate. Similarly, the right to free assembly through group prayer, a practice valued by Muslims and only recently permissible in US prisons, is likely to continue amongst China’s repression of religious expression and assembly. 

Punishing Namāz Prayer in Prison, Part I: “Sabotaging Prison Supervision”

A clock hanging in a Turkish mosque showing Muslim prayer times. Image credit: LooiNL 

Muslims around the world are obliged to perform five daily prayers at dawn, midday, afternoon, sunset, and night. The ritual, commonly known as salah, is often called namazi (CN: 乃玛孜) in China, a Persian transliteration of namāz. Within China’s carceral system, all forms of religious worship, including namāz, are forbidden. Prisoners who covertly perform namāz are at risk of receiving harsh punishment, with the most serious penalty being a sentence extension. 

This risk is well demonstrated in the case of Ismayil Sidiq. In May 2021, the BBC reported that the now-57-year-old Uyghur farmer was serving a 10-year prison sentence for “promoting extremism” in Kuitun Prison in the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps when he had his sentence doubled after he “used a disguised and simplified method to perform namāz in the prison dormitory.” On May 29, 2018, the Kuitun Reclamation Area People’s Court convicted him of “sabotaging prison supervision” and “provoking ethnic hatred,” and handed down an additional prison term of 13 years. Ismayil has 16 more years to serve before completing his sentence on May 28, 2038. He will be 74 years old. 

The four-page judgment gave a detailed account of what happened in Kuitun Prison. First searchable on China Judgements Online, the judgment is among the tens of thousands of sensitive cases taken offline in mid-2021. The judgment has since been archived and translated into English by the Xinjiang Victims Database. 

A translation of the judgment against Ismayil. Image credit: Xinjiang Victims Database Twitter account 

According to the judgment, Ismayil performed namāz on three occasions in the prison dormitory in early 2018. The first two took place on January 25 and February 17 after he realized that the time displayed on the television was the time for his final daily namāz. On March 3, on the pretext of needing to urinate, he secretly performed wudu, the washing ritual that Muslims perform before praying. After being discovered and stopped by his Uyghur cellmates, he became outraged and shouted at them asking, “Are you Uyghurs? Do Uyghurs enjoy reporting other Uyghurs like this?” 

The court found clear and sufficient evidence of Ismayil sabotaging prison supervision because he “repeatedly engaged in covert religious activities in prison.” This crime alone afforded him a prison sentence of three years - the maximum penalty stipulated in Article 315 of the Criminal Law. Furthermore, he was found guilty of “provoking ethnic hatred” because the remarks he made to other Uyghur cellmates “sowed discord among the ethnic groups and created ethnic antagonism.” This crime also landed him the maximum prison sentence of 10 years as stipulated by Article 249. 

An excerpt taken from academic journal Crime and Corrections reveals that namāz is among the religious activities explicitly banned in prisons and re-education-through-labor facilities through Xinjiang. Image credit: Crime and Corrections, (2001) Issue 4 

While prisoners are allowed to retain their religious faith, prison authorities across China proscribe all forms of religious activities but allow prisoners to read religious books or silently chant scriptures. Article 2 of a provisional regulation issued by the Xinjiang Department of Justice explicitly prohibits all forms of religious activity such as participating in Ramadan, namāz, other forms of worship, or sermons in prisons and reeducation-through-labor facilities. However, many Muslim detainees and prisoners defied this prison rule and “shared a propensity to organize gangs when they perform namāz in groups,” according to an article published in Crime and Corrections in 2001. Congregational prayer, referred to as Salat al-Jama'ah, is highly valued among Muslims and is thought to be more spiritually enriching than solo prayer.  

In Xinjiang, namāz is a matter of concern for managing prisoners serving their sentences for endangering state security. A 2008 policy document examining the challenges faced by Xinjiang prison authorities states that these prisoners not only distort the history of Xinjiang, spread rumors, and incite ethnic hatred, but they also “use acts such as hunger strikes, suicide, namāz and feigned illness to disobey management and refuse reform.” 

Existing laws and regulations, however, have not clearly explained the criminal liabilities for performing namāz in prison. The crime of “sabotaging prison supervision,” defined in Article 315 of the Criminal Law, makes no mention of namāz or any other forms religious activity. It only stipulates that the following acts fall under the crime’s purview: (1) beating supervising personnel; (2) organizing other people under detention to sabotage supervision order; (3) assembling a crowd to make trouble, thereby disturbing normal supervision order; (4) beating, carrying out corporal punishment on or instigating other people to beat, carry out corporal punishment on other people under detention. 

It is not immediately clear whether performing namāz fulfills the criteria of stipulation 2 as stated above. Assuming it does, Ismayil’s case might suggest that the three instances of namāz he performed on January 25, February 17, and March 3 of 2018 were already sufficient to reach the threshold for the maximum prison sentence of three years.  

Read Part II.

Rare Sentence Reduction for Falun Gong Follower

Shaoguan Intermediate People’s Court, which granted Yu a seven-month sentence reduction. Image credit: Baidu Maps 

Acts of clemency for Chinese religious and political prisoners have become increasingly rare in recent years. This decrease is the result of Xi Jinping’s hardline approach to both dissent and unorthodox religions, coupled with a sharp drop in judicial transparency. An exception took place in the summer of 2022 when Yu Rongxin (余荣新), a long-time Falun Gong practitioner in Guangdong, was granted a seven-month sentence reduction by the Shaoguan Intermediate People’s Court in June. 

Yu, born 1972, and wife Xie Qing (谢清), born 1966, were both residents of Jiangmen, Guangdong Province, and Falun Gong practitioners. Their case was highlighted on the Guangdong Province Anti-Cult website as a homepage news item in April 2019.  

The couple were summoned by police on September 18, 2017 and detained the next day for violating Article 300 of the Criminal Law, “organizing or using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.” They were subsequently arrested on October 26 of the same year. 

The Yuan bills with propaganda messages. Image credit: sohu.com 

The anti-cult website reported that Yu and Xie were both long-time Falun Gong practitioners, starting in 1993 and 1997, respectively. Yu was the Falun Gong guidance counselor for the Jiangmen branch during the mid-1990s. For this, he received administrative punishment in 1999.

The couple’s 2017 legal ordeal started when police searched their residence and found numerous materials with Falun Gong messages. Those included: 3,834 Yuan bills printed with propaganda messages, 425 copies of pamphlets, 68 optical discs, two USB flash drives, two SD cards, one each of an MP3 player and MP4 player pre-loaded with Falun Gong content, and computers and printers.  

According to Falun Gong media, the couple was first tried by the Jiangmen Pengjiang District Court. On December 28, 2018, Yu was sentenced to eight and a half years and Xie to seven and a half years. Both appealed. 

The anti-cult website reported that on March 12, 2019, the Jiangmen Intermediate Court rejected their appeals and upheld the original sentences. The court found that the couple had been spreading cult messages by spending the message-laden Yuan while shopping as well as gathering others to practice Falun Gong. The court deemed those offenses to be “extremely severe.” 

Yu, according to the Falun Gong media, was sent to the Beijiang Prison in Shaoguang City; while Xie was sent to the Provincial Women’s Prison. 

Beijiang Prison. Image credit: Southern Metropolis Daily 

Dui Hua has raised the two names in recent years, pressing for updates.  

According to sources, Yu has behaved well in prison. He and his wife exchanged letters of encouragement with each other. The Beijiang prison looked upon those exchanges favorably and submitted a sentence reduction request for Yu. The women’s prison apparently did not submit a request for a sentence reduction for Xie. Yu will be released in August 2025, while Xie will be released in March 2025.  

Dui Hua's research into Shaoguan Intermediate Court's sentence reduction and parole decisions released in 2021 and 2022 revealed that clemency granted to “cult” practitioners is uncommon. There were more sentence reduction approvals for prisoners who committed drug-related crimes and violent crimes than there were for "cult" prisoners, even though those offenses were mostly non-violent. When approvals were given, the courts granted shorter periods of reduction than those recommended by the prisons.

“All People Act Together” Supporters Imprisoned, Part II: Public Disruption, Limited Reach

A logo used by the APAT. Image credit: 時事能見度 YouTube page 

Read Part I here.

The “All People Act Together” (APAT), or quanmin gongzhen (全民共振) social media campaign was launched in early 2018 by Chinese dissidents overseas. The campaign encourages rights defenders to engage in collective action and protests on days of importance to China and the Chinese Communist Party.  

Part I of this article focused on how the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” is used against APAT supporters. In such cases, supporters were imprisoned for their behavior on social media, including deleted private conversations. Part II looks at cases where supporters were charged with disrupting public services and preparing for a terrorist activity. 

Disrupting Public Services 

Dui Hua’s research into court judgments revealed that Li Yunzhu (李韫竹) was found guilty of injuring stability maintenance officers and sentenced to eight months in prison in Yinchuan, Ningxia, in August 2019. On February 24, 2019, the officers were sent by guobao, China’s domestic security police, to Li’s home to give her “thought reform” after she circulated footage with an APAT thumbnail tag of “Down with the CCP.” The video allegedly incited the Chinese people to defend their rights and take to the streets every day at 3 PM during the “Two Sessions,” China’s biggest annual gathering of its rubber stamp parliament and political advisory body which discuss plans for national priorities. 

It is unclear what prompted Li to circulate the video or why she was drawn to APAT. The judgment only stated that Li was planning to lodge an appeal in Beijing in December 2018 over a consumer lawsuit but was persuaded by police to stay in her home province Ningxia. The police arranged for her appellate trial to begin the following March. Li refused the arrangement. She expressed concerns about being unable to travel to Beijing during the Two Sessions, despite knowing full well that transport disruptions are commonplace in order to allow for senior government and party leaders to travel to Beijing during the Two Sessions.  

Li was angry upon discovering that the appellate trial date was decided without her consent. She allegedly insulted the stability maintenance officers and asked them to leave her home. She ended up throwing a kitchen knife which left one of them injured. Li completed her eight-month prison sentence for disrupting public services on October 25, 2019. 

Preparing for a Terrorist Activity  

Ethnic Korean Jin Bo (金波) was released from a Heilongjiang prison on April 26, 2022 for plotting what prosecutors called a “violent APAT activity” on May 1, 2018. He was found guilty of preparing for a terrorist activity, one of the terrorism/extremism offenses added to the Criminal Law in 2015. The charge stemmed from him possessing explosive devices and Molotov cocktails which prosecutors believed Jin would use on the Labor Day holiday in connection with APAT. 

Jin admitted to making the explosives primarily to seek revenge for his 444-day wrongful imprisonment. In August 2014, Jin was taken into custody on suspicion of extortion. He was later acquitted and given state compensation. Jin’s father and father-in-law passed away while he was incarcerated. Jin felt guilty for not being able to arrange for their funerals and blamed his business partners for framing him. He also expressed disillusionment with petition bureau officials who repeatedly ignored his complaints. Jin scaled China’s Great Firewall to learn about APAT and took part in online discussions after his unsuccessful attempts to seek redress.  

Jin’s case indicates that some people who lose trust in China’s justice system find APAT appealing. A substantial portion of the prosecutor’s arguments focused on the “reactionary,” “anti-party,” and “anti-China” comments Jin made online. In April 2018, he wrote “What is APAT for? For revolution! What is Revolution? As the name suggests, it aims to overthrow the old and establish the new.” Days before he was criminally detained on April 27, 2018, he claimed to have lost confidence in China and expressed desires to begin retaliation. He ordered materials to make explosives via WeChat, claiming that he might set himself ablaze and throw bombs at his business partners. Although Jin confessed to posting radical comments online, he stated in his defense that he did not personally know any “overseas pro-democracy activists” nor did he join any overseas terrorist organizations. 

In this case, prosecutors characterized the whole APAT campaign as a “violent political activity” organized by overseas forces because of Jin’s way of expressing grievances. However, there is insufficient evidence that other APAT supporters in China or overseas call for violent political resistance. 

Members of San Francisco’s Chinese community participating in the "May 1st National Resonance" event in front of the Chinese Consulate. Image credit: CK via RFA 

APAT fell flat. Fewer netizens in China have answered the APAT appeal than during 2011 “Jasmine Revolution.” Overseas APAT supporters in the United States, Canada, and Australia reportedly organized small rallies outside of the Chinese consulates in 2018-2019, but these had  limited reach in China due in part to pervasive internet censorship and surveillance. Additionally, APAT was hotly disputed even within Chinese dissident circles, with some saying that it was an entrapment attempt devised by the Ministry of State Security to round up political dissenters in one fell swoop. Regardless of the controversy, Dui Hua believes that the four people discussed in this post represent a small portion of criminal cases and more people could have been sentenced for espousing support for APAT. More research is needed to uncover the fate and the acts of other APAT supporters, as well as their motivations for sympathizing with the campaign.  

"All People Act Together" Supporters Imprisoned, Part I: Social Media Campaign Draws Ire

A screenshot from a video about the “All People Act Together” campaign. Image credit: 一平論政 Youtube page 

“All People Act Together” (APAT), or quanmin gongzhen (全民共振), is a social media campaign launched in early 2018 by Chinese dissidents overseas. The campaign calls on rights defenders to collectively seek redress and make their voices heard by staging street protests across Chinese cities on occasions of special historical, social, or political importance such as International Workers’ Day (May 1), the anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (July 1), and National Day (October 1).  

Proponents of APAT believe that resistance movements can “reverberate” or “resonate” around the country and overwhelm the stability maintenance regime if the outbreaks are simultaneous and sustained. They predict CCP’s eventual demise when it runs short of resources to keep up its increasingly expensive operations.  

The CCP’s zeal in crushing dissent to maintain stability has created a domestic security system so costly that it is sapping funds required elsewhere to support the country’s economic health. APAT emerged against the backdrop of China’s spending on internal security, which has exceeded the national defense budget since 2010. The rise in spending on domestic security is most evident in western regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, but a sizable portion is spent in Han-majority regions keeping potential troublemakers in residential surveillance, running “black jails,” or forcing dissenters to “travel” elsewhere — all part of the longstanding scheme designed to muzzle protestors during sensitive occasions.  

Part I of this post focuses on APAT’s reach and cases in which supporters were charged with “picking quarrels and provoking trouble (PQPT).” Part II will look at cases involving charges of disrupting public services and preparing for a terrorist activity. 

The nature of APAT is similar to the online calls for the 2011 Tunisia-inspired “Jasmine Revolution” manifested in the form of “strolling” protests around McDonald’s on Wangfujing shopping streets and spots in other cities. Chinese state media have been largely silent on the planned protests, but social media accounts recounted major shows of police force to disperse small crowds of seemingly curious onlookers that had gathered in Beijing and Shanghai. 

APAT appears to have limited reach in China. No visible protests linked to APAT have been reported. However, prominent dissidents including Hu Jia were reportedly warned by police not to take part in or publicly discuss APAT. There was scant media coverage and the fate of those who openly espouse APAT in China has gone largely unnoticed. Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database has information on six individuals who were given coercive measures for heeding the calls of APAT. Of them, four received prison sentences for a variety of crimes ranging from PQPT and disrupting public services to preparing for terrorist activities. 

Picking Quarrels & Provoking Trouble

Xue Renyi, an advocate of Greenleaf Action, who was arrested on May 1, 2018 for walking in Jiefangbei Square in Chongqing while wearing a green leaf. Image credit: Twitter via RFA 

The first APAT supporter known to have been imprisoned is Xue Renyi (薛仁义). He was taken into custody on May 1, 2018 after posting a photograph of himself “strolling” in Chongqing People’s Liberation Monument Square while carrying a green leaf in his shirt pocket. Some other people were seized on the same day; they were warned off speaking out online or giving interviews with foreign media after being released from custody. 

Xue is the founder of Green Leaf Action, an environmental group which promoted food safety, clean air, and clean water. The group stood accused by police of being “controlled” and “manipulated” by foreign forces. Xue’s three-year sentence became known to the outside world only when his fiancée received his letter from prison one year after he was detained. Xue completed his sentence for PQPT in Dianjiang Prison without receiving a sentence reduction. He was released on April 30, 2021. 

Gao Zhigang’s case materials and ID card. Image credit: Provided by Geng Guanjun via RFA 

In a separate case, Gao Zhigang (高志刚) was sentenced to 10 months in prison for PQPT in 2020 even without showing up at any APAT protest spot. Gao was accused of forwarding a video which called on people to join a rally in Taiyuan’s Wuyi Square on the 2019 National Day. Additionally, Gao sent the video to an “overseas democracy activist” known by the name of Geng Guanjun (耿冠军). Geng fled to the United States in 2018 and has been a target of attack by patriotic internet users for his “reactionary” views and anti-China remarks. After completing his sentence in August 2020, Gao spoke to Radio Free Asia claiming that he never expected the conviction would be based entirely on his private conversations from his social media account which he had deleted prior to his detainment in October 2019. 

Read Part II here. 

Patriotic Acts as Cause for Non-Prosecution

Changle government building. Image credit: Google images 

Chinese prosecutors have the discretion not to indict an accused when the evidence is insufficient or when his/her perceived threat to society is minimal. However, these are not necessarily the most important reasons. Dui Hua’s research found that criminal suspects deemed patriotic can also avoid prosecution in mainland China. 

China’s long-time conviction rate of over 99.9 percent often overshadows the judicial progress it has made in other areas. While the acquittal rate dipped to its lowest point at 0.052 percent in 2021, Chinese prosecutors have approved fewer arrests and indicted fewer suspects in recent years. Statistics released by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate in March 2022 indicated that the country’s non-prosecution rate increased from 9.9 percent in 2019 to 16.6 percent in 2021. 

Non-prosecution embodies the lenient aspect of China’s largely punitive criminal justice system. Among the major beneficiaries of non-prosecution are juvenile delinquents, the elderly, severely ill, first-time offenders, and pregnant and breastfeeding women. Prosecutors can also exercise discretion and choose to not indict suspects if they have made “major contributions to the state or society” or performed “meritorious deeds.” Existing laws and regulations leave undefined what acts are considered “major contributions,” but the following case Dui Hua discovered concerning a Hong Kong “patriot” provides insight into this term. 

On October 21, 2019, the Public Security Bureau of Changle District, Fuzhou, decided not to prosecute a Hong Kong resident surnamed Chan. The bureau carried out criminal detention in December 2013 and listed Chan as a wanted criminal online on June 18, 2014. Chan was suspected of “organizing an illegal border crossing,” for allegedly forging identity documents for a group of 11 Chinese nationals in their applications for tourist visas at the US Consulate in Guangzhou. Their application was unsuccessful because the documents were found to be counterfeit by the consulate staffers. 

Chan flew back to Fuzhou from Hong Kong and turned himself in on October 14, 2019, six years after his alleged offense took place. That same day, Chan was released on bail pending further investigation. About a week later, the procuratorate issued a non-prosecution decision, citing the various patriotic acts he had performed in Hong Kong. 

Fuzhou Changle International Airport. Chan flew here from Hong Kong before turning himself in, six years after his alleged crime. Image credit: Fuzhou Changle International Airport 

First among these acts, Chan served as the then-incumbent executive vice president of the Hong Kong Family Union (New Territories West Branch), a pro-China non-governmental organization which helps mainland residents to emigrate to Hong Kong. During his tenure, Chan allegedly organized and participated in multiple activities to promote love for the motherland and Hong Kong. Chan was given credit for carrying out stability maintenance and secret investigation work for the Hong Kong Liaison Office during “Occupy Central,” the civil disobedience movement which paralyzed parts of Hong Kong for 79 days in late 2014.  

On October 13, 2014, protestors camp out in the streets of Hong Kong as part of the Occupy Central movement. Image credit: L-BBE / CC BY 3.0 

Furthermore, Chan was commended for performing security work for the official celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover to Chinese rule in 2017, the only year Xi Jinping attended the handover celebrations in the former British colony as Chinese president, as of this writing. More notably, Chan was cited for his “fearless” and “tenacious struggle” against the “radical opposition forces” during the recent 2019 protests, as well as his unified actions in supporting the Hong Kong government. The decision not to prosecute Chan came as Hong Kong protesters fought citywide pitched battles with police in an eruption of public anger against an already suspended extradition bill that critics saw as a fundamental threat to the former British colony’s civic freedoms and rule of law. 

Prosecutors also outlined other reasons for not indicting Chan, but the arguments are not without flaws. For example, one reason for not indicting Chan is because he turned himself in even though he did so six years after the public security bureau carried out criminal detention. Additionally, it was argued that the seriousness of Chan’s crime was mitigated because his attempt to organize illegal crossings failed. Chan did not complete the crime; he only attempted to commit it, argued the prosecutors. Even with this reasoning, it is unclear why the prosecutors did not charge Chan with forgery, covered by Article 280 of the Criminal Law, since the non-prosecution decision found that Chan did indeed forge identity documents for 11 Chinese nationals. 

The crime of organizing illegal border crossings is known to incur serious penalties. Dui Hua previously reported that the crime resulted in Korean missionary Cho Young-joo getting a seven-year prison sentence. Cho was not given lenient punishment for the humanitarian mission he conducted across the Yunnan-Myanmar border. Prominent house church leader Cao Sanqiang (曹三强) has more than a year to serve before completing his seven-year prison sentence in Yunnan for the same crime. Also convicted of the same crime are two Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protesters who attempted to flee to Taiwan by speedboat but were intercepted by mainland coastguards in August 2020. The duo is still serving their sentences in Guangdong. 

Map showing the route (in green) from Kunming to Jinghong, from where Cho intended to travel to Mongla. Source: Gaode Map 

The treatment given to Chan was vastly different to that of Cho, Cao, and two of the Hong Kong 12, despite all of them being accused of organizing illegal border crossings. Chan’s preferential treatment calls into question whether “patriots” enjoy impunity for the criminal offenses they committed in mainland China. This raises speculation that Chan is not the only case of prosecutors dropping criminal charges against the so-called “patriots” because of meritorious services rendered in Hong Kong, China, or elsewhere. 

Crimes of Extremism, Part II: Harsh Sentences, Low Transparency in Xinjiang

A Chinese propaganda poster denouncing extremism. In 2018, the poster went viral after a social media user noticed that one of the poster’s images condemning Islamic facial hair featured actor Keanu Reeves, who does not identify as Muslim. Image credit: Reddit via Taiwan News 

Read Part I here.

Although ethnic minorities make up the majority of the extremism cases, there is a dearth of publicly available information about them, particularly those of the Islamic faith. Court judgments and judicial decisions like this in Xinjiang are deemed to be highly sensitive; they were almost never posted online even before the purge on China Judgements Online started in June 2021. Overseas news media sources have reported on a few cases, but it is impossible to grasp the whole picture due to the tight control on information flows in the region. In most cases, media reports did not explicitly state which specific extremism crimes were invoked.   

Radio Free Asia (RFA) is among the overseas news media groups which have occasionally covered extremism cases over the years. In September 2017, a Uyghur woman named Horigul Nasir was reportedly sentenced to 10 years in prison in Kashgar, presumably for extremism because she allegedly told one of her friends that not wearing a headscarf is sinful. The allegation, however, has been disputed by her brother, who claimed that his sister does not even wear a headscarf or pray five times a day.  

In another case also reported by RFA, a Uyghur businessman named Ekber Imin is serving a 25-year prison sentence for an unspecified extremism crime alongside two of his brothers. They were reportedly convicted for having foreign contacts and spreading extremism by incorporating ethnic and religious elements in the buildings they developed.  

In March 2022, RFA reported that Abdureshid Obul died in 2020 while serving his eight-year prison sentence for an extremism crime. The Uyghur farmer was reportedly jailed for having a fourth child and relocating his pregnant wife to avoid a forced abortion. Ethnic minority families living in rural areas are limited to two children. Authorities considered Abdureshid’s violation of the family planning policy to be an act of extremism.  

(Top) Horigul Nasir’s identification card. (Bottom) A photo of Ekber Imin’s passport page. Image credits: RFA listeners via RFA 

The harsh punishments given to the aforementioned Uyghurs are by no means isolated incidents. Dui Hua’s research into Chinese government sources found evidence of Muslim minorities receiving excessive punishment for committing extremism crimes in Xinjiang. For instance, Dui Hua discovered a case in which a Uyghur prisoner had his prison sentence extended by 15 years in July 2017 for violating Article 120(3). He was already serving his seven-year prison sentence for Article 300 “organizing or using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.” It is unclear which “cult organization” he had joined leading to his initial conviction. The court ordered him to serve a total prison sentence of 19 years and 8 months, which included the 56-month sentence for Article 300 he had yet to complete. After his prison sentence expires in 2036, he must still serve a supplemental deprivation of political rights sentence of five years. 

It would be a mistake to assume that only Uyghurs are singled out for excessive criminal punishment. An ethnic Dongxiang surnamed Chen received a 10-year prison sentence for Article 120(3) with a deprivation of political rights sentence of three years in Nilka County in July 2018. As with almost all other cases of a similar nature, there is no information about the acts that led to his harsh prison sentence. 

Two Rare Judgments 

Despite being unable to find an extremism judgment in Xinjiang, where the majority of extremism cases are tried and heavy sentences are meted out, Dui Hua found two rare judgments in other provinces. Dongxiang are among the Muslim communities who have faced restrictions in and outside of Xinjiang, but very little information is known about the crackdown on this ethnic group. The case of Ma Yinglong (马英龙) in Beijing indicates that besides growing beards, conducting regular prayer or unauthorized religious classes, or fasting for Ramadan, Islamic booksellers are another target of China’s crackdown on extremism. 

A picture of the opening ceremony of a Xinjiang re-education camp, posted online by the government in Korla, Xinjiang in June 2018. The partially obscured sign on the left reads “Transformation Through Education Center” (教育转化中心 jiàoyù zhuǎnhuà zhōngxīn). Image credit Korla government via SupChina 

Ma is a native from Xinjiang’s Yining County. He was convicted of Article 120(3) and sentenced to 13 months in prison by Beijing’s Haidian District People’s Court in September 2017. The crime stemmed from him running an Islamic bookstore which sold books about Islam and related topics. Additionally, he administered his IslamBook.net website, which offered a number of Islamic religious items including Malaysian-made hijabs and other clothing, Islamic arts and crafts, and halal food items, according to reporting from unofficial news media sources. 

The court judgment focused on one title he sold: Milestones: Ma'alim Fi'l Tariq. This book was written by Egyptian Islamic author Sayyid Qutb, who calls for the re-creation of the Muslim world on strictly Quranic grounds to counter western influence. Qutb is seen by some observers as one of the formative, leading theorists of violent jihad. Unbeknownst to Ma, the Chinese version of this book had been classified in China as an illegal publication about terrorism and extremism. Ma stated in his defense that he had not read the book; he only procured a total of six copies of Milestones at the request of his customers. The court rejected Ma’s defense because “he should have known about the extremely harmful nature of the book” considering he had many years of experience selling Islamic books. 

In another case, Dui Hua found that Uyghur businessman Erkin Balat was sentenced to 22 months in prison for Article 120(6) in Shandong. Erkin moved to Qufu from Xinjiang to start his jade business in 2007. In early 2017, he was found in possession of 50 Uyghur-language books, one Uyghur-Arabic dictionary and one Arabic-language Quran, which became evidence of him possessing articles to promote extremism. Some of the Uyghur titles touched on topics such as the history of Islam. Other evidence included two Japanese sabres and one Arabian scimitar he displayed in one of his shops. Erkin completed his prison sentence on March 8, 2021. 

Same Acts, Different Outcomes

In Part I, Dui Hua discussed how Han come into conflict with the law for extremism, including by possessing or circulating videos with scenes of violence in connection to the “East Turkestan Independence Movement,” ISIS, or the Taliban. Chinese law criminalizes such behavior regardless of ethnicity, but in practice there is a clear ethnic bias in sentencing. The same acts committed by Uyghurs or other Muslim minority groups are more likely to result in harsher criminal punishments. Precedents indicated that the same audio-visual evidence is almost certainly construed by prosecutors and judges to contain messages about “jihad” and “hijrat” (i.e. migration to another place for the sake of Allah) where the defendants practice Islam. In such cases, other crimes such as splittism, inciting splittism, and/or organizing or participating in a terrorist organization are often tacked on to the allegations of extremism.  

Screenshot from a 2019 CGTN program titled Fighting Terrorism in Xinjiang. Image credit: CGTN 

While Muslims in Western countries have been given prison sentences for viewing, disseminating, or producing films containing extremist material, these cases have typically been handled with greater transparency to hold law enforcements accountable for their decisions and ensure that their counterterrorism measures are non-arbitrary and impartial. In cases where this might not be possible, such as the CIA’s use of black sites to interrogate suspected terrorist actors or other “enemy combatants,” civil society organizations and independent journalism efforts can provide a degree of scrutiny.  

By contrast, cases in China are selectively transparent at best, as in many publicized cases of Han. The vast majority of ethnic minority cases remain shrouded in secrecy. Limited available evidence on Uyghurs and other ethnic groups suggests that the acts are more diverse, but they all resolve around the expression of Islam. Muslims are also much more likely to receive disproportionately severe sentences for the same crimes than the Han counterparts.