Thursday, June 12, 2014

Outside Beijing: Official June Fourth Accounts (Part IV)

Protesters fill Guangzhou’s Haizhou Plaza on June 5, 1989. Photo credit: Guangzhou Yearbook 1990

Nationwide 1,602 individuals were imprisoned as a result of the unrest and counterrevolutionary rioting that occurred across China in the spring and summer of 1989, according to judicial records released in 2003 by the Hunan provincial government.[*] Hunan said it imprisoned the most people, accounting for 133, or 8.3 percent, of the “two disturbances” prisoners.

Most other provinces and municipalities have remained silent about these numbers, but in 2005 Shandong made public that its courts sentenced 81 people in 1989 for counterrevolution and “beating, smashing, and looting” during the political turmoil. Of these 81 people, 46 were sentenced to imprisonment of five years or more, two to death with two-year reprieve, and one to death with immediate execution.

This data in conjunction with data in Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB) indicate that Shandong took a more hardline stance against two-disturbances prisoners than other provinces. The PPDB includes records of 20 such Shandong prisoners; 15 of whom were sentenced to at least 10 years in prison. In comparison, the PPDB shows that these lengthy sentences were handed down to only five of 11 two-disturbances prisoners in Guangdong.

External pressures, not the scale of the disturbances may be the key to this discrepancy. Protests were smaller in Shandong, but economic crisis and international pressure track with early releases in both places. Counterrevolutionary and violent cases in Shandong mostly occurred in the provincial capital of Jinan and the port city of Qingdao, but even in these cities protests stayed relatively small, according to available official information. While protests in the smaller cities of Harbin, Heilongjiang, and Yinchuan, Ningxia, saw demonstrations of 40,000 to 50,000 people in the spring and summer of 1989, Jinan’s largest demonstration peaked on May 21 at 9,000 people spread across several train stations throughout the city. On June 4, an average of 2,000 students protested across five cities: Jinan, Qingdao, Dongying, Taian and Liaocheng.

In Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong, 20,000 people joined May protests that were reportedly sparked by the 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement—a series of patriotic demonstrations triggered by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles that transferred Germany’s concessions in Shandong to Japan. After the killings in Beijing on June 4, 1989, tens of thousands of demonstrators blocked the Haizhu Bridge that crosses the Pearl River in Guangzhou, and “beating, smashing, and looting” ensued.

Some foreign governments responded to the killings and detentions with demands for greater human rights protections and clemency; some foreign businesses scaled back their investments. Having grown tremendously since the reform and opening in 1978, Guangdong felt keenly the loss of foreign investment. In this context, leaders in Guangdong eventually found it pragmatic to yield to demands for clemency. As early as 1992, three Hong Kong residents imprisoned in Guangdong were released on medical parole (see table). Within the first five years after 1989, at least four more prisoners received sentence reductions, parole, or medical parole.

Shandong avoided these pressures until the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to an exodus of the Korean firms, the largest investors in the province. After 1997, as Shandong attempted to appease western investors and stimulate economic recovery, at least eight prisoners were released early (see table).

Guangdong may have opted to serve less severe sentences because it was paying closer attention to its foreign friends from the start. Although the entire nation takes directives from the central party and government, regional differences cannot be ignored, then or now. Twenty-five years later June Fourth remains taboo for the state, but awareness about universal human rights is more widespread on the ground. Making interventions on behalf of human rights may seem like an endless and arduous journey, but there is evidence that these interventions make a difference when we narrow our focus, and seek to help individual prisoners.

June Fourth Prisoners in Shandong and Guangdong

Shandong
Name Sentence Crime Clemency Release Date
Chen Lantao
陈兰涛
18 yrs CR propaganda and incitement, gathering a crowd to disturb social order Released 7 yrs early 2000
Hao Fuyuan
郝付元
10 yrs CR propaganda and incitement Released ~3 yrs early Jul 18, 1996
Hao Jinguang
郝劲光
11 yrs CR propaganda and incitement Released ~4 yrs early 1996
Jie Jinyu
解金玉
6 yrs Unknown Jun 6, 1995
Li Haiyun
李海云
12 yrs CR propaganda and incitement Released ~2 yrs early 1999
Liu Yubin
刘玉滨
3 yrs CR propaganda and incitement Jun 1992
Meng Qingqin
孟庆秦
10 yrs CR propaganda and incitement Paroled Apr 26, 1997
Niu Shengchang
钮盛昌
12 yrs Conspiring to overthrow the government 2001
Shan Zhenheng
单振衡
3 yrs (RTL) Disturbing social order 1991
Shao Liangchen
邵良臣
Death with 2- yr reprieve Sabotaging transport and infrastructure Commuted to life (1992); reduced to 17 yrs (1994); reduced 42 mos (1998, 2000); reduced 1 yr (2002); medical parole (2004) 2004
Sun Baohe
孙保河
Death Arson
Sun Weibang
孙维邦
12 yrs CR propaganda and incitement Released early 1999
Wang Furong (女)
王福荣 (F)
5 yrs Unknown 1994
Wang Lixin
王立新
10 yrs Sabotaging transport and infrastructure 1999
Wang Yong
王勇
10 yrs Sabotaging transport and infrastructure 1999
Zhang Jie
张杰
18 yrs CR propaganda and incitement, gathering a crowd to disrupt traffic Released early 2001
Zhang Xiaoxu
张霄旭
15 yrs CR propaganda and incitement Reduced 4 yrs (1994, 1996); paroled 1998
Zhang Xinchao
张新潮
3 yrs CR propaganda and incitement 1992
Zhang Yafei
张亚飞
11 yrs CR propaganda and incitement 2001
Zheng Quanli
郑全利
15 yrs Organizing/leading/actively participating in CR group Reduced 3 yrs (1994, 1997) 2001

Guangdong
Name Sentence Crime Clemency Release Date
Chen Pokong
陈破空
3 yrs CR propaganda and incitement Jul 1992
Chen Zhixiang
陈志祥
10 yrs CR propaganda and incitement Sentence reduced 24 mos (1995) Nov 1995
Lo Hoi-sing
罗海星
5 yrs Giving harbor and protection to criminals Medical parole 1991
Li Jiaoming
黎觉明
18 yrs Hooliganism, robbery Reduced 1 yr (1994), 1 yr (1998); commuted Sep 2004
Li Lung-hing
李龙庆
4 yrs Giving harbor and protection to criminals Medical parole 1992
Lin Songlin
林松林
8 yrs CR propaganda and incitement Deceased
Lai Pui-sing
黎沛成
5 yrs Giving harbor and protection to criminals Medical parole 1992
Liu Baiqiang
刘柏强
10 yrs Robbery Released 5 yrs early Jun 2001
Wu Jiandong
吴健东
10 yrs Espionage Reduced 20 mos (1993), 24 mos (1995) Aug 1995
Yi Danxian
易丹轩
3yrs Robbery Released 11 mos early Aug 1991
Zhang Yi
张益
13 yrs Espionage Reduced 15 mos (1992), 1 yr (1995), 1 yr (1996); commuted May 1998


* Hunan Records: Judicial and Administration Records, 1978-2002 湖南省志:司法行政志.

Tuesday, June 10, 2014

Detained Actor Spotlights Custody and Education, Censors Intervene

Huang Haibo. Photo credit: sohu.com

On May 15, police in Beijing detained well-known Chinese actor Huang Haibo for soliciting a prostitute. He and the prostitute were each subjected to 15 days of administrative detention, after which police decided to send them both to custody and education—a custodial measure targeting sex workers and their clients—for an additional six months. Reversing an earlier decision, Huang's Weibo account announced on June 8 that he will not appeal. On June 9, he terminated the contract with his lawyer Mo Shaoping.

The Chinese public has largely responded with sympathy for Huang and a sense that his punishment is excessive. Since the abolition of reeducation through labor (RTL) in 2013, the Chinese public seems to have become less tolerant for measures that enable police to detain individuals for extended periods without proper legal basis or due process. This has led some to push for abolition of “quasi-RTL” measures like custody and education.

In fact, there were signs of a healthy public debate over custody and education even before Huang’s case helped put the measure in the spotlight. In early May, more than 100 individuals signed a petition calling on the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee to abolish custody and education. After Huang’s arrest, on June 7, a group of legal experts, scholars, and lawyers met in Beijing leading to another proposal recommending formal abolition of the custody and education system.

Like the debate over RTL in 2012, many of the controversies surrounding custody and education have received widespread attention from the Chinese media. One article, however, appears to have crossed an invisible line. On June 4, an article entitled “What is the Legal Basis for Custody and Education?” was published on the front page of Procuratorate Daily, the official newspaper of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, one of China’s main law-enforcement bodies. According to a report received by the China Digital Times website, media outlets were later instructed not to republish this article and immediately delete it from their online sites. On the website of Procuratorate Daily, the article is visible on an image of the front page of the June 4 edition, but links have been broken to both that article (available via web cache) and a more legible image of the front page.

It is not clear why this particular article was singled out for censorship. One possibility might be its concluding emphasis on the need for more effective ways for Chinese citizens to challenge the constitutionality or legality of measures or legislation. Although popular discontent over measures like “custody and repatriation” or RTL eventually led officials to abolish these detention measures, the initiative for action has very much remained in the hands of Chinese authorities. Establishing a routine mechanism for constitutional review—like the one suggested in this article—is liable to shift some of that initiative to society, and to give citizens a channel through which to assert the supremacy of constitutional principles and rule of law. China’s current leaders have expressed a certain degree of hostility to a system of constitutional checks and balances, and this article may have tested the limits of that attitude.

*
What is the Legal Basis for “Custody and Education”?

Xiao Rong
Procuratorate Daily, June 4, 2014

Experts believe that custody and education is unlawful and unjustified and that those sent for custody and education can protect their rights in accordance with the law

Recently, the decision to send actor Huang Haibo to custody and education has put the Measures for the Custody and Education of Prostitutes and Clients of Prostitutes [hereafter, “Custody and Education Measures”] in public view. It has also raised many questions: Is custody and education lawful and justified? Does sending a prostitute or client of prostitutes to custody and education after [they serve] administrative detention violate the prohibition against “double jeopardy”? How should a review mechanism be initiated for “evil laws” that violate the constitution and Legislation Law? On June 3, Procuratorate Daily interviewed legal scholars regarding these questions.

Back on September 4, 1993, the State Council issued the Custody and Education Measures in response to the NPC Standing Committee’s 1991 Decision on the Strict Prohibition of Prostitution. According to these measures, which the State Council revised in 2010, “Prostitutes and the clients of prostitutes, in addition to the penalties provided for under Article 66 of the Public Order Management Penalty Law of the People’s Republic of China, in those cases in which RTL is not yet necessary, may be placed under custody and education by the public security organ.” Custody and education, which can last from six months to two years, primarily involves collective legal and moral education, arrangement of productive labor, and testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases for prostitutes and the clients of prostitutes.

“Custody and education is a compulsory measure restricting personal liberty that falls between general administrative penalties and RTL. However, the Administrative Compulsion Law does not have any provision for this kind of compulsory measure,” says Qi Dongwen, assistant professor at Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications Law School. Qi believes that the custody and education system is unlawful, both in terms of its legislative status and content.

According to China’s constitution, the personal freedom of citizens is inviolable. According to Article 8 of the Legislation Law, enacted in 2000, compulsory measures and penalties that deprive citizens of their political rights or restrict their personal freedom may only be enacted by law. Jiang Ming’an, director of the Center for Constitution and Administrative Law Studies at Peking University, told Procuratorate Daily that the provisions of the Decision on the Strict Prohibition of Prostitution involving restriction of personal freedom are in conflict with the aforementioned provision of the Legislation Law because that decision is not an act of law. Moreover, Article 9 of the Legislation Law states: “If laws have not been enacted regarding the matters specified in Article 8 of this law, the NPC or its Standing Committee has the power to make a decision to authorize the State Council to formulate administrative regulations first for some of those matters, based on actual needs, excluding criminal offenses and their punishment, compulsory measures and penalties involving deprivation of citizens’ political rights or restriction of the freedom of their persons, and the judicial system.” Therefore, the Custody and Education Measures are also in conflict with the Legislation Law. Qi Dongwen adds: “Custody and education also conflicts with the 2005 Public Order Management Penalty Law, which provides for detention or fines for prostitutes and their clients and makes no mention of custody and education.”

In the view of Fu Dalin, assistant professor at the Xi’an Institute of Political Studies [a unit of the People’s Liberation Army], custody and education is a coercive measure that took shape as part of China’s social management process that specifically targets prostitutes and their customers. In light of its own particular background, it has a certain degree of justification. However, since the enactment of the Legislation Law and Administrative Compulsion Law, the illegal and contradictory nature of this system has become increasingly apparent, and there is no further need for it to exist.

Does it violate the prohibition against “double jeopardy” to send prostitutes and their clients to custody and education after placing them under administrative detention? Fu Dalin told Procuratorate Daily that if you look simply at legal statute, custody and education following administrative detention does not count as “double jeopardy” because custody and education is not an administrative penalty. But looking from the perspective of law enforcement, administrative compulsion involves placing temporary restrictions on a citizen’s personal freedom in accordance with the law or taking temporary control of property belonging to a citizen, legal person, or other organization in accordance with the law, all for the purpose of preventing unlawful behavior, avoiding harm from occurring, and controlling the spread of danger. In prostitution cases, administrative detention or fines should be sufficient, and there is no need to impose additional custody and education.

Given that custody and education lacks clear lawfulness or justification, can Huang Haibo and others sent to custody and education protect their rights [through legal channels]? Fu Dalin says they can: “No matter whether it is an administrative coercive measure or an administrative penalty, if the person concerned believes the measure is unlawful he or she may file administrative litigation in accordance with the law in order to protect his or her own lawful rights and interests.”

Qi Dongwen says: “The Sun Zhigang incident led to the abolition of the custody and repatriation system. Complaints by petitioning mother Tang Hui led to the abolition of RTL. I believe that Huang Haibo’s case is a good chance to initiate the constitutional review mechanism and call an immediate halt to the custody and education system.” Fu Dalin recommends that there ought to be a regular channel within the state’s institutional arrangement for resolving difficult questions of constitutional review. “The review process established in the current Legislation Law only involves the ‘Part One’ issues of raising requests or recommendations for review,” says Fu. “There needs to be additional content added for the more crucial stage of ‘Part Two.’ Review of the Legislation Law is in the works, and I hope that it will establish an appropriate mechanism for constitutional review and oversight.”