China Plots National Verdict Database

Supreme People’s Court meeting on judicial openness in Liuzhou, Guangxi, May 8, 2013. Photo credit: Gmw.cn

Appeals for public access to court documents may have gained new ground in China. Following a recent upsurge in reporting on miscarriages of justice, plans to establish a national database of court decisions became the main topic of discussion at a meeting convened by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) on May 8 and 9. The meeting appears to be part of new SPC President Zhou Qiang’s effort to increase the transparency and credibility of the judicial system.

Calls to make court verdicts available online have been around almost as long as the Internet in China. Nearly a decade ago, legal scholars such as Peking University’s He Weifang argued that the online publication of verdicts would bring increased scrutiny and force judges to produce higher-quality judgements. Advocates of online publication also say that it will promote greater public awareness of the judicial system and its procedures.

In the years since, there has been a gradual expansion in both the number of courts that put verdicts online and the scope of decisions that are available for public viewing. In 2007, the SPC issued guidelines urging courts to increase their efforts in this regard, and courts in Henan Province have perhaps gone the farthest, publishing over 440,000 decisions on its court websites as of the beginning of this year. In February 2013, Guangdong High People’s Court President Zheng E said that Guangdong courts would start to publish “all” court verdicts online in the coming months.

In an opinion piece published in the May 12 edition of The Beijing News (translated below), lawyer Liu Changsong welcomes the plans for a national database and provides some examples of how access to court documents can make it easier for people to appeal wrongful convictions. He also cites curbing judicial corruption as an important reason to make verdicts available online.

If plans for a national database are realized, it would be a monumental showing of transparency in China’s often opaque judicial system, but there is good reason to believe that any such database would remain selective. Courts are likely to resist having their work subjected to public scrutiny, and certain types of verdicts are expected to remain outside the public domain. In particular, cases that involve crimes of “endangering state security” are less likely to become public given their political nature and tendency to be classified as involving “state secrets.” Similarly, while Chinese courts have released verdicts in cases of death with two year reprieve (as these sentences are generally commuted to life or fixed-term imprisonment), it would be surprising if they released decisions in all cases of death with immediate execution, as this would shed light on another closely guarded secret: the number of executions—believed to be in the thousands—that China carries out each year.

Although some of these exceptions may seem logical on the surface, they are not based in the law. This is because, while Chinese law allows courts to hear certain cases in closed hearings when issues such as state secrecy or privacy are involved, the law requires that all court verdicts be announced publicly, even for closed trials. Legitimate concerns about personal privacy may justify light redaction of certain court decisions, but complete exclusion or heavy culling of entire verdict categories would simply highlight the division of the legal system into two realms—one open and the other hidden—divided out of political expedience, rather than legal bounds.

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Publishing Court Decisions Will Help Reduce Judicial Corruption
Liu Changsong, The Beijing News
May 12, 2013

The core motivation of making court decisions public is to allow judicial decisions to have oversight from all sectors [of society] and thereby promote judicial fairness.

Recently, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) held a study meeting on judicial openness in Liuzhou, Guangxi, where publishing court decisions online became a hot topic of discussion. The SPC Judicial Reform Office revealed that a Chinese Judicial Decision Website may be operational within the year (via People’s Court Daily).

Publication of judicial decisions is the issue related to judicial openness that has received the most public attention. With the development of Internet technology, many have dreamed of the ability to freely search for and read online any judicial decision that they care about. Now, that dream will finally become a reality.

The reason that publication of judicial decisions has received so much attention is because of its importance. The [decisions] fully reflect the claims of each party, the court’s finding of fact, and the reasoning behind the court’s decision. They are the basis for appeal and petition when a party doesn’t agree with the decision, as well as the basis for the court’s implementation of the verdict after it takes effect. Even more, [publication of verdicts] is a basis for all sectors of society to monitor and oversee court decisions.

A well-known example can show the difficulties that arise when court decisions are unavailable. In 2005, 10 years after Nie Shubin was executed for rape and murder, the real culprit was discovered. Nie’s mother spent two years petitioning the Shijiazhuang Intermediate People’s Court and the Hebei High People’s Court to re-open the case, but both courts refused to accept the petition without a copy of the court decision. After two years of petitioning, a mysterious person sent Nie’s mother copies of the first- and second-instance decisions by courier, finally enabling her to initiate the petition process.

As Nie’s mother said: “If we’re not even clear about the court’s finding of fact, how can we petition? If we don’t even know the specific document number of the effective verdict, how can we ask for a retrial?” Of course, despite continued petitioning by Nie’s mother, for a variety of reasons there has not yet been any result in the Nie Shubin case. This is something that causes legal professionals to feel deep [regret]. That’s another issue entirely, but one can get a sense of the importance of court decisions from the fact that without a verdict it’s impossible to petition for retrial.

As a lawyer, I’ve also felt the awkwardness of not being able to access court decisions. Last year, I represented the victim’s family in a voluntary manslaughter case. After both the first- and second-instance trials, the victim’s parents did not accept the verdict and wanted to petition for a retrial. They didn’t have a copy of the verdict, so I had to use my connections to get a photocopy from the court so that we could initiate the petition process.

Of course, even the current criminal procedure law does not categorize the immediate family members of a deceased victim as a party to the case or require that they be given a copy of the court verdict. This is a gap in the legislation, but if they could easily go online to search for and copy court verdicts, this gap would be sufficiently filled.

Naturally, the benefit of publishing court decisions online would not merely be to facilitate appeals and court petitions. The core motivation is to allow all sectors [of society] to engage in oversight of judicial decisions and, thereby, promote judicial fairness. Publication of court decisions online can force courts to improve the quality of their decisions, increase the reasoning of the decisions, promote a higher degree of professionalism among judges, prevent and reduce judicial corruption, and increase the credibility of the courts.

Both the constitution and the law have clear provisions about public adjudication, so there is no legal impediment to publishing all court documents online. I understand that the SPC is presently undertaking to establish a Chinese Judicial Decision Website that when fully functional will include all types of verdicts, be updated in real time, contain clear categories, have scientific search functionality, and provide convenient statistical information and automatic analysis. At the same time, I hope that the SPC will issue an authoritative judicial interpretation on the subject of publishing all court decisions online in order to provide even stronger legal protection for judicial openness.

How Many More Sacrifices until Rule of Law Reigns?

Zhao Yanjin and her husband read her acquittal verdict in their home after her release. She had spent 10 years in custody. Photo credit: dfdaily.com

On May 6, the China Youth Daily reported on the case of a Hebei woman, Zhao Yanjin, who had stood accused of murdering a neighbor’s child in 2001. In May 2011, after a series of trials, appeals, and conflicting court decisions, the Hebei Higher People’s Court finally acquitted her on the grounds of insufficient evidence. By that time, she had spent nearly 10 years in police custody.

This might have been just one more case of belated exoneration for a suspect victimized by a criminal justice system that too often rushes to solve murder case. But there was an added twist: in Zhao’s case, it took six months for the court’s decision to reach the Baoding Intermediate People’s Court, which was responsible for announcing Zhao’s innocence, and after the decision was announced authorities in Baoding delayed her release for more than a year while they took steps to ensure that the murdered child’s relatives would not protest the decision.

Meanwhile, unaware of the acquittal, Zhao’s husband continued to protest her innocence by petitioning, which landed him in a reeducation through labor (RTL) facility for nearly 10 months—his second RTL sentence for petitioning on his wife’s behalf. In the weeks leading up to her release, court officials repeatedly met with Zhao and had her write a statement promising to remain “low-key” after her release.

Chinese media has recently reported several stories similar to Zhao Yanjin’s. In late April, two men in Zhejiang submitted a claim for 7.02 million yuan (US$1.1 million) in state compensation after a court retrial found insufficient evidence to support their conviction on rape charges nearly 10 years ago. The men say that they had been tortured into confessing. Then on May 3, five men were acquitted of charges stemming from the bombing of a government office in Fujian province—charges for which they, too, had spent a decade in custody while court proceedings stalled because local law-enforcement authorities were unwilling to acknowledge that they had no case beyond confessions coerced through torture.

In the wake of these and other cases, the problem of wrongful convictions has been in the spotlight in recent months. In March, the president of the Zhejiang Higher People’s Court blamed pressure to deal with murder cases and other serious crime for the frequent use of torture to extract confessions. Earlier this week, Shen Deyong, a vice-president at the Supreme People’s Court, warned in an essay in China Court News that mounting wrongful convictions posed an “unprecedented challenge” to China’s court system.

In a commentary posted on a major news portal in Henan Province (where authorities recently announced that judges will held accountable for wrongful convictions), Ning Xinchun reflects on the way that Zhao Yanjin’s husband describes their sacrifices as necessary to promote rule of law development in China. Ning rejects this interpretation, writing that Chinese citizens are much too easily sacrificed to the largely indifferent power of the state. Instead of forgiveness and a willingness to sacrifice oneself in the interest of eventual progress, Ning suggests that such progress is not inevitable and that outrage at the unacceptability of such sacrifices is instead needed to change a criminal justice system that makes people live in fear.

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Citizen Sacrifice Doesn’t Represent Rule of Law Progress
Ning Xinchun
May 6, 2013 dahe.cn

“Without sacrifice, we can’t further the promotion of rule of law,” said Li Jianjun. Li is Zhao Yanjin’s husband. In an effort to proclaim his wife’s innocence, he went all over to engage in petitioning and was sent to re-education through labor more than once. In September 2001, Zhao Yanjin got caught up in a murder case. Over 12 years, she was twice sentenced to life in prison and twice acquitted. Before fully recovering her freedom, she had spent a total of 10 years in a detention center. After the Hebei high court issued its acquittal decision, she was kept in custody for an additional 20 months before she regained her freedom. (Source: China Youth Daily, May 6)

A close look at the news reveals that the experience of Zhao Yanjin and her family is not unique. First, there was the She Xianglin case. Then there was the reversal of the case in Zhejiang of the uncle and nephew surnamed Zhang who had been wrongly convicted for more than 10 years. Then there was the Henan case of the “guaranteed death sentence” for defendant Li Huailiang. In terms of the time involved and the experience of having finally been acquitted and released on grounds of insufficient evidence after going through seven court hearings and three verdicts, the case is much more similar to the case of the bombing at the Fuqing, Fujian, discipline inspection committee office, where five defendants languished for 12 years in prison only to be acquitted and released.

Without doubt, human life cannot be recovered. More than a decade passed in jail, with no career advancement, loss of health, and even changing the fate of the entire family. Under the giant wheels of the state machine, lowly individuals wind up being ground up into scattered dust. Perhaps it’s out of a sorrowful choice to “forgive” or an intentional exaggeration of consciousness [that leads them to say]: “Without sacrifice, we can’t further the promotion of rule of law.”

What this news shows is that, the reality of the justice system is not only a host of procedural problems but the fact that the presumption of innocence is often set aside. Pursuing responsibility in these individual cases perhaps won’t have huge significance for a country’s legal system. But to each citizen, there is nothing in the world more significant. Faced with a shattered family or loss of life, any so-called “huge compensation” is really quite insignificant. In this respect, fairness and transparency of the legal system, adherence to basic legal rationality such as “no crime without sufficient evidence” is the most valuable thing in the lives of ordinary people because it protects people from malicious prosecution under the law.

In Hugo’s masterpiece Les Misérables, there is a representative of the legal system, Javert, who spends his entire life pursuing the main character, Jean Valjean. Here, the law almost becomes a force of evil used to attack ordinary people. Just like these innocent Chinese citizens who have spent long years locked up in jail, Jean Valjean lives his life in the shadow of this kind of evil law, living a life of continual setbacks, vagrancy, jail, and persecution. The only beauty in his life is in his imagining the kingdom of heaven.

Only through strict observance of legal procedure and adherence to legal rationality can we prevent the way that the machinery of state has for a long time waged mistaken wars against citizens. From another perspective, this raises a question that urgently needs to be answered: when citizens fall into deliberate legal traps, how should they use everything from state institutions to civil society to mobilize and organize forces to remedy the situation and clear channels for relief? We’ve seen that when there is no [means to seek] immediate remedy, any person can fall victim to this kind of evil legal system. If you have good luck, you can wait until the facts of the case clear your name; if not, you can spend your life in jail.

But we know that justice is not a matter of hitting the jackpot.

In his brilliant work of philosophy, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu holds rationality to be the first criterion and maintains that ordinary laws are [reflections of] human rationality and that law is the application of human rationality in special circumstances. Today, people do not lack in expectations for rationality, but the progress of a country’s rule of law, besides being built upon the foundation of people’s rationality, must also [be based in] the state’s adherence to rationality, including a pursuit of procedural legality, improving channels for relief, etc.

At the beginning of the essay, the party to the case said that without sacrifice, we can’t further the promotion of rule of law. But society should not take comfort in this kind of magnanimous forgiveness. Instead, we should always bear in mind: citizen sacrifice does not represent social progress; it represents the shame of our rule of law, and nothing more.

Tang Hui Case: Why the Focus Should Be on Judicial Independence

Tang Hui weeps outside the courtroom after her lawsuit was rejected. Photo credit: Ycwb.com

Last Friday, the Yongzhou Intermediate People’s Court in Hunan Province rejected a much-anticipated administrative lawsuit brought by “Petitioning Mother” Tang Hui against the local reeducation through labor (RTL) management committee. Tang is seeking a written apology and about 2,500 yuan (approximately US $400) in compensation and damages for the controversial RTL decision issued against her in August 2012. The decision sentenced her to one and a half years of RTL in response to the tenacious petitioning she lodged to bring perpetrators and police to justice in her daughter’s case of sexual abuse and exploitation.

Influenced by strong public sympathy for a mother whose 11-year-old child was repeatedly raped and forced into prostitution, the provincial RTL Committee annulled the local committee’s decision shortly after Tang applied for administrative reconsideration. The annulment was issued on the grounds that, under the circumstances, admonition and education would be “more appropriate.”

At issue during this month’s trial was whether the Hunan Province RTL Committee’s revocation of the RTL decision against Tang means that the original decision should be considered “unlawful,” and therefore eligible for compensation. Tang’s lawyers argued that the annulment clearly implied that the decision was unlawful. Although the Yongzhou RTL Committee acknowledged in court that the RTL decision had been “clearly inappropriate,” it countered that the decision to release Tang had been made out of “humanitarian concern” (namely, in light of her need to care for her traumatized daughter), without questioning the legality of the underlying RTL decision.

If the Yongzhou RTL Committee’s action against Tang Hui was “clearly inappropriate,” then it could be argued that the RTL decision represented an abuse of official power, which would be grounds for compensation under Chinese law. But instead of undertaking its own examination of the legality of the original RTL decision—an authority it has under the revised State Compensation Law—the court ultimately accepted the argument that the decision had been “inappropriate,” but not “unlawful.” The result is a seemingly paradoxical conclusion in which both the RTL decision against Tang and the subsequent revocation of that decision were found to be proper and lawful.

Images of an inconsolable mother circulated widely on the Internet after the intermediate court’s decision, followed by numerous expressions of public sympathy and outrage at the perceived unwillingness of local authorities to admit their mistakes. The inability of the judicial system to achieve a just outcome in Tang’s case threatens to lead to further erosion of trust in the judicial system, a dangerous loss of legitimacy, and a potential source of instability.

But whereas the majority of commentators see Tang’s case as a consequence of the flawed RTL system, Hainan University Law School Professor Wang Lin, a frequent commentator on legal matters, places blame on the strained relationship between China’s judiciary and the system of “letters and visits” (or xinfang, a system that gives Chinese citizens an extra-judicial channel through which to make complaints and petition for redress of grievances). Lack of faith in the judicial system’s ability to produce justice leads people like Tang Hui to petition, but seeing them as threats to social stability, authorities take measures against petitioners and thereby exacerbate a broader sense of injustice.

This vicious cycle exists independently of specific countermeasures, meaning that reform or abolition of RTL is unlikely to break the cycle. Writing in Monday’s Oriental Morning News, Wang opines that the solution lies in the promotion of an independent judiciary, one that would restore citizens’ faith and confidence in the legal system and make alternative channels like petitioning less necessary.

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Use Tang Hui Case to Rebuild Relationship of Judiciary, Petitions
Wang Lin, Oriental Morning News
April 15, 2013 

On March 25, the first-instance decision was issued in the suit brought by Lanzhou’s “Petitioning Mother” Zhao Meifu[*] against the Lanzhou RTL Committee. The court rejected Zhao’s litigation demands on the grounds that the deadline for litigation had already passed. On April 12, a first-instance decision was issued in the suit brought by Yongzhou, Hunan’s “Petitioning Mother” Tang Hui against the Yongzhou RTL committee. The court found that plaintiff Tang Hui’s demands could not be accepted because they lacked a factual and legal basis.

It is no coincidence that both of these “petitioning mothers” lost their respective lawsuits against RTL committees. Public opinion expects the tears of these “petitioning mothers” to be the final blow prevailing over the RTL system. Judging from the statements made by the relevant central authorities, this is no extravagant hope. Major changes are in the works for RTL; it’s just a matter of time.

With the Tang Hui and Zhao Meifu cases as points of departure, attention to the reform or even abolition of the RTL system is a natural public reaction. But hidden in the background of these two cases is not simply a debate over the legality of the RTL system, but [a need to] rethink the relationship between petitioning and the judicial system. Why were the “petitioning mothers” sent to RTL? Because of their “petitioning.” Why did they “trust the petitioning system rather than the judicial system”? Because they believed that they had already exhausted all channels for a judicial remedy and felt that they were unable to defend their rights effectively. So, they tied their hopes to the petitioner’s path.

For example, in the Tang Hui case, this mother was an ordinary citizen who became a “victim’s relative” because of a sudden calamity from heaven. In October 2006, her 11-year-old daughter was repeatedly raped and then forced into prostitution. Ordinarily, in a society with rule of law, the police ought to launch an investigation soon after receiving a report [of a crime]. But, ironically, in this major case, it was the victim’s mother who went undercover to collect evidence and then asked two relatives to pose as brothel customers in order to save her daughter. Afterwards, only after Tang Hui threatened to kill herself were the police motivated to file the case for investigation. Then after that, at many key stages in the judicial process, action was only “compelled” through some stirringly desperate rights-defense measures pursued outside the legal system. Whenever there are problems with the rule of law, petitioning naturally replaces rule-of-law channels.

And as we can observe from media descriptions [of the case], it wasn’t actually the “petitioning” that led to the case being handled in accordance with the law; rather it was the “impact” that impelled the relevant accommodations. That “impact” Tang Hui made by petitioning was also the cause of her being sent to RTL.

Let’s look at how the “case of the Yongzhou girl forced into prostitution” evolved into the “case of Tang Hui v. Yongzhou RTL Committee”: On August 2 of last year, the Yongzhou RTL Committee decided to send Tang Hui to one and a half years of RTL for disturbing social order. Tang Hui did not accept the RTL decision and applied for administrative reconsideration by the Hunan Province RTL Committee on August 7. Three days later, amid the focus of public opinion, the Hunan Province RTL Committee annulled the RTL decision.

After being released from RTL, Tang Hui then applied for state compensation. On January 5 of this year, the Yongzhou RTL Committee rejected her request and issued a decision not to pay state compensation. On January 22, Tang Hui sued the [committee] in the Yongzhou Intermediate [People’s] Court. After losing in the court of first instance, media flocked to report that Tang Hui would appeal the case to the Hunan High People’s Court.

Assuming that rejection is still the ultimate outcome of this case, will Tang Hui accept the decision and drop her lawsuit? If Tang Hui does not accept the final verdict, at that point the only channel for judicial remedy would be the even more uncertain path of appealing to reopen the case. This could perhaps send Tang Hui once more on the old path of petitioning.

If the judicial system is unable to end disputes, then the path of abnormal petitioning becomes viable again, and in the worst case scenario, RTL measures that exist out of a need to maintain stability would inevitably befall Tang Hui yet again. In order to prevent petitioners from falling into this vicious cycle, it is imperative to reconsider the petitioning system. Even if the RTL system is brought to an end within the year, if profound reforms aren’t made to the petitioning system, then replacement measures will inevitably be put in [RTL’s] place. This is practically a vicious cycle.

Thus it is just as important to use Tang Hui’s case as an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the judiciary and petitioning as it is to reconsider the RTL system. If it is rare that a person sent to RTL is successful in a suit against an RTL committee, it’s definitely not solely because of “malicious litigation”; in reality, much of the time it’s because of the “mutual cooperation” of relevant departments.

If rights defenders are deprived of their personal liberty because they use “inappropriate” measures to “force state organs to perform their duties in accordance with the law,” I fear this will only force rights defenders onto the path of no return. As a victim, Tang Hui did not set out to choose petitioning. She once believed in the local police and judicial bodies and exhausted her energies urging the local functional departments to perform their duties in accordance with the law. Her “petitioning” was because the actions at the “lower levels” made her lose that belief.

Resolving this difficult situation rests on rebuilding the relationship between the judiciary and petitioning and making it ordinary for parties’ lawful rights and interests to be protected within legal channels. It is essential to let judicial independence pave the way for judicial fairness. Only by protecting citizens’ lawful rights and interests can we ensure the stability of localities and rights; this is an undisputable truth.

(The author is an assistant professor at Hainan University Law School.)

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* Zhao Meifu has reportedly been involved in petitioning activities for 20 years. In November 2012, she went to Beijing to visit her son, a postgraduate student studying in the capital, and was intercepted by police under suspicion for petitioning. Lanzhou, Gansu, police escorted Zhao back home where, without being granted access to her family, she was sentenced to one year of RTL. The case received media attention after Zhao’s son posted it on Weibo (a Chinese version of Twitter), and 18 days after being sent to RTL, Zhao was released citing medical reasons. ⇑

Magazine Exposé Reinvigorates Calls to End RTL

The story as it appears in the April edition of Lens

The recurrent exposure of individuals sent on dubious charges to reeducation through labor (RTL) is one important impetus to growing consensus about the need to reform or abolish RTL in China. Details of cases involving online criticism or petitioning have galvanized opinion against the nearly 60-year-old system of administrative detention, which central authorities indicate will undergo reform later this year.

The past few days have added urgency to an overhaul of the RTL system. In its April issue (published on April 6), Lens magazine included a 14-page exposé of exploitation, abuse, and torture at the Masanjia women’s RTL facility in Liaoning Province. Based on interviews with more than 20 women formerly incarcerated there—most of whom were sent to Masanjia over the past decade as punishment for petitioning—the article documents dehumanizing treatment in an institution where power can be exercised with near complete impunity.

Domestic Media Wildfire

The article is remarkable for its detailed descriptions of conditions at Masanjia and its corroboration of detainee accounts by labor-camp staff. Coming from Lens, a mainland publication owned by the publishers of popular financial magazine Caijing, the report arguably lends concern over RTL abuse more weight and traction inside China than reports by Western media or NGOs. Human rights organizations have reported the appalling conditions in RTL facilities before, and many of the accounts of torture at Masanjia echo allegations that have been raised for many years by practitioners of Falun Gong, banned by the Chinese government in 1999. In late 2012, Masanjia was named in mainstream Western media after an Oregon woman opened a box of Halloween decorations to find a letter apparently enclosed by a detainee at that women’s RTL facility. The letter described workers laboring for long hours with little rest and nearly negligible pay in order to avoid torture or abuse.

Once online, the Lens story created an immediate sensation. A slightly shortened version of the article was the most-read item on four major Chinese news sites. According to analysis (subsequently deleted from the Internet) by the “Public Opinion Monitoring Office” of People’s Daily Online, by noon on April 8, at least 420,000 had participated in online discussion of the report. The story could be found on more than 200 news sites and web forums, and it was discussed in 16,000 microblog posts, up from just over 200 the day before. Discussion has been overwhelmingly negative and has strengthened calls for the abolition of RTL and better oversight of the criminal justice system. Based on the data, analysts predicted that the public would become increasingly incensed and warned relevant authorities to “pay close attention to the potential for further developments.”

Official responses to the allegations have so far been mixed. On the one hand, authorities in Liaoning announced that they would form a special investigative team, including members of the media and the local people’s congress, to look into the charges. (This resembles the response of Yunnan officials who were faced with public pressure over a series of suspicious deaths in police detention centers in 2009.) On the other hand, officials from the Central Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party reportedly issued instructions on April 9 prohibiting media outlets from “reposting, reporting, or commenting” on the Masanjia story. In response, many websites have pulled the article, although, at present, most of the Lens report remains openly available online.

Extreme Corporal Punishment

The most shocking details from the Lens article are of inhuman and degrading punishment. Formerly incarcerated women describe being sent to solitary confinement in tiny cells with as little as two square meters of floor space. Inadequate air circulation left women—many of whom already suffered from physical ailments—gasping for breath and nosing the ground for drafts that might waft under the door. These damp, fetid spaces lacked adequate heating in winter, and the women often had no choice but to relieve themselves on the floor. One woman describes being handcuffed to a cell door and forced to remain standing day and night for two weeks. Although Ministry of Justice regulations limit the use of solitary confinement cells to a maximum of 10 days, women recount being held for months at a time.

The article also reports beatings, reckless use of electric batons, bodily suspension, and use of the notorious “tiger bench.” Women were hung, their outstretched arms handcuffed to the upper frames of bunk beds, so that the tips of their toes just barely touched the ground. Others were hung in awkward positions with their bodies stretched and contorted. One woman described being suspended for 28 hours. Asked about the use of such torture at Masanjia, one of the article’s inside informants explained that it was similar to the way a parent uses corporal punishment to force a child to submit: “This is related to a guard’s individual personality. Some see themselves as those who are in control, whose every action is correct. They do not have an understanding of those sent to RTL.”

Many of the petitioners interviewed used hunger strikes as a form of protest, but the response from authorities was nothing short of brutal. Hunger strikers were routinely placed on “death beds,” their bodies strapped down tightly while their mouths were wrenched open and feeding tubes forced down their throats. Confined this way for days, many of the women came away with permanent scars and broken and loosened teeth. In extreme cases, women subjected to these various treatments have developed serious mental illness and been forced to undergo radical treatments, including electroshock.

Seeking Redress on Shaky Ground

Whether describing inhuman treatment, exploitative working conditions, or the quality of food and sanitation, a recurring theme in the article is that the conditions at Masanjia fail to meet norms set forth in Chinese laws and regulations. This fact seems obvious even to those running the carceral institution, but despite such recognition, incarcerated women appear to have little recourse to protection.

An anonymous source quoted throughout the article repeatedly blames the system of “stability maintenance” for putting undue pressure on the RTL apparatus—in particular, for institutionalizing people who do not meet the criteria for confinement. “In the past, the people sent here were really bad types,” the informant explained. “Now, it’s vulnerable groups like petitioners or university students involved in pyramid schemes. I feel pity for them.” Because petitioners, in particular, tend not to acknowledge that they have violated any laws, “they don’t acknowledge guilt and they don’t work—this puts us in a difficult position.”

Procurators assigned to monitor conditions at the RTL facility are flooded with complaints, and they seem to investigate many. But gathering evidence can be difficult. The worst abuses often occur beyond the reaches of closed-circuit cameras, and potentially implicating footage is often erased. When investigators do find evidence of wrongdoing, it tends to be classified as a “disciplinary violation” for internal handling, rather than criminal prosecution. Given RTL’s shaky legal foundation, the basis for procuratorial oversight is unclear, and procurators at Masanjia seem reluctant to “take on the entire facility.” Since 2004, there has only been one criminal prosecution at Masanjia, when a guard was sentenced to 12 years in prison for assaulting an incarcerated woman, leaving her in a coma.

Some women have succeeded in getting their RTL decisions overturned through administrative litigation, but results are not guaranteed, even with clear evidence of violation. After one woman successfully had her RTL decision annulled, the Chaoyang RTL committee appealed, arguing: “Though there were flaws in the procedure [we] used . . . there was nothing inappropriate about the decision to send [her] to RTL. [The decision] was made in the interest of preserving overall stability and accords with the local law-enforcement realities of Chaoyang. Sending [her] to RTL benefits the preservation of social order and stability.”

The appeals court ultimately upheld the lower court’s decision to annul the RTL decision, a welcome rejection of the “stability above all else” mentality that has dominated China’s criminal justice system for too long. That type of mentality still has deep roots in China’s law enforcement institutions, but exposure of the many social costs associated with the overriding priority given to stability is leading the public to demand change. As Chinese authorities prepare to bring an end to RTL, and replace it with something new, these demands must be taken into account.

Non-Custodial Sentences Rise for Juveniles, Migrants Benefit Less

Supreme People's Court. Photo credit: Wikipedia

In March, the Research Office of the Supreme People’s Court published juvenile justice statistics for 2008‒2012, reflecting positive reforms in juvenile justice. During the period, China adjudicated 365,750 juveniles, down 4.5 percent from the previous five years. Meanwhile, the portion of juveniles receiving non-custodial punishments increased, reaching 42 percent in 2012 from 35 percent in 2008.

China added a juvenile section to its Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) last year including diversionary measures and codifying the principle of education first, punishment second. In 2011, the country amended its Criminal Law to recommend suspended sentences for youth who commit minor offenses.

Non-custodial punishments are crucial to help juveniles avoid re-offending, ensure their healthy development, and facilitate their positive interaction with the community. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules) call for the least possible use of institutionalization, or custodial punishment, explaining that:

Little or no difference has been found in terms of the success of institutionalization as compared to non-institutionalization. … Moreover, the negative effects, not only of loss of liberty but also of separation from the usual social environment, are certainly more acute for juveniles than for adults because of their early stage of development.

The president of Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, Liu Nianfu, agrees that there is significant harm in institutionalizing juveniles who should receive non-custodial punishments. He sees the danger as a consequence of removing juveniles from society and putting them in close confinement with others who have come into conflict with the law.

In China, the most common form of non-custodial punishment is suspended sentence or reprieve. Suspensions or reprieves postpone the sentence for a specified period during which the defendant is required to submit to certain conditions—such as regularly reporting to a monitoring organization and obtaining approval for travel—in order to have the sentence withdrawn at the end of that period. Other types of non-custodial punishments include public surveillance and fines.

Migrants Benefit Less 

Although juvenile justice is meant to be impartial, migrant youth have been barred from equal access to non-custodial punishments in China. Shanghai and Guangdong have lower than average rates of juvenile non-custodial punishments, and courts in both regions have attributed this to higher proportions of migrants among juvenile defendants. For example, of juveniles tried in Shanghai in 2010, suspended sentences were given to 15 percent of non-locals, i.e., people without a Shanghai hukou (household registration), compared with 63 percent of locals. [1] 

There are many reasons why migrants are more likely to be incarcerated. The Criminal Law lists “expressing remorse” as one of the criteria for receiving a suspended sentence. While not theoretically discriminatory, courts commonly consider whether defendants return stolen property and provide financial compensation as an aspect of remorse thereby privileging wealthier defendants.[2] In 2011, the Juvenile Court Guiding Office of the Shanghai Municipality High People’s Court reported that migrant youth are less capable of returning stolen property or providing compensation since the property in question is often immediately expended and the youth themselves have fewer economic means.

Hukou, or household registration status, is important in determining non-custodial sentencing. Photo credit: Xinhua News

Some organizations in charge of monitoring individuals serving suspended sentences—police or grassroots organizations under the previous CPL and community corrections organizations under the revised law, effective January 1, 2013—limit their scope to people with local hukous, making migrants ineligible for suspended sentences, unless they are sent back to their hometowns. The prospect of relocation raises several issues including moving costs, the disruption of routine and social networks (especially if the juvenile has been living away from home for a significant period of time), and whether the juvenile will have suitable adult supervision. Moreover, according to Liu Nianfu, a solid understanding of the circumstances of a case is crucial to carrying out a tailored plan for rehabilitation. However, having a juvenile serve his or her sentence in a place other than where he or she committed the offense leads to an information disconnect where the implementers are less equipped to respond to the specific needs of the juvenile.

Another reason why migrant youth are not given suspended sentences is to account for what can become lengthy stays in detention. Migrant youth can be detained for months while their case is pending trial because they are more likely to lack the guarantor or funds necessary to post bail. According to the Shanghai high court, these prolonged detentions lead courts to issue custodial sentences whose lengths correspond to the amount of time juvenile defendants spent in detention to avoid the appearance of “excessive” punishment—even in cases where non-custodial punishments would have been applicable. The court goes on to note that this problem could be addressed by allowing community corrections organizations, defendants’ employers, or public welfare organizations to act as guarantors and by conducting speedier trials.

Making Progress

With growing awareness of the issue, Shanghai and Guangdong are working to boost access to non-custodial punishments for migrant youth. In Shanghai, the percentage of migrant juveniles receiving these punishments increased to 15 percent in 2010 from 9 percent in 2008. In Guangdong, non-custodial punishments for all juveniles (not disaggregated by hukou status) rose to 50.2 percent in 2011 from 10.9 percent in 2008. 

Last year, a member of the Shanghai No.2 Intermediate People’s Court published an article calling for equal sentencing for migrant youth.[3] The article uses the case of 17-year-old surnamed Shan to demonstrate how engagement from the defendant’s family, the judiciary, and the community can reduce institutionalization.

Shan’s parents had been working in Shanghai for seven years. He worked at a car factory and was convicted in a robbery case involving two victims, a few hundred yuan, and several mobile phones. Originally sentenced to 1.5 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 1,000 yuan, Shan successfully appealed the verdict and was given a suspended sentence due to several factors. The court strengthened cooperation between the district procuratorate and local community corrections organization to conduct a social investigation report. Members of the juvenile court visited Shan’s home and workplace to determine that he had a stable residence. Shan participated in reconciliation during which he showed remorse and offered financial compensation to the victims. Since Shan’s parents were in Shanghai and had applied for a temporary residence permit, he was eligible to participate in a local “help and education” (bangjiao, which is similar to probation) program, during which the court periodically evaluated his progress. Shan’s employer also agreed to continue his employment and undertake more rigorous supervision. This case demonstrates that increased collaboration can lead to the successful application of non-custodial sentencing, but given Shan’s ability to provide compensation and his relatively stable residency and work status, it is not necessarily applicable to most migrant juveniles.

Guangdong has addressed the issue by bolstering its policy framework with regulations for implementing non-custodial punishments in juvenile cases. Issued by the Guangdong High People’s Court, the regulations state that community corrections organizations can provide help and education to juvenile suspects and defendants who are not Guangdong residents but who regularly reside, study or work, or have family members in Guangdong.

Rather than referring generally to those with non-local hukous, which can include people from different cities or counties of Guangdong, the rules refer to non-Guangdong residents. That means that while a juvenile in Guangzhou, Guangdong’s provincial capital, with a Sichuan hukou need not be sent back to Sichuan to carry out a suspended sentence, a juvenile who has moved to Guangzhou from elsewhere in the province just might. In order to facilitate these types of movements, the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court has devised a new system of post-sentencing corrections plans. The system requires juvenile judges who issue suspended sentences to write corrections plans that are tailored to the circumstances of each defendant and submit them to community corrections organizations that carry out the help-and-education stage. In situations where migrant juveniles are sent back to their place of registered residence, these plans help community corrections organizations understand the juvenile’s needs, but relocating juveniles is not without problems. Removing a young person whose identity is still being formed from a familiar school, job, or group of friends presents a major transition that can either facilitate or complicate the reform process.

Despite ongoing problems caused by economic inequality and hukou status, the amount of collaboration involved in increasing access to non-custodial punishments among migrant youth in the immigration centers of Shanghai and Guangdong is significant. In order to realize the principle of education first as emphasized by the revised CPL, more broad-based attention must be paid to migrant juveniles to ensure that they benefit from forward-thinking juvenile justice reforms.

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1. 朱妙, 陈慧, 张世欣 [Zhu Miao, Chen Hui, Zhang Shixin], “非上海未成年人缓刑使用状况及对策” [Feishanghai weichengnianren huanxing shiyong zhuangkuang ji duice], 中国少年司法 [Zhongguo Shaonina Sifa], 2011(1):76. ⇑

2. Ibid. p 78. ⇑

3. 李振武 [Li Zhenwu], “对符合条件的非本地户籍未成年被告人应平等适用缓刑” [Dui fuhe tiaojian de feibendi huji weichengnian beigaoren ying pingdeng sheyong huanxing], 预防青少年犯罪研究 [Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Research], 2012(7). ⇑

Tibetans Imprisoned for Text, Images as Immolations Continue

Gyurmey Thabkey, Kalsang Dondrub, and Lobsang stand trial in Qinghai's Haidong Prefecture. Photo credit: people.com.cn

Courts in Tibetan areas of China have been handing down long prison sentences to Tibetans accused of “inciting splittism” for activities connected to the series of self-immolation protests that have escalated over the past year. Just this week, three men were sentenced in Qinghai to between four and six years in prison for unspecified pro-independence text and images connected to the immolations. No detail is provided of the alleged offenses, but the official media report regarding the trial (translated below) goes to great lengths to state that the trial—which was concluded within one day, including sentencing—was carried out in strict accordance with the law and with the defendants’ rights fully protected.

This trial is the latest sign of Chinese authorities’ determination to use criminal prosecution to respond to the serious problem of self-immolation protests by Tibetans. In December 2012, local authorities in Gansu announced that criminal liability would be pursued against both those who commit self-immolations and those who aid and abet such protests.

By the end of 2012, Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database included about 5,000 people known or believed to be in custody (including in prison, RTL, detention, etc.). Of these, nearly a quarter were Tibetan, with the number of Tibetan activists recorded in the database growing 28 percent year-on-year largely due to the self-immolation protests. Imprisoned for charges similar to those brought against the men tried this week, prominent monk Yonten Gyatso was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment in June 2012 for sharing photographs and information about Tibet, while 20-year-old Ngawang Topden, an art student, was reportedly sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in February 2013 for storing images of self-immolations and the banned Tibetan national flag in his mobile phone.

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Haidong Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court Issues Sentences in First-Instance Trial for Inciting Splittism

Kan Wacao and Zhang Rui, People’s Daily Online
March 18, 2013

On the afternoon of March 18, 2013, the Haidong Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court of Qinghai Province publicly tried the inciting splittism case of defendants Gyurmey Thabkey†, Kalsang Dondrub‡, and Lobsang and issued its verdict at the conclusion of the trial. For the crime of inciting splittism, Gyurmey Thabkey was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with subsequent deprivation of political rights for three years; Kalsang Dondrub was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment with subsequent deprivation of political rights for four years; and Lobsang was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment with subsequent deprivation of political rights for two years.

In the course of the trial, the Haidong Intermediate People’s Court ascertained that defendants Gyurmey Thabkey, Kalsang Dondrub, and Lobsang carried out the actions of inciting splittism by using others’ self-immolation incidents to disseminate text and images relating to Tibetan independence, actions that had a negative effect both locally and internationally and violated the provisions of Article 103 of the Criminal Law, constituting the crime of inciting splittism. The facts charged by the prosecution were clear and the evidence was reliable and sufficient; [therefore] the crime stands as charged. Based on the facts, nature, circumstances, and degree of social harm of the three defendants’ [respective] crimes, and having given full consideration to the opinions of both the prosecution and defense, the court issued the aforementioned verdict.

Furthermore, the Haidong Prefecture Branch of the Qinghai People’s Procuratorate assigned personnel to appear in court for the prosecution, and defendants Gyurmey Thabkey, Kalsang Dondrub, and Lobsang each appeared in court with their defense counsel to participate in the proceedings. The Haidong Prefecture Intermediate People’s Court tried this case in strict adherence with the law and regulations and fully safeguarded the procedural rights of the defendants. In the course of the trial, the court provided the defendants with Tibetan interpreters and the defendants and their defense counsel fully expressed their defense opinions during the investigation and debate over the facts and evidence relevant to conviction and sentencing. More than 100 people including friends and relatives of each defendant and people from all segments of society observed the trial and sentencing hearings.

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† Translated as “Jigme Thabkey” by Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD)

‡ Translated as “Kalsang Dhondup” by TCHRD

Judicial Independence Debuts in Contentious SPC Work Report

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference delegate Wang Junfeng (right) discusses the "Two Meetings." Photo credit: legaldaily.com.cn

One of the major events during the annual lianghui—plenary sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—is the day when the heads of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (commonly referred to as the “two supremes”) present their work reports to delegates assembled in Beijing. Though short on detail, these overviews of the work done by the national judiciary and procuracy can still help to identify aspects of the legal system that are given special emphasis in China as well as those areas that might be given special priority for future reform.

The reports presented this year by outgoing Supreme People’s Court (SPC) President Wang Shengjun and Supreme People’s Procuratorate Procurator-General Cao Jianming, who will serve a second term, focus on the accomplishments of the previous five years and set out an agenda for their successors for the coming year. To many casual observers, these work reports often seem replete with empty rhetoric and slogans. But those who look carefully can sometimes discern new phrases and subtle shifts in emphasis that may signal important future policy directions.

Such speculation was the subject of a recent interview conducted by the newspaper Legal Weekly with CPPCC delegate and chairman of the All-China Lawyers Association (ACLA), Wang Junfeng. At issue was how much to read into references to “judicial independence” in this year’s SPC work report—especially in light of pronouncements made earlier by new Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping about the importance of governing in accordance with the law and upholding the independence and fairness of the judicial system.

Supreme People’s Court President Wang Shengjun delivers the court's work report during the National People's Congress. Photo credit: China.com.cn

This expression of commitment to judicial independence by SPC President Wang Shengjun is notable, especially considering that many observers feel that under his tenure political control of China’s courts increased and earlier progress towards a more professional, independent judiciary stalled or even eroded. As evidence of dissatisfaction among lianghui delegates, the SPC report was one of several government work reports receiving the most opposition votes it has seen in five years and received more opposing votes than any other government work report, with 2,218 yeas, 605 nays, and 120 abstentions.

Wang Junfeng is clearly hopeful that new leadership in the party and the courts will change the atmosphere of “neglect of rule of law” that he sees as having brought many negative consequences to China over the past decade. But one can sense continued uncertainty in his optimism, as he insists that commitments to judicial independence and rule of law be more than just slogans.

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Judicial Independence Shouldn’t Be Mere Slogan
Interview with CPPCC delegate, ACLA president Wang Junfeng

Chen Xiao and Gao Yuan, Legal Weekly
March 13, 2013

Legal Weekly [hereafter, “LW”]: We’ve noticed that the issue of courts exercising independent, impartial judicial power was mentioned twice in the sections of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) report discussing the problems and difficulties faced by courts and the section on this year’s work agenda. Legal academics have been talking about this problem for a long time, but past reports seem never to have clearly raised the issue. What do you think about its being raised now?

Wang Junfeng [hereafter, “WJF”]: I think it’s great to bring up (independent judicial authority)! We legal professionals feel extremely gratified to see the SPC report clearly raise this issue. Actually, we knew that it would be mentioned sooner or later. From the beginning of opening and reform, independent judicial authority was one of our important standards. Independent judicial authority is one of the most important cornerstones of a rule-of-law society.

Over the past decade, China’s economy has been very successful and there have been many changes in all industries. We feel extremely proud, as if we had experienced it ourselves. But there’s no doubt that a major regret is the neglect of rule of law. In an era when the economy developed so quickly, [this neglect] is really astonishing.

But lately we’ve seen General Secretary Xi Jinping mention upholding the authority and protecting the dignity of the constitution and say that we ought to hold firm to the independence and fairness of the judicial system. Legal academics and professionals know that this is the way it should be. Of course it shouldn’t merely be mentioned. Our judicial work, including our legal professions must always attach importance to the professional and independent nature of the law. Only by remaining firm on this point will we have true rule of law.

LW: What do you think led [SPC] President Wang Shengjun to mention this problem in this year’s report? What expectations do you have as a result?

WJF: First, the new generation of central leadership is vigorously promoting governance in accordance with the law, which is a fundamental basic plan for China. Because General Secretary [Xi] mentioned this earlier, it’s logical for President Wang to mention it in [the SPC] report. If it continued to go unmentioned, how could [the report] reflect the importance of the credibility of our judicial system? To a great extent, the decline in credibility of the judicial system is a consequence of the inability to uphold judicial independence.

Bringing up the issue after 10 years makes me feel gratified, but that the same time I feel...I don’t know how to put it.

From another angle, it reminds us that this is not a slogan. No matter what changes take place in society, they must not shake the cornerstone of judicial independence.

I anticipate that this is not merely a slogan and hope that independent judicial authority can truly be put into effect in practice.

LW: President Wang mentioned in his report that the problems of difficult litigation and implementation have not yet been fundamentally resolved. As a lawyer, what is the situation? Does the All-China Lawyers Association have any data that reflect these problems? Can you give us one or two examples drawn from your practice [as a lawyer]?

WJF: The difficulties of litigation and implementation are major problems.

On the one hand, the difficulty of litigation has to do with the inability to strictly operate according to legal procedures during the court’s trial process. Sometimes the difficulty can be seen in cases where one side is in the right but cannot win their suit. Other times, it’s difficult even to file the case. In general, judicial work is affected by all sorts of factors that shouldn’t exist, problems with judicial independence, problems with judges themselves, etcetera.

Every year there’s talk of the “difficulties of litigation and implementation.” I sweat with anxiety for China’s judicial system. This shows that even though China has made many advances in rule of law, there is still a long way to go to reach ordinary people’s ideal of rule of law.

So, I look forward to this being improved under the new central party leadership and their promotion of governance in accordance with the law. Many people in legal sectors said they felt there was more hope for the nation after hearing General Secretary Xi Jinping’s speech, first of all, that the spring of rule of law had arrived. Once the spring of rule of law arrives, the glory of a nation can further progress.

I hope that when judicial independence is realized and China’s rule of law progresses further that President Wang or [future] court presidents will [be able to] speak less of these kinds of problems at the NPC and allow ordinary people to live in a bit more dignity. This is what we look forward to.

As far as the difficulties of litigation and implementation are concerned, I don’t have any relevant data. But the data isn’t that important. Now that President Wang has spoken of how difficult things are in front of the NPC, is data really that important?

LW: In the agenda for this year’s work, the SPC report spoke of the need to build up the credibility of the judicial system. This phrasing also seems rather new. Based on your practical understanding, what aspects of the realities [of the judicial system] is this aimed at? From a lawyer’s perspective, how should the credibility of the judicial system be strengthened?

WJF: Ordinary people know what it means to talk about the credibility of the judicial system.

I think that to restore the credibility of the judicial system, it’s important to eliminate bureaucratism. Actually, being a judge is an extremely sacred and honorable position, one with the authority to adjudicate according to national laws and regulations. We must eliminate bureaucratism from this profession, reduce the air of “officialism,” and increase the spirit of professionalism.

First of all, how can there be credibility when there is still no judicial independence, when bureaucratism is so severe, and when there are so many ranks among judges? In foreign countries, judges are called judicial officers and represent fairness. In China’s feudal, traditional consciousness, [the word “judge” was created by] taking the word for “law” and adding “official” at the end. I encourage the media and the courts internally to stop calling [judges] “officials” in the future. “Judicial officers” or “presiding judge” is more appropriate. When you add the word “official,” it not only brings with it seriously feudal ways of thinking, it also desecrates the position of judge itself by wiping out its specialized and professional characteristics. In the feudal society of the past, bureaucrats judged cases; now, [this is done by] judicial officers and presiding judges. If we stop calling them “officials,” perhaps it will enhance the credibility of the judicial system.

There are many factors affecting credibility: the inability to adjudicate independently, interference of all types, various disciplinary problems and derelictions among judges themselves, insufficient respect for professionalism, and so on. But as long as we stand firm on judicial independence and accept society’s public oversight, I think this problem shouldn’t be difficult to resolve.

LW: Ordinary people attach considerable importance to the fight against corruption. Recently, the anti-corruption winds have been blowing rather fiercely. Before they came out, we had hoped that the [SPC and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)] reports would make a point of describing the results and future plans on this subject, but it seems that not much ink was spilled on this account. Why is this?

WJF: The fight against corruption has already been mentioned many times. I think it’s normal that it wasn’t mentioned and that the court didn’t mention it. When corruption cases occur, the courts should punish them in accordance with the law. Moreover, I don’t think that the court report needs to mention such things as preserving growth or maintaining stability. The law is the law; when [a case] comes, you try it. When courts’ actions follow society or politics too closely, there will be doubts about judicial independence.

The legal system and the courts are like high mountains, standing in the distance. Its ordinary operations are to uphold fairness, punish crime, and support society. It shouldn’t be affected by the blowing wind or the falling rain. Courts ought to stand firm and adjudicate fairly and independently in accordance with the law and regulations and adhere to its professional spirit. That’s enough.

I personally believe that judges are chosen through a certain process and are endowed by the law with a special mission. It’s enough for them to handle the cases they’re given to adjudicate and stick to their responsibilities to the law.

LW: Please share your thoughts on the [SPC and SPP] reports, including positive aspects, what the highlights were, where they were lacking, and your expectations as a lawyer.

WJF: The [reports] explain clearly to the public what work was done in the judicial system over the past five years and what things were achieved. As in the past, I feel that for the most part the reports were factual and honest.

The rare thing here is that we saw that the [SPC and SPP] did not avoid the problems they face. We also saw the efforts being made to restore the credibility of the judicial system.

However, we know that legislation is not an end [in itself]. Laws are meant to be enforced. On this point, lawyers, police, prosecutors, and judges all share the same goal of ensuring that state legislation is truly and correctly enforced. That is the ultimate purpose of legislation and the ultimate objective of the state’s development of rule of law.

What we want to see from the court and procuratorate reports is not only that they say a lot, but even more so we want to see how much they have done. We hope that in the new era of national development we will be able to see the effect of rule of law in all areas of the state. Over the past decade, neglect of rule of law has brought negative consequences: corruption, loss of credibility, a growing gap between rich and poor, poisoned milk powder, collapsing buildings, and so on. I hope that society will not make this mistake again.

Over the past decade, China’s economy developed so fast yet the unfortunate neglect of rule of law brought about consequences. The entire nation should reflect on this and not allow ourselves to make this mistake again. We cannot afford to.

It’s good for us to bring up the issue of independent judicial and prosecutorial power, but we still don’t know how much we can achieve or how quickly. Based on the hopes expressed in [Xi Jinping’s] words and the expectations we legal professionals have, all lead to the hope that the springtime of rule of law could be approaching.