Tuesday, October 29, 2013

Leftist Subversion in China: 1980 to Present

Mao's statue towers over a public square in his birthplace, Shaoshan City, Hunan. Photo credit: Changsha Evening Newspaper

Officials in Shaoshan City, Hunan Province, the birthplace of Mao Zedong, have already spent in excess of 1.9 billion yuan in preparation for the 120th anniversary of Mao’s birth this December. Last month, more than 20 thousand people visited a mausoleum in the middle of Beijing to mark the 37th anniversary of his death. Throughout the country thousands more—many of them petitioners, former soldiers, workers, and officials—attended “red song” concerts in memory of China’s “great man,” depicted in official narratives to have “liberated” China from feudalism, capitalism, and imperialism.

Mao and patriotism seem to go hand in hand, but Chinese authorities have convicted scores of individuals of “reactionary” or “subversive” acts for singing Mao’s praises too loud. Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB) has information on more than 40 individuals detained or sentenced for their involvement in illegal opposition parties advocating pre-reform socialism. These self-proclaimed vanguards of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought include farmers, workers, academics, cadres, and even entrepreneurs discontented by the capitalist influence that poured into China following Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening in 1978.

While many Chinese have joined leftist symposiums and, in the past decade, Internet forums to vent grievances about the corruption and social inequality that persist despite, or because of, the Communist Party of China (CPC), few chose to organize opposition parties to rebuild a proletarian dictatorship. Those who do face the same, and at times worse, fates as those who organize in the name of western-style democracy, a multiparty system and separation of powers.

Striking Hard Against “Mao Anmin”

On December 22, 1983, the Linyi District Intermediate People’s Court in Shandong Province sentenced Zhang Chengjian (张成检) to death. According to an official summary of the case (translated in Dui Hua Occasional Publications, Volume 2), the farmer claimed that he was Mao Anmin (毛岸民), Chairman Mao’s successor and Jiang Qing’s stepson. He said that his entire family was murdered by Deng Xiaoping and his allies and that Deng “usurped” the power of Mao’s designated successor, Hua Guofeng, and “distorted Mao’s revolutionary path.” Zhang was particularly critical of the household responsibility system. First adopted in the agricultural sector in 1981, the system allowed farmers to sell their produce at unregulated prices after meeting state production quotas. While increasing production incentives dramatically, the system also made farmers more vulnerable to economic losses from poor harvests, fluctuating market prices, and natural disasters.

Assembling several like-mind individuals who hoped to restore the people’s commune and abolish the one-child policy, Zhang formed a new “Central Party Committee” in preparation for “revolution.” Between April and September 1983, the group allegedly mailed 97 letters attacking CPC principles, inciting military units to take up armed rebellion, and urging students to skip classes and workers to go on strike. Some letters were sent to foreign embassies, requesting their personnel to leave China and disseminate information about Zhang’s organization in their own countries.

The case summary, the only known description of Zhang’s party, implies that the group was small and of little influence. Six farmers, ages 25‒43, were convicted for their involvement. Two others were mentioned as being approached by party members but refusing to join.

In the trial of first instance, Zhang was convicted of organizing and leading a counterrevolutionary group, collaborating with foreign countries to conspire to damage state security, inciting state personnel and military units to rise up in armed rebellion, and counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement. As the trial coincided with China’s first “strike-hard” campaign, which used swift and severe punishment to maintain political stability, Zhang’s death sentence came as little surprise.

A year later, however, an appellate court found the crimes against Zhang to be incorrect and his sentence to be unduly heavy. The Shandong High People’s Court reduced his sentence to 20 years’ imprisonment, convicting him only of non-violent crimes. The other members of his group were sentenced to 1.5 to 15 years’ imprisonment on appeal. According to government responses to 10 prisoner inquiries made by Dui Hua, Zhang received one sentence extension and three sentence reductions and was released in April 2005. He was 52 and had spent 22 years in prison.

Henan’s Mamao Party

Established in 1991, the Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought Communist Party of China (中国马列主义毛泽东思想共产党), or Mamao Party (马毛党), is one of the largest illegal political parties in China known to Dui Hua. Most opposition parties discussed in Chinese open sources are only reported to have a few dozen or few hundred followers. Three times the size of the Chinese People’s Democracy Party, the Mamao Party once had nearly 3,000 members in and around Dengfeng City, Henan Province. Of the 1,031 members identified in the late 1990s by local police, 899 were farmers; more than 100 were workers, teachers, cadres, and retirees; 90 percent had received middle-school education or above; and over two-thirds were ages 25‒45.

Local public security records from 2003 name Wang Wuzhou (王五州) as party leader. A farmer and self-proclaimed special representative of the party’s Henan Provincial Committee, Wang assigned key members to take charge of propaganda, labor, military, and women’s affairs and appointed secretaries to various county- and district-level committees. The party criticized CPC policies dating back to the third plenary session of the 11th CPC Central Committee in 1978, when Deng’s market reforms were introduced. Calling the CPC “degenerate” and “corrupt,” the group cited Mao’s strategies of guerilla warfare to encourage the establishment of a new proletarian regime.

Local police branded the Mamao Party a subversive group that “stole” the title of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Wang was detained in Xuchang, Henan, on January 9, 1999. Chinese government sources informed Dui Hua that Wang was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for subversion, while leading members Zang Yongqin (臧永钦) and Dong De’an (董得安) were both sentenced to 10 years. Police classified all party members as part of the “targeted population,” a group of free persons singled out for additional public surveillance, and forced them to write statements of repentance. Zang and Dong were released in 2006 and 2007, respectively, after receiving sentence reductions. Wang is not known to have received clemency and may remain in prison until 2014.

Internal Uprising

In the 1990s, several senior CPC leaders advocated for workers and farmers to stage an armed rebellion, among them was Xu Jianyi (徐建一), according to investigative journalist Zhao Yan (赵岩). (Zhao was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in 2006 for exposing forced land seizures, evictions, and other farmers’ rights issues.) Born in 1954, Xu was an editor of Hongqi (Red Flag), the state-run magazine that was renamed Qiushi Journal in 1988. He studied human rights theories in Geneva and co-wrote China’s first human rights white book, rebuking western criticisms of China’s human rights situation from 1990‒2000. Along with former Central Propaganda Minister Deng Liqun and leftist writer Wei Wei, Xu “supported” two banned publications that criticized Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” as overly capitalistic. Leftist officials were particularly outraged by Jiang’s plan to allow private entrepreneurs to become party members.

Allegedly using Hongqi to establish a new publishing company and purchase an office building in Beijing, Xu was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for “embezzlement” and “favoritism” on December 31, 2003. He is the only person known to have been sentenced in the case. According to Zhao Yan, Xu’s sentence was “relatively light” because state prosecutors deliberately prolonged his investigation until after Jiang Zemin retired as chairman of the Central Military Commission in 2002. In 2005, Hong Kong journalist Ching Cheong (程翔) shared a cell with Xu in Beijing’s Dahongmen Detention Center, which houses high-profile political prisoners and high-ranking officials.

One Man Committee

Wang Shiji (王士吉) formed the CPC Revolutionary Committee at his chemical plant in Yongjin County, Hebei Province, on May 16, 1999. As the sole member of his committee, he called for the proletariat to stage the “second socialist revolution.” He appointed himself party secretary and designed party flags and emblems. In letters he wrote petitioning the CPC in 2001, Wang said he was born to a poor family in 1944 and was indebted to Mao for assigning farm work to his family, giving them a house, and subsidizing his education from the time he entered primary school to his university graduation in 1968.

Wang opined that corruption plagued the CPC because it failed to strictly follow The Communist Manifesto and the principles of the Paris Commune. The root of this corruption, he argued, was Deng Xiaoping’s “revisionism,” a term used by Mao in the early 1960s to indicate that post-Stalinist Soviet interpretations of Marxism adulterated Marxist theory with capitalistic elements. Accusing Deng’s economic theory of betraying Marxism, Wang also openly criticized Jiang Zemin for strengthening the revisionist path and urged members of the Central Standing Committee to collectively resign. Between 1997 and 1999, Wang used the penname Mao Jidong (毛继东), literally “Mao’s successor,” to send more than two dozen critical letters and articles to the central government, party schools, and state-run and Hong Kong-based publishers. The self-proclaimed patriot and loyal party member warned that revisionism dismembered the Soviet Union in 1991, and China would follow suit.

On November 22, 2000, the Shijiazhuang Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Wang to three years’ imprisonment for inciting subversion. His letters and articles, although never published, were presented as evidence of “rumors” defaming party policies and leaders and the socialist system.

After his release in August 2002, Wang began petitioning to overturn his conviction and resumed his “anti-revisionist” writings. By that time, with the popularization of the Internet, he gained a broader audience, and in 2010, he reportedly formed the Marxism-Leninism-Maoism Workers’ Party of China (中国马列毛主义工人党). Wang explicitly stated that the party had a “fraternal” policy toward the CPC and would not attempt to overthrow incumbent party leaders.

In December 2010, the Chang’an District Civil Affairs Bureau rejected Wang’s application to register the party as a social organization. Wang then defiantly stated that he would formally announce the party’s establishment in March 2011, but whether the party was formally established or continues to operate is unknown. In an article that appeared on Boxun in June 2013, Wang focuses on corruption in the CPC but makes no mention of his party. He questions President Xi Jinping’s sincerity and ability to curb graft after fire engulfed grain stocks slated for central government inspection in Daqing, Heilongjiang Province.

Against Hu Jintao and Charter 08

Circulating information on social networking services and sympathetic websites, the Mao Zedong Thought Communist Party of China (中国毛泽东主义共产党) was founded on November 28, 2008. In its “Ten Declarations,” the party promises that a successful revolutionary movement against the CPC will purge corrupt officials; restore the people’s communes; and lead to employment, education, healthcare, and housing for all. About a month after its founding, the party allegedly distributed pamphlets in Beijing, Shanghai, and other big cities asserting the rights of workers to overthrow Hu Jintao’s “fascist” regime. The party was equally hostile to signatories of Charter 08, a political manifesto calling for multi-party governance, calling them “traitors” and “reactionary elites” who plotted to “westernize” and “subjugate” China to US imperialism. In 2009, the party briefly received foreign media attention, but little is known about the fate of party members.

Possibly emboldened by Bo Xilai’s Mao-style approach, 34 representatives from more than 20 provinces convened a secret meeting on October 15, 2009, in rural Wansheng County, Chongqing, where Bo was municipal party secretary, to discuss “Mao’s revolutionary practices.” One of the organizers was Ma Houzhi (马厚芝), a teacher and Shandong native who had spent more than 40 years advocating Maoism. According to Hong Kong’s Open Magazine, the meeting was joined by several members of a Chongqing Mao Zedong Thought society and a Nanjing university professor who had organized Mao Zedong Thought classes in Henan’s Nanjie Village—a place that reportedly retains pre-reform collectivized agricultural production.

Online forums include accounts of armed police and security officers raiding the gathering and confiscating computers, party flags, and propaganda. Twenty-five of the meeting participants were sent back to their original residences after serving 4‒5 days of administrative detention for holding an “illegal assembly.” Ten other members, whose average age was over 50, were criminally detained for “organizing terrorist activity.”

Government sources confirmed for Dui Hua earlier this year that at least four members, including Ma, are serving sentences for subversion in Chongqing and Guizhou. Ma and Wei Jinxiang (蔚晋湘) are both scheduled to complete 10-year sentences on October 14, 2019. Incarcerated in Guizhou’s Zunyi Prison, Niu Yong (牛勇) and He Yuanfa (何远发) are serving five- and six-year sentences, respectively. Government sources were unable to verify information about Deng Guobin (邓国宾), who was reportedly sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.

Patriotism and Mao Zedong

Partially to appease hardline leftists bitter over Bo Xilai’s downfall, in his first speech at the Politburo collective study session in November 2012, Xi Jinping emphasized that Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought “must not be lost.” This summer, Xi remarked that Mao’s lakeside villa in Wuhan, Hubei Province, should become a youth learning center dedicated to patriotism.

While toeing the line of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “stability above all else” under one-party rule, how appropriate is it for Xi to stress Mao Zedong Thought? As the aforementioned cases show, a deep love for Mao and country is not the same as a deep love for the CPC, and those who favor communist ideals over the “perils” of democracy and constitutional government may also face persecution.

Tuesday, October 22, 2013

Politico-Legal Committee Issues Rules to Prevent Injustice

Four well-known miscarriages of justice befell (from left) Zhao Yanjin (in prison nearly a decade), Nie Shubin (executed, 1995), She Xianglin (in prison 11 years), Hugejiletu (executed, 1996). Photo credits: Sanlian Life Weekly, xinhuanet.com, sohu.com

A series of high-profile cases involving wrongful conviction and other miscarriages of justice has increasingly forced China’s top law-enforcement officials to address this troubling issue head-on. In March, the president of Zhejiang’s High People’s Court placed much of the blame for wrongful convictions on the extraction of confessions through torture. President Xi Jinping has spoken prominently about the need for “the popular masses to feel fairness and justice in every judicial case,” and new Supreme People’s Court President Zhou Qiang has called on lawyers and scholars to help reform the criminal justice system.

Then, in mid-August, the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Politico-Legal Commission (CPLC) issued a set of 15 provisions aimed at systemic changes that could help prevent future injustice. Met with considerable fanfare by Chinese media, the provisions included a call to establish a new responsibility system in which judges, prosecutors, and police would be held accountable for life for negligent or wrongful acts that result in wrongful conviction.

Over the past two months, judicial and law-enforcement bodies throughout China have been studying the CPLC pronouncements. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate has already issued provisions for implementation. Despite all the attention, copies of the provisions have not been widely circulated. In fact, Dui Hua has only been able to find one copy online (translated below) as circulated by a local party branch politico-legal committee in Jining, Shandong Province.

On one level, much of the CPLC guidelines reiterate provisions and principles that are already part of China’s Criminal Procedure Law and related regulations. The emphasis on fully recording interrogations and excluding illegally obtained evidence reflect the growing recognition of the need to protect the rights of criminal suspects and defendants, but implementation of these important protections has yet to become routine. Likewise, the CPLC provisions emphasize the importance of keeping channels of communication open within the criminal process and acting on information in a timely manner, whether it be the opinions of defense lawyers or allegations of wrongdoing made by convicted persons.

Besides the proposed responsibility system, another theme of note in the CPLC provisions is the need to insulate the judicial process from external interference. Public opinion, petitioning, and “stability preservation” are all cited as sources of external pressure that should not be allowed to influence decisions made during the criminal process. By the same token, the guidelines also point to the possibility of less interference by local party and government officials by limiting the scope of politico-legal committees’ guiding opinions and efforts to “coordinate” opinions between law-enforcement bodies when there are disagreements about how a case ought to be handled.

There is much in these guidelines that sounds positive from the perspective of promoting procedural fairness and rule of law in China. The ultimate impact of these pronouncements, however, is likely to depend on how much weight they are given vis-a-vis other, well-established imperatives to pursue stability in the interest of the overall socio-political order, for it is the perception that these interests can trump the law and political and civil rights that contributes most to miscarriages of justice in China.

Provisions on Earnest Prevention of Miscarriages of Justice

In order to give thorough implementation to the spirit of the important written instructions given by General Secretary Xi Jinping and Comrades Meng Jianzhu and Guo Shengkun, fully realize the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Politico-Legal Commission, punish crime in accordance with the law, respect and safeguard human rights, increase the credibility of the judicial system, and uphold social fairness and justice, we hereby enact the following provisions on the subject of strict adherence to legal procedure and holding firm to the bottom line on prevention of miscarriages of justice.

  1. Except in emergencies when it is necessary to conduct on-the-spot questioning, questioning of criminal suspects or defendants ought to be carried out in case-handling locations provided for [by law and regulation]. After a criminal suspect has been transferred to a detention center for custody, questioning shall be carried out in the detention center interrogation room with simultaneous audio- or video recording of the entire process. The investigating organ may not use reasons such as recovering stolen goods or [conducting an] identification [procedure] to remove suspects from the detention center in order to conduct questioning outside the facility.
  2. When the investigating organ transfers a case [to prosecutors], it ought to include all evidence of the guilt or innocence of the suspect or defendant as well as of the severity of the crime. It is strictly forbidden to withhold or fabricate evidence.
  3. When evidence that ought to be excluded is discovered during investigation, prosecutory review, or trial, it ought to be excluded in accordance with the law and may not serve as the basis for requesting arrest approval, approving or issuing an arrest decision, transferring the case for prosecutory review, making a decision to prosecute, or issuing a verdict. Suspect or defendant confessions obtained through torture or other illegal means, or witness testimony or victim statements obtained through violence, threats, or other illegal means may not be used as the basis for conviction.
  4. People’s procuratorates shall conduct oversight in accordance with the law as to whether investigation activities are lawful; provide opinions and recommendations as to the collection, securing, and perfection of evidence; and, when necessary, appoint procurators to take part in discussions with the investigating organs concerning major or serious cases and re-testing or re-examination of crime scenes or items, persons, or corpses associated with a crime.
  5. People’s procuratorate shall strictly ensure the standards for arrest review, prosecutory review, and prosecutory appeal. In cases that do not meet the statutory requirements for arrest or prosecution, it shall withhold arrest approval or issue a decision not to prosecute in accordance with the law. Appeal shall be made in accordance with the law in cases that meet the conditions for prosecutory appeal, especially when the innocent are found guilty, the guilty are found innocent, or the sentence is either unusually light or unusually heavy.
  6. Firmly adhere to the principle of judgment on the basis of evidence. When a witness who ought to appear in court in accordance with the law refuses to appear or appears but refuses to testify without good reason and the court has no way to confirm the veracity of his or her testimony, the testimony of that witness may not be used as the basis for conviction. Any evidence that has not been presented, examined, and cross-examined in court and verified through these court investigation procedures may not be used as the basis for conviction.
  7. Strictly implement the legal standard of proof. When there is only a defendant’s confession and no other evidence, the defendant cannot be convicted or given criminal punishment. In cases where there is insufficient evidence to convict, the presumption of innocence shall be adhered to and the defendant pronounced innocent in accordance with the law, standards cannot be lowered to issue a verdict with a “margin of error.” When evidence to convict is truthful and sufficient but there are doubts concerning evidence with implications for sentencing, a sentence favoring the defendant shall be issued.
  8. When people’s courts, people’s procuratorates, or public security organs handle criminal cases, they must take facts as the basis and law as the criterion and cannot issue judgments or decisions that violate the provisions of the law due to pressure caused by public-opinion hype, disruptive petitioning by a parties to the case or their relatives, “case-solving deadlines,” or local “stability preservation.”
  9. Earnestly safeguard the rights of defense lawyers to meet [with clients], read case files, carry out investigations, and obtain evidence, and to raise questions, cross-examine evidence, and debate in court. During the phases of concluding the investigation, prosecutory review, and final review of death sentences, people’s courts, people’s procuratorates, and public security organs ought to hear defense lawyers’ opinions in accordance with the law. With respect to the defense arguments and evidentiary materials submitted in defense by defendants and their defense counsel, people’s courts ought to give them serious review and provide an explanation in the court decision as to why they were accepted or rejected.
  10. People’s procuratorates and people’s courts ought to conduct timely review in accordance with the law when receiving allegations or petitions that may truly involve miscarriage of justice. After review, if a criminal verdict or decision is found to be in error, prosecutory appeal or request for retrial shall be made in accordance with the law. People’s procuratorates shall immediately rectify mistaken decisions made in a criminal case by itself or by its subordinate procuratorates in accordance with statutory procedures.
  11. Prisons or other penalty-enforcement organs may not withhold petitions, allegations, or accusation materials made by offenders and ought to transmit them or request the relevant authority to handle them in a timely manner. The relevant authority ought to conduct a serious review and handle [the petition, allegation, or accusation] in a timely manner and notify the prison or other penalty-enforcement organ of its decision. When offenders make petitions or allegations, it shall not affect their eligibility for sentence reduction or parole.
  12. Establish a strong case-management responsibility system in which the collegiate bench as well as individual judges, procurators, and police officers are held equally accountable and judges, procurators, and police officers are held accountable for life for the quality of the way a case is handled insofar as the purview of their duties is concerned. Responsibility for unlawful acts related to the handling of cases by judges, procurators, and police officers shall be pursued in accordance with the relevant laws and provisions.
  13. Clarify the standards for [what constitutes] a miscarriage of justice as well as procedure for and agent who can initiate remedial action and establish a strong mechanism for pursuing responsibility in miscarriages of justice. Acts such as coercion of confession through torture, use of violence to obtain evidence, and withholding or fabricating evidence shall be severely punished in accordance with the law.
  14. Establish a strong, scientific, and rational system for case-management performance evaluation that adheres to judicial rules; do not one-sidedly pursue targets such as a case-solution rate, arrest rate, prosecution rate, or conviction rate.
  15. Party politico-legal committees at all levels ought to support the independent and fair exercise of judicial and procuratorial powers by the people’s courts and people’s procuratorates and support each politico-legal unit in carrying out its work in an independently responsible and coordinated manner in accordance with the constitution and laws. In cases where the facts are unclear or the evidence is insufficient, do not coordinate [opinions between law enforcement bodies]; when coordinating [opinions regarding] cases, generally refrain from making specific opinions regarding the determination or substantive handling of a case.

Thursday, October 3, 2013

For State Security, Police Rules Color Code “Targeted Population”

Guizhou Public Security Bureau Director-General Sun Licheng discusses targeted population management with local police. Photo credit: Guizhou Public Security.

In addition to their roles as crime investigators, Chinese police are responsible for taking proactive measures to maintain political and social stability. Increasingly, this involves Chinese police at all administrative levels carrying out massive efforts to gather and analyze intelligence about their jurisdictions in an effort to prevent crime and unrest before it occurs. This has been especially true since 2008, when the former head of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Meng Jianzhu, announced a nationwide goal of “public security informatization” (gongan xinxihua). Evidence of concrete applications of this new “intelligence-led policing” can be seen in measures (translated below) concerned with control of the “targeted population” (zhongdian renkou) that were adopted last December by police stations in a handful of areas in Guizhou Province.

Though few Chinese outside of law-enforcement circles are probably aware that a targeted population officially exists, local police officers are given a serious responsibility to “manage” this group, which includes individuals suspected of “endangering state security” (including those who participate in “cults” or illegal religious activity), people who use drugs, people with previous convictions, and persistent petitioners or others with grievances that might lead to protests or other forms of social unrest.

Chinese police have been keeping detailed files on the targeted population in local police stations for many years under MPS regulations first issued in 1985. Advances in technology have made it easier for police to monitor targeted persons and gather information about them, share information between law-enforcement agencies, and draw upon a wide variety of other data from government agencies to profile suspects and predict their potential to cause unrest. As one part of a comprehensive system of “social management” (shehui guanli), Chinese police are using technology to collect and analyze huge amounts of personal data in hopes that it might help them to be more preemptive in preserving social stability. In areas where stability is of particular concern, such as Tibet, pervasive surveillance measures in a system of “grid management” (wanggehua guanli) aim to feed the intelligence system with data and assist local authorities in predicting and neutralizing risks.

From the Guizhou measures, we see evidence of information from a number of databases being integrated under a comprehensive “police-station basic information system” as well as an “intelligence platform” that pushes alerts concerning particular targets to local police stations. Based on the data collected in this intelligence platform, targets are assigned points between 0 and 100 based on their predicted degree of risk. Based on that score, targets are assigned one of three color codings that determine the sort of control measures police are expected to put in place. For the most high-risk “orange” targets, the Guizhou measures call for deployment of para-police “public safety activists” and informants to carry out monitoring, and it seems very possible that additional measures—such as the kind of long-term “house arrest” carried out against individuals like Chen Guangcheng and Liu Xia—may be used by police in individual cases against those targets considered to pose extraordinary risks.

Guizhou Province Provisional Measures: click to expand

Guizhou Province Provisional Measures for Management of
the Targeted Population by Public Security Organs

Chapter One: General Provisions

Article 1: In order to protect public order and state security and further enhance management of the targeted population, these measures are hereby enacted in accordance with the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) Standards for Regularized Construction of Public Security Police Stations and Regulations for Management of the Targeted Population; the Anti-Drug Law and the Drug User Registration Measures; and the Guizhou Province Anti-Drug Regulations, Guizhou Province (Trial) Measures for Points Warning Status Control of Targeted Persons by Public Security Organs, and Guizhou Province Provisional Regulations for Application and Management of the Information System for Persons Released from Prison and RTL and in light of the current application of information technology in our province .

Article 2: These measures aim to explore ways of informatizing police work and gradually integrating the MPS Regulations for Management of the Targeted Population with the “Great Intelligence” measures of assigning points to members of the targeted population [in order to achieve] early warning and situational control and resolve the problems of the targeted population being unquantifiable, having unclear details, being hard to discover, and being unable to put under control. In these measures, targeted population refers to persons put under targeted management by public security organs on suspicion of endangering state security or social order and public safety. This includes the 20 types of targeted persons in five categories specified in MPS regulations and six of the seven categories of targeted persons (excluding fugitives) pushed through the intelligence platform.

Management of the targeted population is a basic task to be handled internally by the public security organs, and it is strictly prohibited to divulge information [about this work]. “Targeted population” is a phrase used internally by public security organs, and it is strictly prohibited to use this phrase publicly. Auxiliary personnel and other non-police personnel are strictly prohibited from accessing targeted population information.

Article 3: Public security police stations are responsible for daily management of the targeted population. Public safety units are responsible for operational guidance. Intelligence, anti-drug, custodial, legal affairs, information technology (IT), and other relevant units shall assist with management of the targeted population and build information collaboration mechanisms and facilitate information-sharing between units and types of police in order to reduce the burden on police station officers.

Article 4: Placement of targeted persons under control or removal of targeted persons from control shall be decided pursuant to an opinion on control (removal) by a community police officer of the public security police station and subject to review and approval by police station officials.

Article 5: Management of targeted persons is to be carried out chiefly by the public security police station in the place of current residence. For those targeted persons whose place of current residence and place of household registration are not under the jurisdiction of the same police station, dual control shall be carried out. For those who have migrated to other provinces, management is to be carried out chiefly by the police station in the place of household registration.

Article 6: The goal of targeted population management is the prevention, discovery, and fighting of unlawful and criminal activity; the education, management, and rescue of individuals engaging in unlawful and criminal activity; and the preservation of social order and safety.

Article 7: Management of the targeted population must uphold the principle of “Information Management, Situation Assessment, and Categorized Control” and rely on the Police Station Basic Information System (hereafter, [BIS]) to carry out information management.

Article 8: Management of the targeted population is a standardized management supported by information and data. Information concerning the targeted population includes identity, background, trajectories, present behavior, and control information. All data on the targeted population is to be uniformly provided by the BIS for use by community police officers. Information about the identity, background, and trajectories of the targeted population collected outside of the BIS is to be delivered to the BIS through a comprehensive information system platform. All social resources collected by public security organs at the prefecture and county (city, district) levels shall first be compiled by the prefectural [PSB] before delivering to police stations via the BIS. Daily management of targeted population by police station community police officers is carried out using the BIS, and community police officers must ensure that information about targeted population management is accurate and up to date.

Article 9: In order to ensure effective cooperation between all types of police in the management of the targeted population, the BIS shall be integrated into a comprehensive information system that interfaces uniformly with other public security operations systems. Real-time adjustments to the BIS shall be carried out according to changes in the operations of targeted-population management. Adjustments to operational functions are to be approved by the public safety corps, and [adjustments to] system functions are to be approved by the IT unit.

Chapter Two: Scope of Management

Article 10: The following individuals are subject to management as targeted persons:

  1. Those suspected of endangering state security, including suspected terrorists identified by the intelligence platform;
  2. Those suspected of serious criminal offenses, including information put forward by the intelligence platform regarding those suspected of unlawful and illegal activity;
  3. Those who because of intense conflicts and disputes have a potential to create a disturbance, engage in violent retaliation, or act recklessly, including those identified by the intelligence platform as being individuals suspected of causing instability, key petitioners, and mentally ill persons capable of creating trouble, as well as persons identified by the detention center and jail information system as persons [recently] released;
  4. Those who were sent to prison or reeducation through labor (RTL) for intentionally unlawful or criminal acts and who have been released for less than five years, including those persons identified by the intelligence platform as having prior records for major criminal offenses and those whom the Prison/RTL Release System identifies as persons released from prison or RTL for intentionally unlawful or criminal acts;

    For those targeted persons from Guizhou who are released from prison, RTL, or compulsory drug treatment in other provinces, the police station in the place of household registration shall list them for control in the BIS upon their reporting [to the police station] or receipt of legal documents.
  5. Those who consume or inject drugs, including those whom the BIS identifies as being drug offenders or whom the Drug User Situational Control System identifies as drug users, as well as those released from compulsory drug treatment facilities run under the justice bureau or public security bureau.

    After the Drug User Situation Control System is integrated with the BIS, police station community police shall no longer use the Drug User Situation Control System to manage drug user information.

Article 11: For those targeted persons whose place of current residence and place of household registration are not under the jurisdiction of the same police station, the police stations in the place of current residence and place of household registration shall exchange information and promptly place them under control. Within the province, use the BIS to circulate information; outside the province, use letters, the Internet, or other means to circulate information.

Article 12: Under one of the following conditions, control shall be revoked for individuals already placed under control as members of the targeted population

  1. Death;
  2. Suspicion has been eliminated through investigation;
  3. Loss of potential to engage in crimes of office such as corruption or bribery;
  4. Loss of potential to engage in crimes due to advanced age or physical infirmity;
  5. Illegal or criminal activity was committed through negligence;
  6. Current imprisonment, RTL, or compulsory drug treatment;
  7. Release from prison or RTL for at least five years (except for those targeted individuals identified by the intelligence platform);
  8. Transfer of household registration outside of the jurisdiction of a given police station, when control has been established by the new place of household registration;
  9. Control established by the police station in the place of current residence (revocation of control may be carried out by the police station in the former place of residence);
  10. Drug offender who has not taken drugs again three years after treatment;
  11. Others who should no longer be placed under control.

Article 13: For those targeted persons already under control, the control category should be revised when the circumstances change such that the former control category is no longer applicable.

Chapter Three: Information Management

Article 14: Situation assessments for the targeted population consist of the four steps of information processing, information verification, information entry, and control registration.

Article 15: The intelligence center and public safety unit of the county level public security organ shall compare of all types of [information] resources in order to locate targeted persons for whom control has not yet been established.

Article 16: Information processing. Processing deadlines are:

For orange alerts delivered by the intelligence platform, within one hour;

For yellow alerts delivered by the intelligence platform, within 12 hours;

For blue alerts delivered by the intelligence platform, reminders regarding targeted persons sent by other information systems, targeted-person management reminders originating from the BIS, and requests for mutual assistance in establishing dual control from locations inside the province, within 48 hours.

Article 17: Information verification. Within the deadline for information entry, verify the targeted person’s basic details and get a handle on his or her current behavior and situation by checking the information and conducting fieldwork investigations.

Article 18: Information entry. Community police officers from the police station shall enter information regarding the information verification and current behavior and situation into the BIS.

Article 19: Assessment of points. Assessment of points for targeted person shall be conducted according to Chapter Four of these measures.

Article 20: Control registration. Register the [type of] control [to be imposed] in the BIS according to the targeted person’s category and circumstance and within the stipulated time period.

Article 21: Information feedback. The BIS shall feed details about management of the targeted population to the relevant information networks: Information about a targeted person’s current behavior, assessed points, and control measures shall be fed into the intelligence platform. Information about a drug user’s current behavior and urinalysis results shall be fed into the Drug User Situation Control System. Information about control established over individuals released from prison or RTL shall be fed into the Prison/RTL Release System. Feedback deadlines are as follows:

For orange alerts sent by the intelligence platform, within 48 hours;

For yellow alerts sent by the intelligence platform, within 72 hours;

For blue alerts sent by the intelligence platform, targeted person memos sent by other information systems, and targeted-person management memos originating from the BIS, within seven days.

For dual-control mutual assistance requests from inside the province, within seven days.

Article 22: Location of targeted persons not yet under control. For those targeted persons over whom control has not yet been established, community police officers shall apply to the intelligence center for temporary control while simultaneously try to locate them using information from various social resources such as family-planning, insurance, broadcasting, water and electric utilities, communications, gas, or student records together with transient population information from places they might be and notify the police station in the place of residence to establish control.

Chapter Four: Situation Assessment

Article 23: Assessment of points. Assess points based on a targeted person’s current behavior, divided between system-generated points and manually-generated points. System-generated points are used as reference, whereas manually-generated points are used to determine the final points assessed to a targeted person.

Article 24: System-generated points are points automatically assessed by the BIS for current behavior based on information entered by community-based police officers on current behavior and trajectory information provided by other systems in accordance with the Targeted Population Current Behavior Points Regulations.

Article 25: Manually-generated points are points assessed by community police officers, using the system-generated points as a reference, on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of the targeted person’s present risk and current behavior. When the community police officer believes that the system-generated points accord with the targeted person’s present risk, the system-generated points serve as the final assessed points. When the community police officer believes that the system-generated points do not accord with the targeted person’s present risk, he or she may directly assess points based on the targeted person’s present behavior but must make a note of the reason [for the intervention].

Article 26: Accumulated points correspond to three color levels: orange, yellow, and blue. Orange is 80 points or above, corresponding to high-risk targeted persons. Yellow is 50 to 79 points, corresponding to targeted persons of concern. Blue is 49 points and below, corresponding to ordinary targeted persons.

Article 27: When a targeted person’s accumulated points change, the community police officer of the police station may revise the targeted person’s control category.

Chapter Five: Control categories

Article 28: Police stations shall employ different control measures and control frequencies for different color categories of targeted population information.

Article 29: Orange information corresponds to targeted persons suspected of being a major and present risk. The police station community-based police officers must take management and control measures and arrange for public safety informants or public safety activists to carry out strict control. For high-risk targeted persons, the frequency of management and control by community police officers should be at least once per month.

Article 30: Yellow information corresponds to targeted persons suspected of being a relatively large and present risk. The police station community-based police officers must pay close attention. For targeted persons of concern, the frequency of management and control by community police officers should be at least once per quarter.

Article 31: Blue information corresponds to targeted persons suspected of being a minor and present risk. The police station community-based police officers must carry out help and education measures. For ordinary targeted persons, the frequency of management and control by community police officers should be at least once every six months.

Chapter Six: Work Evaluation

Article 32: Targeted population control work shall be subject to evaluation and assessment and shall serve as one major index in evaluating the work of public security police stations and community police.

Article 33: Evaluation of targeted population management work shall be carried out by the public safety unit. Evaluation of community police officers shall be carried out by the police station. Evaluation of the police station shall be carried out by the county (city, district) public security (branch) bureau. Evaluation of the county (city, district) public security (branch) bureau shall be carried out by the municipal (prefectural) public security bureau.

Article 34: The main areas for evaluation of targeted population control work are the role and effectiveness of targeted population control work in the discovery, prevention, and fight against criminal activity, and quantitative evaluation is made on the basis of four areas including processing rate, entry rate, and control rate. Evaluation score = (processing rate + entry rate + control rate) /3 * 100.

Article 35: Processing rate = number processed on time / number of system alerts

Article 36: Entry rate = number with data entered / number of system alerts

Article 37: Control rate = number under control / number that should be under control

Article 38: Police stations with a control rate of less than 95% or a targeted-population-not-yet-under-control rate of over 80% will have their police station qualification assessment revoked.

Article 39: Evaluations concerning targeted persons put forward by the intelligence platform will be made according to the intelligence agencies’ evaluation measures.

Chapter Seven: Additional Provisions

Article 40: These rules take are to be implemented in Yunyan, Qingzhen, Honghuagang, Suiyang, Jinsha, Weng’an, and Kaili from April 20, 2012. All public security organs in the province are encouraged to actively promote them.

Article 41: Incentive measures for targeted population management work are to be improved following a trial process.

Article 42: Public security organs and public safety offices at all levels in the trial areas may consult these rules to enact detailed implementation rules and measures for evaluation incentives.

Chinese Source(原文):
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第一章 总 则

第一条 为维护社会治安和国家安全,进一步加强重点人口管理工作,根据公安部《公安派出所正规化建设规范》、《重点人口管理工作规定》、《禁毒法》、《吸毒人员登记办法》、《贵州省禁毒条例》、《贵州省公安机关重点人员积分预警动态管控工作办法(试行)》、《贵州省刑释解教人员信息系统运行应用管理暂行规定》,结合我省公安信息化应用实际,制定本办法。

第二条 本办法旨在探索在警务信息化条件下将公安部的《重点人口管理工作规定》和“大情报”重点人员积分预警动态管控办法逐步融合,解决重点人口底数不清、情况不明、发现不了、控制不住问题。本办法所称重点人口是指有危害国家安全和社会治安嫌疑,由公安机关重点管理的人员。包括公安部规定的五类二十种重点人口和由情报平台推送的七类重点人员中除在逃人员外的六类重点人员。


第三条 公安派出所负责重点人口日常管理工作,治安部门负责业务指导工作,情报、禁毒、监管、法制、科信等相关部门协助做好重点人口管理工作。建立信息协作机制,实现警种、部门之间的信息共享,减轻派出所民警工作负担。

第四条 重点人口的列管与撤管,由公安派出所社区民警提出列管(撤管)意见,呈报公安派出所领导审批。

第五条 重点人口管理以现住地公安派出所管理为主。对现住地和户籍地不在同一公安派出所辖区的重点人口,实行双列管。对流出到外省的,以户籍地派出所管理为主。

第六条 重点人口管理工作目标是预防、发现、打击违法犯罪活动,教育、管理、挽救有违法犯罪行为的人员,维护社会治安。

第七条 重点人口管理工作坚持“信息管理、动态评估、分类管控”原则,依托派出所基础信息系统(以下简称派基系统)进行信息化管理。

第八条 重点人口管理以信息数据为支撑进行规范化管理,重点人口信息包括身份、背景、轨迹、现实表现和管控信息,全警采集的重点人口信息统一由派基系统提供给社区民警掌控,派基系统以外采集的重点人口身份、背景、轨迹信息统一由信息系统整合平台推送到派基系统中。市州、县(市、区)二级公安机关采集的各类社会资源由市州汇集后通过派基系统向派出所推送。派出所社区民警对重点人口的日常管理在派基系统中进行,社区民警要确保重点人口管控信息的真实、及时。

第九条 为确保重点人口管理工作中各警种的有效协作,派基系统与其它公安业务系统的衔接统一由信息系统整合平台贯通。派基系统根据重点人口管理业务的改变进行实时调整,业务功能调整由治安总队审核,系统功能由科信部门审核。

第二章 管理范围

第十条 下列人员列为重点人口管理:








第十一条 对现住地和户籍地不在同一派出所辖区的重点人口,现住地派出所和户籍地派出所要互通情况,及时列管。省内通过派基系统通报,省外通过信函、网络等方式通报。

第十二条 对已列管的重点人口,符合以下条件的,予以撤管:












第十三条 对已列管的重点人口,情况变化不再适用原列管类别的应予变更列管类别。

第三章 信息管理

第十四条 重点人口动态评估按照信息签收、信息核查、信息维护、管控登记四个步骤进行。

第十五条 利用各类资源比对寻找失控重点人口的工作由县级公安机关情报中心和治安大队进行。

第十六条 信息签收。签收时限是:




第十七条 信息核查。在信息维护时限内,通过信息核对、实地调查等方式,核查重点人口基本情况,掌握现实表现情况。

第十八条 信息维护。派出所社区民警将信息核查情况和现实表现情况维护到派基系统。

第十九条 积分评估。按本办法第四章对重点人口现实表现进行积分评估。

第二十条 管控登记。根据重点人员的分类情况在规定时间内在派基系统中进行管控登记。

第二十一条 信息反馈。派基系统要将重点人口管理工作情况反馈相关信息系统:将重点人员现实表现、积分结果、管控信息反馈给情报平台,将吸毒人员现实表现及尿检情况反馈给吸毒人员动态管控系统,将刑释解教人员的列管状态反馈给刑释解教系统。反馈时限是:





第二十二条 失控重点人口的查找。对于失控的重点人口,社区民警应当向情报中心申请临控,同时要通过计生、保险广电、水电、通信、煤气、学生信息等社会资源和可能流入地的暂住人口信息找到失控人员,通知居住地派出所列管。

第四章 动态评估

第二十三条 积分评估。根据现实表现对重点人口实行积分,分为系统积分和人工干预。系统积分作为参考,人工干预实现重点人口的最终积分。

第二十四条 系统积分是派基系统根据社区民警维护的现实表现信息和其他系统推送的重点人口轨迹信息,按照《重点人口现实表现积分规则》自动生成的现实表现积分。

第二十五条 人工干预是社区民警以系统积分为参考,对重点人口现实危害性综合评估确定的现实表现积分。社区民警认为系统积分与重点人口的现实危害相符的,以系统积分作为最终积分;社区民警认为系统积分与重点人口的现实危害不相符合的,可以直接确定重点人口的现实表现积分,但需注明理由。

第二十六条 积分对应橙、黄、蓝三种颜色表示。橙色为80分以上,对应高危类重点人口;黄色为50至79分,对应关注类重点人口;蓝色为49分以下,对应一般类重点人口。

第二十七条 对于积分有变化的重点人口,派出所社区民警可以变更重点人口管控类别。

第五章 分类管控

第二十八条 派出所针对不同颜色的重点人口信息,采取不同级别的管控措施和管控频率。

第二十九条 橙色信息,对应有重大现实危害嫌疑的重点人口,派出所社区民警要落实管控措施,安排治安耳目或治安积极分子严密控制。社区民警对高危类重点人口的管控频率至少每月一次。

第三十条 黄色信息,对应有较大现实危害嫌疑的重点人口,派出所社区民警要密切关注。社区民警对关注类重点人口的管控频率至少每季度一次。

第三十一条 蓝色信息,对应有轻微现实危害嫌疑的重点人口,派出所社区民警要落实帮教措施。社区民警对一般类重点人口的管控频率至少每半年一次。

第六章 工作考核

第三十二条 对重点人口管理工作要进行考核评比,并作为考核公安派出所及社区民警工作的重点指标之一。

第三十三条 重点人口管理工作考核由治安部门进行。社区民警的考核由派出所进行,派出所的考核由县(市、区)公安(分)局进行,县(市、区)公安(分)局的考核由市(州)公安局进行。

第三十四条 对重点人口管理工作考核的主要内容是重点人口管理工作在发现、预防、打击刑事犯罪活动中发挥的作用和效果,从签收率、维护率、列管率四个方面进行量化考核。考核得分=(签收率+维护率+列管率)/3*100。

第三十五条 签收率=按时签收数/系统提醒数。

第三十六条 维护率=信息维护数/系统提醒数。

第三十七条 列管率=已列管数/应列管数。

第三十八条 对重点人口列管率不到95%,重点人口失控率超过80%的派出所,取消派出所等级评定资格。

第三十九条 对情报平台推送的重点人员按照情报部门的考核办法进行考核。

第七章 附则

第四十条 本规范从2012年4月20日起在云岩、清镇、红花岗、绥阳、金沙、瓮安、凯里试行,并鼓励全省公安机关积极推行。

第四十一条 重点人口管理工作的奖惩办法待试行后完善。

第四十二条 试行地各级公安机关治安部门可以参照本规范制定实施细则、考核奖惩办法。